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Abstract 
 
This study analyzes the existence and political history of Kumpulan Militan Malaysia 
(Malaysia Militant Group-KMM); the most spectacular Muslim militant group to 
recently emerge from Malaysia. Using an interpretive framework derived from 
typology of radicalism, this study exposes the roots of the group and its 
transformation into a militant movement. Based on extensive fieldwork, numerous 
interviews and in-depth research of related documents, this study demonstrates that 
the existence of KMM cannot be dissociated from Afghanistan’s global Jihadist 
campaign.  
 
This study analyzes the activities of KMM in the context of radical Islam in the 
South East Asia region and its wider connection, particularly with the Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI). Findings from fieldwork research conducted with active and ex-
members of KMM and JI are presented to find the answer to the question pertaining 
the involvement of these two groups in terrorism activities in Southeast Asia.  
 
Southeast Asian contemporary social and political scenarios have been build-up from 
a long history of rebellious freedom fighters against colonial super-powers. In 
addition to nationalism, Islamization has also played a significant role in establishing 
freedom movements in the 1940s and 1950s. Systematic pressure under colonial 
powers and harsh policies implemented by ultra nationalists to these groups resulted 
in a series of rebellions and defiance such as what happened in Indonesia, Southern 
Thailand and the Southern Philippines. Historical facts led to radicalism in these 
countries, which are important for gaining a better knowledge about Muslim 
radicalism in Southeast Asia also presented in this thesis.  
 
The ‘typology of radicalism’ - the transformation from ‘nominal believers’ to 
activists, extremists, radicals and terrorists is explained in this research. 
Understanding Islam and their willingness to perform Jihad as was carried out in 
Afghanistan has had a significant impact on today’s militants.  Finally, this research 
suggests the best methods for overcoming radicalism and diffusing KMM and JI’s 
threat in Southeast Asia. 
 
 iii 
Note: 
 
In appendices 1, 2 and 3 and throughout the thesis the names of individuals are not 
mentioned. The names of such individuals have been excluded because of security 
and ‘in confidence’ considerations. The policy has been followed after discussion 
between the supervisors and writer of the thesis. The primary supervisor is aware of 
the identity of these individuals.   
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Chapter I-  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
…The war on terror is different than any war America has ever fought. Our enemies 
seek to inflict mass casualties without fielding mass armies. They hide in the shadows, 
and they're often hard to strike. The terrorists are cunning and ruthless and 
dangerous, as the world saw on September 11, 2001….Yet these killers are now 
facing the United States of America and a great coalition of responsible nations, and 
this threat to civilization will be defeated
1
. 
            
 
1.1  Background: 
Terrorism is a major issue in the 21
st
 century. The tragedy of September 11 (9/11), 
2001 changed the world‟s view on terrorist threats. The disaster also had far-reaching 
implications for future security. The attacks on the New York World Trade Center 
(NYWTC) that day caused suffering Americans had not previously experienced. 
September 11 re-created the term “terrorist”, which is widely used today.2 People 
remain fearful they might become the victim of a terrorist. Many Muslims living in 
the West have experienced an increase in aggressive Islamophobia
3
 in the wake of the 
9/11 attacks, and many have suffered humiliation or worse, as the result of orders for 
heightened security.
4
 Muslims around the world have cringed at the way in which 
Islam and Muslims are so often depicted by Western media. It is understandable that 
many Muslims question the appropriateness of expressions such as “Islamic 
Terrorism” and “Islamic Radicalism”. Nevertheless, the fact that many terrorists and 
militant extremists such as Abu Dujana, Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir, Osama bin Laden, 
Ayman Zawahiri and many more see themselves as acting in the interests of Islam 
cannot be denied. There needs to be a way to talk about these issues rationally and 
without emotional bias, to reach a solution. 
 
                                                 
1
 Rumsfeld, D. (2004). "Remarks at the Signing of the Defense Authorization Act, Nov. 24, 2003."   
Retrieved 14 June, 2007, from  http://www.defendamerica.mil/iraq/nov2003/defenseviews112503.htm 
2
 Terrorism hass a long and interesting history. See Chaliand, G., & Blin, A. (2007). The History of 
Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda. Berkeley: University of California, Ltd. 
3
 World Islamophobia has been included in the Oxford Dictionary in 1997 and it was first used in 
periodical publication in United State in 1991. See Sheridan, L. P. (2006). Islamophobia Pre– and 
Post–September 11th, 2001. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 21(3), 317.   
4
 Ihsanoglu, E. (Producer). (2005, 15 March 2005) Speech before sixty-first session of the United 
Nations commission on human rights. Podcast retrieved from http://www.oic-
oci.org/press/english/2005/March%202005/SG-Geneva.htm.  
 2 
 
Countries in Southeast Asia have indirectly become the strategic base for al-Qaeda. 
Organizations such as the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) and the Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) are linked to al-Qaeda and terrorism.
5
 It is therefore important to 
understand the role of these two groups and their connection to regional violence such 
as the Bali bombing in 2002.  
 
The 9/11 tragedy changed the political and social climate of the Muslim world 
including Malaysia. Since then, Malaysia has faced activists who fight with hidden 
agendas. Between the 1960s and 2001, Malaysia has recorded 13 activism cum 
militant
6
 groups including, Tentera Sabiullah (1967), Golongan Rohaniah (1971), 
Koperasi Angkatan Revolusi Islam Malaysia (1972), Kumpulan Mohd Nasir Ismail 
(1980), Kumpulan Revolusi Islam Ibrahim Mahmud aka Ibrahim Libya (1985), 
Kumpulan Jundullah (1987), Kumpulan Mujahidin Kedah (1988), Kumpulan 
Perjuangan Islam Perak (1998), al-Maunah (2000), Kumpulan Militan Malaysia 
(2001), Darul Islam Sabah (2003) and Jemaah Islamiyah (2001).
7
                                                                                                                                              
 
From research, it is clear KMM has had a direct link with violence, especially in 
Malaysia. This problem worsened when KMM and JI built a relationship with the 
man most wanted by the CIA: Hambali aka Riduan Isamuddin. KMM and JI were 
involved in the bombings and attacks in Indonesia and Malaysia.
8
  As the war on 
terrorism continues, the spotlight has increasingly fallen on the governments of 
Southeast Asia and their hunt for Islamic militants within their own territorial 
boundaries. Malaysia has stood out for specific scrutiny in this regard.
9
  
 
The writer‟s personal research has tried to clarify the involvement of KMM and its 
wider connection to organizations such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 
                                                 
5
 Abuza, Z. (2003). Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, p. 
48-76.   
6
 News Straits Times (2003). Takeover Attempts by 12 Groups. Retrieved 26 September 2003: 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-
878354_ITM?email=nzsm2009akagmail.com&library=  
7
 Noor, E. (2007). Al-Maunah and KMM in Malaysia in A Handbook of Terrorism in Insurgency in 
Southeast Asia. London, Edward Elgar, p. 186. 
8
 Singh, B. (2003). Asean Australia and the Management of the Jemaah Islamiyah Threat. Canberra, 
Strategic and Defense Studies Centre ANU, p. 40-41.    
9
 Liow, J. C. (2004). "The Mahathir's Administration War against Islamic Militancy: Operational and 
ideological Challenges." Australian Journal of International Affairs 58(2), 242. 
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the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and al-Qaeda. It also sought to 
find the link between them and Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI) - the most dangerous group in 
Southeast Asia. In addition, the writer looked at the connection between KMM and JI 
with violent activities in Southeast Asia. These movements, why they became violent 
and their struggle are researched in this study along with the KMM‟s involvement in 
violent activities and terrorism.  
 
The writer also elaborates on the role of KMM members in criminal and violent 
activities as the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) identified KMM as a gun smuggling 
syndicate  involved in bank robberies, attacks on the Sungai Petani and Petaling Jaya 
Church, attacks on Hindu temples and several small bombings including the Guinness 
Company at Sungei Way, Malaysia.
10
 These kinds of attacks are considered violence, 
as described by Won Jeong (2000) in his book.
11
  
 
The most typically understood meaning of violence, is referred to as physical injuries 
and the infliction of pain caused by a person. Thus killing and beating, whether they 
happen in war or interpersonal situations, represent violence.
12
 
 
Their actions were serious enough to gain them the label of an extremist group.
13
 
Furthermore, the writer will suggest ways of reducing or diverting the militant 
ideologies in Malaysia, as well as the Southeast Asia region. 
 
 
1.2 What is Terrorism? 
One of the earliest reliably documented instances of terrorism, occurred in the first 
century. The Zealot-Sicarri, Jewish terrorists dedicated to inciting a revolt against 
Roman rule in Judea, murdered their victims with daggers in broad daylight in the 
heart of Jerusalem.
14
 Eventually they created such anxiety among the population that 
they generated a mass rebellion.
15
 Other early terrorists include the Muslim Assassins 
                                                 
10
 Shinyang, A. (2003). Ratnakumar: Bongkar KMM. Utusan Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur.  
11
 Op. Cit., Ho Wan Jeong, (2002), p. 19-21. 
12
 Ibid., 19. 
13
 Coordinator for Counter Terrorism. (2007). Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview.   
Retrieved 31 July, 2008, from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82731.htm  
14
 Koski, D. J. (2002). Counterterrorism Policy-Do we have it Right? Pennsylvania: U.S.Army War 
College. p. 1.  
15
 Laqueur, W. (1977). Terrorism. London, Weidenfield and Nicholson,  p. 7-8. 
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and Hindu Thugs. Modern terrorism however, is generally considered to have 
originated from the French Revolution.
16
  
  
The term „terror‟ was created in 1795 and was originally popularized during the 
French Revolution. It has been taken from the „regime de la terreur‟ system, 
prioritized by the French Revolution movement in France.  Bruce Hoffman (2006) in 
his book „Inside Terrorism‟ stated:     
 
The system or „regime de la terreur‟ of 1793-1794 was adopted as a means to 
establish order during the transient anarchical period of turmoil and upheaval that 
followed the uprisings of 1789, and indeed many other revolutions.  Hence, unlike 
terrorism as it is commonly understood today to mean a revolutionary or anti 
government activity undertaken by nonstate or sub-national entities. The regime de la 
terruer was an instrument of governance wielded by the recently established 
revolutionary state.
17
 
 
 
The definition is difficult to label exactly because it has different meanings in 
different contexts. Not surprisingly, the meaning and usage of the word has changed 
over time to accommodate the political vernacular and discourse of each successive 
era. Terrorism has proved to be increasingly elusive in the face of attempts to 
construct one consistent definition. Sometimes people have confused freedom fighters 
with terrorists. “The early practitioners didn‟t mince their world or hide behind the 
semantic camouflage or more anodyne labels such as „freedom fighters‟ or „urban 
guerrilla”.18 
 
Some might argue the most difficult aspect of dealing with terrorism is defining it. 
Terrorism is notoriously difficult to define; in part because it is associated with an 
activity designed to be subjective.
19
  The word terrorism has been used to describe a 
variety of acts from domestic altercations to gang violence to workplace homicide. 
Some of the explanations and definitions relating to terrorism are particularly 
important to people who want to know the most solid meaning of terrorism. Terrorism 
                                                 
16
 Rapoport, D. C. (1999). "The Fourth Wave: 9/11 in the History of Terrorism." Current History, 
(December 2001), p. 419-424. 
17
 Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. New York, Columbia University Press, p. 3-4. 
18
 Ibid. p. 20-21. 
19
 Cronin, A. K. (2004b). Behind The Curve: Globalization and International, Terrorism. London, 
Ashgate, p. 32. 
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is a method of action by which an agent tends to produce terror to impose his or her 
domination onto the state in order to change it.
20
  
 
Terrorism involves the intentional use of violence against a target in order to 
communicate a threat of future aggression.
21
  
 
Sociologically, terror is a person or thing or practice that causes intense fear of 
suffering, the aim of which is to intimidate, subjugate, especially as a political 
weapon or policy. Politically, its main function is to intimidate and disorganize the 
government through fear and through the political change that can be achieved.
22
 
 
Two facets incorporated in the definition of terrorism are a state of fear or anxiety 
within an individual or group and the tool that induces the state of fear.
23
  
 
Terrorism is an organized system of extreme and violent intimidation to create 
instability within democracies. International terrorists seek to launch indiscriminate 
and unpredictable attacks on groups (police, army, multinationals or nations) to 
change the politico-economic balance of world.
24
 
 
Terrorism is thus the use of violence, especially murder or bombing in order to 
achieve political aims.
25
  The FBI defines terrorism as:  
 
The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance 
of political or social objectives.
26
  
 
The US Department of Defence defines terrorism as: 
 
The unlawful use of or threatened use of force or violence against individuals, the 
unlawful use of or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property 
                                                 
20
 Chrisholm, A. J. (1948). The Function of Terror and Violence in Revolution. Washington, 
Georgetown University. Thesis MA.  
21
 Paust, J. J. (1977). A Definitional Focus in Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. New York, 
John Jay Press and Mc Graw Hill book Co, p. 18-29. 
22
 Roucek, J. S. (1980). "Terrorism in its Sociological Aspects." Sociologia Internationalis, p. 97-110. 
23
 Singh, B. (1977). An Overview in Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. New York, John Jay 
Press and Maidenhead: Mc Graw Hill Book Co, p. 5-17.  
24
 Thackrah, J. R. (1987). A Definition Problem. New York, Brassey's Defence Publisher, p 181-204.  
25
 Collins Cobuild Advanced Leaner's English dictionary. (2006). Glasgow, Harper Collins, p. 1495.  
26
 The Israel Project. (2007). "Middle East Glossary."   Retrieved 09 August, 2007, from 
http://www.theisraelproject.org/site/apps/nl/content2.asp?c=hsJPK0PIJpH&b=886017&ct=1181611 
and Federal Bureau of Investigation (2001). Terrorism. Retrieved 14 July 2009, from Federal Bureau of 
Investigation: http://denver.fbi.gov/nfip.htm  
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to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, 
or ideological objectives.
27
  
 
The US Code, title 22 also defines terrorism as: 
 
Politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets, by sub 
national groups or clandestine agents, is usually intended to influence an audience.
28
 
 
Furthermore, terrorism activities are discussed in U.S Code (title 22) as involving:  
 
(A) acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the US or 
of any state, (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population, (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
kidnapping, and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the US.
29
 
 
Meanwhile, the United Nations uses a definition from Alex P. Schmid.
30
  
 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by 
semi-clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or 
political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are 
generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or 
symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- 
and violence-based communication processes between terrorist organization, 
imperilled victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target 
(audience), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of 
attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily 
sought .
31
 
 
There is no definite and comprehensive description of terrorism in global criminal law 
due to inter-alia, the enormous variety of the objectives, conditions, motives, forms, 
authors, and many further aspects connected to terrorist movements. Terrorism is so 
diverse and complicated it is difficult to make generalizations. However, even though 
                                                 
27
 Public Broadcasting Service. (2002). In Search of Al-Qaeda. Retrieved 31 July, 2008, from 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/alqaeda/glossary.html  
28
 Ruby, C. L. (2004). Dimension of Terrorism. London, Ashgate, p. 16. And US Department of State 
(2008). US Code. Retrieved 14 July 2009, from US Department of State: 
http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/18C113B.txt  
29
 Senate of US. (2001). "Patriot Act."   Retrieved 08 August, 2007, from 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/hr3162.pdf  
30
 One of the most comprehensive and frequently cited, academic definitions of terrorism offered by 
Schmid, who elicited the aid of more than fifty scholars in developing refining his definition.  Schmid 
definition is the product of the synthesis of 109 definitions. 
31
 Schmid. (1992). "Definition of Terrorism." Retrieved 08 August, 2007, from 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html  
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difficulties exist in compiling the various features of terrorism into a sole definition, it 
is broadly agreed that: 
Terrorism is the use or threat of violence, a method of combat or a strategy to achieve 
certain goals, aim to induce a state of fear in the victim, it is ruthless and does not 
conform to humanitarian norms, and publicity is an essential factor in terrorists‟ 
strategy.
32
 
 
 
1.3 Lessons Learned 
From all of these definitions, six observations can be made.
33
 It is difficult to find an 
overall conclusion which includes all of the possible acts and movements. Therefore, 
at a minimum, terrorism has the following characteristics. It is: “fundamentally 
political [in] nature, [it is] the surprise use of violence against seemingly random 
targets and the targeting of the innocent by a meticulous group of people”.34  The 
main objectives are:  
 
First, it is politically inspired. Terrorism is directed towards political goals; in other 
words, a terrorist‟s action is intended to influence or change government policy. 
Political goals transform into actions and later violent acts in order to achieve them. 
Clearly, the goal of the New York World Trade centre (NYWTC) attack was to 
change the United States government policy in the Middle East. “Most definitions 
include deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purposes”.35 
 
Second, terrorism is the act of groups and states or so called „non-combatants‟. A 
non-combatant is a person who is not a member of the military service or actively 
involved in military hostilities.
36
 Many questions arise when discussing state 
terrorism. America views Korea, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria and Afghanistan as state 
sponsored terrorism or so called “axis of evil”.37 After 9/11, al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, 
                                                 
32
 Laqueur, W. (1986). Reflections of Terrorism New York, Council of Foreign Relation, 86-100. 
33
 Richardson, L. (2006). What Terrorists Want. London, John Murray Publisher, p. 20. 
34
 Frey, R. G. M., W. Christopher (1991). Violence, Terrorism and Justice. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 3. 
35
 Op. Cit., Richardson, L. (2006). p. 20.    
36
 Badey, T. J. (1998). Defining International Terrorism; a Pragmatic Approach. Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 10(1), p. 90-107. 
37
 Bolton, J. R. (2002). Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Washington: Heritage Foundation. 
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Hamas, JI and many more emerged as terrorist organizations. Japanese Red Army 
(JRA) and Irish Republican Army (IRA) were among such groups in an earlier time.
38
 
 
Third, the point of terrorism is for the psychological impact to be greater than the 
actual physical act. For example, targeting the New York World Trade Centre 
(NYWTC) in 9/11 and double-decker buses in the July 7 London bombing, 
Richardson (2006) wrote “Terrorists are invariably both outmanned and outgunned by 
their opponents, so they employ these tactics in an effort to gain more attention than 
any objective assessment of their capabilities would warrant”.39  
 
Fourth, violence is a vital factor of all terrorist attacks. If there is no violence in each 
attack, it may not be considered „terrorism‟. 40  Bombing, explosions, killing, and 
destruction are the basic acts carried out by terrorists. Negotiation and talking are not 
part of terrorism. Some groups might follow with violence after negotiation has failed. 
Groups such as Hamas carried out violent attacks against Fatah after a series of 
unsuccessful discussions with the government. MILF decided to carry out arms 
fighting with the Philippine government after the Tripoli Treaty was not fully 
restored.
41
       
 
Fifth, victims are one of the main focuses of terrorism. Terrorist attacks aim to 
destroy their victims, who are usually people. If they focus on destroying a non-living 
object, such as a building or monument, terrorists are not concerned with fatalities 
caused by the attacks. For example, in the 9/11 attacks targeting NYWTC, more than 
4000 people died. “Victims are either chosen at random or as representatives of a 
larger group”.42 Most victims targeted by Muslim terrorists are „white‟ (Europeans) 
and „kafir‟ (non-Muslim).43 In the Bali bombing, the 202 people who were killed 
                                                 
38
 Hoffman, B. (1997). Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypothesis. The Non-proliferation 
Review, 4(3), p. 45-53. 
39
 Op. Cit., Richardson, L. (2006). p. 21.  
40
 Ibid., 20.  
41
 Veitch, J., Boyer, C., & Aslam, M. M. (2006). Bangsamoro: A Never Ending Story in the Southern 
Philippines. Wellington: Intelligence and Security Studies Research Unit, School of Government. p. 14.  
42
 Op. Cit., Richardson, L. (2006), p. 22. 
43
 Imron, A. (2007). Interview with Ali on 01 November 2007 at Polda, Jakartaraya. Jakarta. 
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came from 22 countries and most of them were „Westerners‟, with Australians 
making up the largest group (88 percent).
44
   
 
Sixth, the key-point defining the criteria of terrorism is the deliberate targeting of 
civilians. Any act of violence seen as directed towards the society, whether it involves 
the activities of anti-government dissidents or the government themselves, organized 
crime syndicates, common criminals, riots, mobs, people engaged in militant protest, 
individual psychotics or lone extortionists, is often labelled as terrorism. Terrorism 
manifests itself through distinctive deployment of a variety of criminal acts calculated 
to harm human life, property and other interests.
45
  
 
This is what sets terrorism apart from other forms of political violence, even in its 
closest form: guerrilla warfare. Terrorists have elevated practices normally seen as 
the excesses of warfare to routine practice, striking at non-combatants not as an 
unintended side effect but as a deliberate strategy.
46
  
 
From these characteristics, it is clear KMM and all of the militant groups that took 
part in activities were considered violent and criminal. These groups have created fear 
and created threats in Indonesia, Malaysia and Southeast Asia. They have a wider 
network in the region and trained members to use weapons. The bombings on 
churches and Hindu temples, the Hong Leong Bank robbery at Petaling Jaya and the 
attempted robbery of a bank in Jalan Gasing are among the „violence acts‟ carried out 
by KMM in Malaysia.
47
  
 
All of those attacks were clearly intended to create social dislocation and chaos, 
especially for this multi-ethnic country, including the bombing of Sri Ganesha Hindu 
temple in Kuala Lumpur and arson attacks on Marthoma Christian Church in Sungai 
Petani.
48
 Another motive for such attacks was to discredit or destroy the government, 
as what was done by al-Maunah. This is why all 29 al-Maunah members were 
charged under section 121 of the Malaysian Penal Code for „waging war against the 
                                                 
44
 British Broadcasting Corporation. (2004). "Bali Bombing Victims Remembered." Retrieved 07 
August, 2007, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3735506.stm  
45
 Thackrah, J. R. (2004). Dictionary of Terrorism. London, Routledge, p. 66.  
46
 Op. Cit., Richardson, L. (2006), p. 22. 
47
 Op. Cit., Noor, E. (2007), p. 167. 
48
 Aslam, M. M. (2006a). Why Muslims Becomes Activists: A Malaysian Experience, Intelligence and 
Security Studies Research Unit, school of Government Victoria University of Wellington, 12.    
 10 
 
King‟ 49  by trying to overthrow the government in power. 50  Christopher Harmon 
(2004) wrote that “A strategy of most terror groups is related but less wide it is to 
discredit, diminish or destroy a particular government, ruining its legitimacy and 
authority so as to replace it with a revolutionary government”.51  
 
It is clear in the Southeast Asian region, the KMM was based in Malaysia and most of 
its members were students who came from the Middle East. Among the countries said 
to have trained and educated the group members are Pakistan and Afghanistan.
52
 One 
of the KMM‟s wider networks included JI (based in Indonesia and headed by Abu 
Bakar Ba‟asyir).53 Both groups were said to be extremist and took part in subversive 
as well as fundamentalist activities.
54
 Their actions were dangerous and destroyed 
lives and property, such as the Bali bombings in Indonesia, and their plans to defeat 
the Malaysian government. 
 
 
1.4 The Study of Terrorism 
The literature on the study of terrorism is considerable. But because terrorism is 
basically a method for applying a political agenda, it has been difficult for scholars to 
develop a methodology for studying or interpreting the phenomenon. The use of fear 
of violence or the actual use of violence on either innocent civilians or 
military/paramilitary groups to achieve political goals differs from geographical 
situation to geographical situation. The one common factor in the terrorism of recent 
times is the use of religion to authorize, justify and empower those involved. It is the 
connection with religion, in this case Islam, which is almost impossible to interpret 
through the use of a particular theoretical framework. Terrorism without religion has 
been interpreted in terms of political, social and psychological theories. But when 
religion is added to the equation the search for a theory to explain the connection 
remains elusive. For this reason, this study will describe and analyze Kumpulan 
                                                 
49
 Op. Cit., Noor, E. (2007), p. 180. 
50
 Alternatives charges for 14 of the accused were later offered under section 122 of the Penal Code for 
collecting arm, etc with the intentions of waging war against the King which carries a lesser sentence. 
From Op. Cit., Noor, E. (2007), p. 180. 
51
 Harmon, C. C. (2004). Five Strategies of Terrorism. London, Ashgate, p. 282. 
52
 Op. Cit., Abas, N. (2005).  
53
 Liow, J. C. (2007). Interview 26 November 2007 at International Centre for Political Violence and 
Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Nanyang Technology University. Singapore. 
54
 Op. Cit., Liow, J. C. (2007). 
 11 
 
Militant Malaysia in its Malaysian and Southeast Asian context, but will not adopt a 
theory to explain this phenomenon.    
 
However, the thesis will contribute to the literature on such religiously driven 
movements and may well assist with the development of such a theory as more is 
known about Islam and terrorism from the Muslim perspective. Almost all of the 
literature on Islamic terrorism is written from the Western perspective, either by 
Western scholars or by Muslims working in the Western world
55
. What is needed, are 
studies from the “other side” as it were, but so far such studies are far from 
numerous
56
.   
 
1.5 Malaysia and the Counter-Terrorism Legislation  
Malaysia has no specific anti-terrorism law, but relies instead on a variety of laws for 
militancy and terrorism such as the Malaysian Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure 
Code and the Anti Money Laundering Act 2001.
57
 However the crucial „anti-
terrorism‟ related legislation implemented in Malaysia is the Internal Security Act 
(ISA). The ISA
58
 was endorsed in 1960 during the country‟s resistance against 
communist mutineers. The ISA in Malaysia is a historical carry-over of Orwellian 
legislation under the British colonial rule.
59
 Despite United Nation (UN) requirement 
                                                 
55
 Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. And Hoffman, B. 
(1995). "Holy terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative". Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, 18(4), Winter 1995. The problem with Hoffman in this study is that he writes 
from a Western point of view which is understandable but limited in its usefullness.  
56
 The perspectives I have adopted in this thesis arise out of recent research undertaken by my 
supervisor in another context.   
57
 Noor, E. (2007). Interview on 19 November 2007 at the Institute of Strategic and International 
Studies, Kuala Lumpur and confirmed through email on the 17 July 2009. And Siang, L. K.  (Producer). 
(2003, 27 July 2009) Call on Abdullah to give government support to Teresa Kok‟s motion on Monday 
to refer the slew of three anti-terrorism bills to Parliamentary Select Committee to benefit from world-
wide backlash and review that terrorism laws enacted after September 11 terrorist attacks had been 
too indiscriminately wide as to be counter-productive by undermining human rights and the rule of law. 
Podcast retrieved from http://www.dapmalaysia.org/all-archive/English/2003/nov03/lks/lks2731.htm.  
58
 “ISA is The Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) is a preventive detention law in force in Malaysia. Any 
person may be detained by the police for up to 60 days without trial for an act which allegedly 
threatens the security of the country or any part thereof. After 60 days, one may be further detained for 
a period of two years each, to be approved by the Minister of Home Affairs, thus permitting indefinite 
detention without trial” Barraclough, S. (1985). The Dynamic of Coercion in the Malaysian Political 
Process. Modern Asian Studies, 19(4), 807.  
59
 Human Rights Watch (2004). Background: The ISA in Law and Practice. Retrieved 15 July 2009, 
from Human Right Watch, Podcast retrieved from 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/malaysia0504/2.htm  
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for legislation countering terrorism in 1960s, implementing the ISA was a 
controversial decision at the time.  
 
The ISA introduced a preventive detention law into Malaysia. Under Section 73 (1) of 
the ISA, police may detain any person for up to 60 days, without warrant or trial and 
without access to legal counsel, on suspicion that: "He has acted or is about to act or 
is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part 
thereof or to maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life 
thereof".
60
 In other words, with no meaningful judicial review, anybody can be 
detained for as long as it perceives fit, if officials believe they are a threat to national 
security.  
 
Meanwhile, under section 8 of this law, the Minister of Home Affairs can then extend 
the period of detention without trial for up to two years after 60 days.
61
 This can be 
done without submitting any indication for review by the courts, by issuing a 
detention order, which is renewable indefinitely.
62
 The ISA was revised to exclude 
any legal review on the grounds of confinement made under section 8 (which allows 
for a detention period of two years) in June 1989.
63
  
 
Instead of detention, the ISA allows for limitations on assembly, organization, 
expression, freedom of movement and many more. The ISA also allows for the 
closing of institutions such as schools or communes if they are used as a gathering 
point for an illegal organization or for any other reason deemed unfavourable to the 
security of Malaysia.
64
 Since the ISA was implemented in Malaysia in 1960, 
thousands of people, including communists, religious leaders, social activists, 
                                                 
60
 Malaysia Government (1960). Internal Security Act. ISA  Retrieved 15 July 2009, Section 73(1)(b), 
Podcast retrieved from http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/resource_centre.html  and Ramraj, V. V., Hor, 
M., & Roach, K. (2005). Global Anti Terrorism Law and Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. p. 408. See also copy of Internal Security Act 1960 (Act 82) at appendix 44, p. 293.  
61
 Asian Network for Free Election (ANFREL) (Producer). (20 July 2009) Malaysia's Internal Security 
Act. Podcast retrieved from <http://www.anfrel.org/mission_data/ISA%20-%20Malaysia.pdf>.  
62
 Ibid. 
63
 Op. Cit., Malaysia Government (1960).  
64
 Moderator (Producer). (15 July 2009). Malaysia's Internal Security Act and Suppression of Political 
Dissent. Podcast retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/malaysia-bck-0513.htm.  
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environmentalists, political opposition leaders and academicians were detained under 
this law.
65
  
 
Among the alleged accusations of those arrested are document falsification, militant 
groups (JI, KMM, al-Maunah, al-Arqam, Darul Islam Sabah, and many more), 
Shiah
66
 activists, Hindraf (Hindu Rights Action Force), „Reformasi‟ (Anwar 
Ibrahim‟s led movement following his arrest in 1998), firearms, currency 
counterfeiting, human trafficking, activist from Free Acheh Movement and Southern 
Thailand separatist, and many more.
67
  The ISA has also been used by the Malaysian 
government to arrest the former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim 
in September 1998.
68
  
 
In the awake of the „war on terrorism‟ and radicalism in Malaysia, at least 112 
individuals were detained between 2000 and 2004.
69
  This includes 19 KMM, 79 JI 
and 14 Darul Islam Sabah (DIS). They have been detained between two to eight years. 
Until May 2009, Abdullah Daud, Samsudin Sulaiman and Mat Shah Satray were 
recorded as the longest-serving detainees for JI related activities. In Aril 2009, three 
individuals were detained under the ISA, Mas Salamat Kastari-the most wanted JI 
fugitive who escaped from Whitley high security detention camp in Singapore in 
February 2008,
70
 Indonesian, Abdul Matin and Malaysian, Johar Hassan.
71
   
 
 
1.6  An Overview of the Thesis 
This study focuses on KMM. The choice was based on the fact that KMM emerged 
un-mistakenly as a militant Islamic group, by supporting the JI. Because of its early 
                                                 
65
 Moderator (Producer). (2009, 24 July 2009) List of Known Detainees as at 13 May 2009. Podcast 
retrieved from http://www.aliran.com/oldsite/monthly/2001/3e.htm.  
66
 Malaysian government only recognized Sunnah (Islamic practice based from Prophet Muhammad‟s 
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67
 Ibid.  
68
 Op. Cit., Moderator (Producer). (15 July 2009). 
69
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anonymous to protect privacy and to comply with the Victoria‟s „Human Ethics Committee‟ (HEC) 
requirement.          
70
  Lopez, L. (2009). Mas Salamat Captured. The Straits Times Singapore, from 
http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Singapore/Story/STIStory_373899.html  
71
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attacks on places of religious worship and other criminal acts such as bank robberies 
and attempted attacks on the United States (US) Navy, it has become the most 
prominent face of Islamic militancy in pre and post 9/11 in Malaysia. The key to 
understanding the intricate and intersecting relationships between its variables lies in 
the dynamics of the competition for the interpretation of the „true Islamic‟ practice 
and secular things. An understanding of this process provides the foundation for an 
analysis of the factors that might have contributed to the activism and radicalism of 
the community ending in militancy and violence.    
 
This research consists of seven chapters. Chapter one is an introduction explaining the 
origins of KMM, research questions, scope of research, methodology, objectives and 
a thesis statement. An overview of KMM and JI was provided to show their 
similarities and differences as well as the connections. This overview also provides a 
guide for considering this phenomenon within the larger framework of radical Islam. 
Some theoretical considerations were included to demonstrate the direction of 
assessment and analysis.  
 
Chapter two discusses how terrorists and their networks came to exist in this region. 
The discussion started with the origins of radicalism in Islam and its relationship with 
the Salafi Movement in Southeast Asia.
72
 Attention was devoted to the expansion of 
radical ideology, a factor that fuelled it and the dynamics of salafi movements. 
Islamic teaching and doctrines in the Islamic movement and its connection to the 
radicalism ideologies from the Middle East that spread throughout the world in 1940s 
until the 1980s were discussed to discover underlying doctrines of KMM. This 
research also elaborates on how the radical movement started by Azzam, al-Banna 
and Maududi provided the foundation that attracted a young generation to support 
calls for Jihad in Southeast Asian countries.
73
 It is important to understand this origin 
in order to get a clear picture on why the ideology is so crucial to a social movement 
and security in Malaysia and the region. Sociological factors were useful in 
                                                 
72
 Wiktorowicz, Q. (2006). Anatomy of the Salafi Movement. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29(3), p. 
207-239. 
73
 Musa, H. (2001). Merekonstruksi Tamadun Melayu Islam: Kearah Pembinaan Tamadun Melayu 
Alaf Ketiga. Kuala Lumpur: Akademi Pengajian Melayu, 10-11.  
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identifying social problems that have contributed to the formation of a radical Islamist 
group.  
 
Chapter three discusses radical Islam in Malaysia and chapter four discusses the role 
of KMM, which is the main subject of this research. Although KMM is not as well 
known as JI in this region, the impact of its existence on this group is particularly 
significant, especially in a Malaysian context. In addition, it looks at how KMM and 
radical Islamist groups emerged and developed. The writer also tried to deal with the 
question of why such a group was formed and maintained. For this purpose, this study 
attempts to understand the extent to which ideological factors have played a major 
role in directing the activism and formation of KMM. Furthermore, the role of 
Indonesian clerics in KMM, especially in the “Puchong section”, are examined.   
 
Focusing on KMM, this chapter also looks at the origins and anatomy of radical 
Islamist groups in Malaysia. In understanding the dynamics of this group, it is 
important to look beyond the immediacy of events to the historical context of its 
creation. This historical assessment provides a perspective on how radical Islam has 
developed and how strategies and activities were planned. To understand this 
phenomenon, we need to examine more than just the dynamics of domestic politics 
which have so far dominated the scholarly debates of political Islam in Malaysia.  
 
This phenomenon has similarly been determined by global gatherings. As 
demonstrated in this chapter, national politics are interwoven with global politics and 
KMM has been influenced by the Middle Eastern stream. Besides the determination 
of the KMM from every angle, this chapter also explores its interests, motivations and 
characteristics, as shared by the members of the movement. This chapter also explains 
how the KMM identity was developed, communicated and integrated in a specific 
socio-cultural context. This research also analyses the series of violence that took 
place in Malaysia. Finally, this chapter addresses the demise of KMM which no 
longer poses a threat to the country.  
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Chapter five discusses the connections between JI and KMM. JI and KMM trained 
their members to start trouble within the country as well as in Southern Thailand,
74
 
which was linked to KMM‟s spiritual leader, Hambali aka Riduan Isamuddin aka 
Encep Nurjaman. Also discussed in this chapter is radicalism in Indonesia, 
particularly the involvement of JI and the role of Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir and Abdullah 
Sungkar. Ba‟asyir and Hambali were significant in the strong ties between JI and 
KMM, also known as a „connector‟. Therefore, this chapter reveals the backgrounds 
of these radical Islamic leaders by considering their personal experience and social 
networks. Their participation in Jihad in Afghanistan and Southern Philippines and 
desire for religious knowledge in India and Pakistan are explored.   
 
This chapter deals with the crucial role played by Malaysia as a hub for terrorism for 
the JI from 1986 to 2002. The strategic location of Malaysia was used by Hambali, 
Ba‟asyir and Sungkar to enable JI in becoming the most important radical 
organization in this region. JI was connected to conflict in the Southern Philippines 
and the escalation of the Moluccan conflict. Therefore, an analysis of the involvement 
of JI is also discussed. No less significant is the future of JI and KMM in today‟s 
situation, which is also examined in this chapter.      
 
Chapter six looks at the de-radicalization of countries and organizations in the region. 
An in-depth explanation and understanding of terrorism and radicalism is important in 
order to learn about terrorists and their activities, and to be able to overcome them. 
Several ideas on creating a balanced and a peaceful world are also discussed. 
Explaining the strategic approach carried out by the Malaysian government, such as 
detention under the Internal Security Act (ISA), Restriction Order (RO) and regular 
basis „rehabilitation programmes‟ are also discussed. Furthermore, this chapter also 
looks at the ways ASEAN countries react to terrorism and radicalism. Several 
questions have been asked about the effectiveness of ASEAN countries to prevent 
threats from militants. 
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Chapter seven summarises the study‟s conclusions. The evidence considered and 
analysis outlined in this thesis will therefore contribute to further understanding of the 
research questions stated in the introductory chapter. This chapter concludes with a 
section on Muslim attitude to Islam and a section responding to the question of why 
radical Islam rose in Malaysia in the past covered by this thesis.     
 
 
1.7 Research Methods and Objectives  
This research is descriptive in nature and combines theoretical and empirical 
investigations. Sources for these investigations were collected through literature 
review
75
 and fieldwork. The bibliographical work was carried out through research 
held at a number of libraries and institutes which included books, articles, academic 
theses and research reports containing early findings. The writer focused this work 
using the library research approach, and primarily used the Victoria University of 
Wellington (VUW) library. Several materials relating to terrorism, violent activities, 
globalization, imperialism, the Islamic countries and the al-Qaeda movement from 
here were used. Other than this, the National Library of New Zealand in Wellington 
and other libraries including Wellington City Library (WCL) were used for research 
due to the variety of materials, manuscripts, researches, journals and articles 
available. The bibliographical study was completed by exploring relevant documents 
and media publications, particularly newspapers, books, magazines and the internet.  
 
The University of Malaya (UM) Kuala Lumpur and the National University Malaysia 
(UKM) library were also used as sources of information on the KMM and its wider 
connection to the Southeast Asian region. The Malaysian National Archive had 
information concerning violence and terrorism involving the KMM and JI, especially 
in the form of newspaper articles. The writer also attended local and international 
seminars on the subject as a means of gaining knowledge and exchanging ideas with 
the other scholars. 
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The major sources of information are from intensive fieldwork that took place over a 
period of three months. Several interviews were conducted to collect primary and 
secondary data, especially from specialists in the area of Southeast Asian conflict and 
terrorism such as Associate Prof. Agus Yusoff and Kamarulnizam Abdullah from the 
Politic Department, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (Malaysia National University). 
The writer also travelled to Singapore to meet Professor Rohan Gunaratna and Joseph 
Chin Liow Leong from the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism 
Research (ICPVTR) at Nanyang Technological University Singapore as the Southeast 
Asia terrorism expert. This research was completed after the writer spent time with 
Nasir Abas, the ex JI‟s operation leader in Mantiqi Ula. Nasir Abas, who has been  
working with the Indonesia Police (POLRI) in the de-radicalization programme since 
2003.      
  
Open-ended or semi-structured interviews were used with participants in this 
research. Malaysian and Indonesian individuals who are involved with KMM were 
questioned to explore radicalism from varied perspectives. The method of recruitment 
used by the writer to find possible participants in this research, involved his own 
networking in Malaysia and Indonesia. Individuals were invited to take part in this 
research, and were informed about the study‟s purpose and about how identities 
would be protected for those who chose to take part. The names of each participant 
are not recorded in this thesis, neither in the body of the thesis, nor in the 
appendices.
76
  
 
The writer also allowed participants to ask questions. The writer provided an 
information sheet for those who wanted it, though some did not want to retain any 
evidence that a conversation occurred, and not all were sufficiently literate to read it 
themselves. These interviews aimed to gather information about the group‟s history, 
composition, structure and activities. The history also covered the experiences of 
individual members before joining the KMM. This was particularly crucial in 
exploring the social composition of the group and the factors that encouraged 
individual members to engage in militant activities between 1999 and 2001.   
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All of the data collected was analyzed in detail to produce findings that fulfilled the 
objectives of the research. A number of cities were visited as part of the research 
process including Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Kedah, Johor, Kelantan, Yala, 
Narathiwat, Pattani, Phnom Penh, Singapore and Jakarta. Primary and secondary data 
was also collected from several Malaysian governmental institutions such as the 
Royal Malaysia Police (RMP), Ministry of Internal Security (MOIS) and National 
Security Division (NSD) as well the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM). 
Based on the data gathered through extensive fieldwork and theoretical assessments, 
this study provides an empirically detailed analysis of how radicalism takes form and 
emerges in a given society over a period of time.  
 
The primary analytical focus of this research is “to explore the nature of the „religious 
radicalism‟ which is found in Malaysia and the Southeast Asian region. In order to 
determine the nature of this radicalism, the thesis analyses the core of the Malaysian 
militant group, the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) that had operational and 
ideological connections with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia and other Southeast 
Asia militant groups”.   
 
Any scholarly research that observes religious radicalism in groups like KMM should 
include internal as well as external perspectives. The significance of internal 
observation allows this study to articulate the ideologies of the group from an intrinsic 
political, religious and cultural context. In other words, the writer sought to look from 
the inside of the movement outwards, using the interview technique with former 
operative.  
 
For this reason, this study provides an understanding of the KMM, its regional 
connections and the security implications for Southeast Asian countries. The research 
aims to develop a clear picture of religious radicalism and the use of violence by the 
KMM and its related groups in Southeast Asia, particularly, in Malaysia and its 
neighbouring countries. This study examines the factors that led to the birth of 
terrorism in relation to religious radicalism in Malaysia and the region. The aim of 
this research was fulfilled through a close observation of the group, its internal 
structure, background, ideologies, motives, memberships, operations and objectives. 
These factors will be explored further in correlation to KMM‟s wider external 
 20 
 
connections, their network with JI, regional violent activities and their contact with al-
Qaeda. These observations will highlight the appropriate method for encountering 
religious radicalism and the use of violence, based on a de-radicalization 
methodology. 
 
Outcomes of the work have various uses in providing a framework for developing 
suitable policies for countering terrorism and religious radicalism in Southeast Asia 
and beyond. New Zealand would benefit from the findings of this project for advising 
counter-terrorism strategies and approaches to religious radicalism in its geographical 
proximity. 
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Chapter II-  
RADICAL ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
 
…The topic of terrorism and insurgency of Southeast Asia cannot be viewed in 
narrow definitional terms nor is it amenable to a set of generalization, and hence 
narrow perspectives countermeasures. Indeed the complexities and diversities are 
such, and the variables are so many, that no such generalization may be possible. 
Each and every rebellion in this region has deep historical, political, social and 
economic roots…
77
   
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In October 2002, hundreds of people died in a high scale explosion in Bali, Indonesia. 
The majority of them were Westerners, mainly Australian and American citizens who 
were in the Paddy and Sari nightclub in Kuta, Bali at the time. The attack rocked the 
whole world even though it was located thousand of miles from the United States, 
where the 9/11 incident occurred. The series of attacks, bombings and resistance from 
the separatist movement which followed this incident can easily be seen. 
 
The real issue is that Southeast Asia has been a fragile region since the colonization 
era during the 15
th
 century. Historically, this region has been embedded in Islam about 
a century before Western power entered. Eventually, there were many Muslim 
kingdoms such as Pan-Pan and Tun-Tun in Segenting Kra in Thailand, Pattani 
Sultanate in Southern Thailand, Sulu Sultanate in Southern Philippines, Acheh 
Sultanate in Indonesia, Johor-Riau kingdom and many more. However, the colonial 
superpowers drew lines between these kingdoms and as a result, grievances and 
resistances emerged both pre and post independence.  
 
Among the reasons behind this struggle is the question of who holds the political 
power. Apart from most ordinary Muslims, the real problems the government faced 
were social and economic. Islam played the major role in unifying ordinary people to 
oppose their own government. Andrew Tan makes this point: “...Islam is a potent 
mobilizing symbol and focal point in harnessing political opposition to the 
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government. Indeed, the Islamic factor has proved to be a unifying factor and a focal 
point for the rallying of armed resistance such as in Acheh and Mindanao”78.          
 
It is important to distinguish the significance of radical Islam and the development of 
this ideology in order to determine what is in the minds of militants‟ and the purpose 
of their struggle. Understanding the roots of radicalism is vital to understanding how 
it came about in Southeast Asia, particularly in Malaysia and Indonesia, as radicalism 
has a strong connection with extremist beliefs and militant activities.   
 
 
2.2 The Idea of Radicalization  
A radical is “one who advocates fundamental or revolutionary changes in current 
practices, conditions, or institutions”.79 In other words a radical is someone who is 
driven by ideology
80
. Radical Islam in Southeast Asia is further defined as a 
movement whose ideology is “to establish an Islamic state governed by Shari`ah 
through violence and extralegal means…81 Modern Islamic ideology materialized in 
the Middle East in the second half of the 20th century as a revivalist and anti-
nationalist movement.
82
 In the early 1920s, most of the Muslim world was under 
European imperialism and then by 1925 the Ottoman Empire (Caliphate) was 
disestablished.
83
 Although by that time the Ottoman Caliphate was limited in power, it 
was seen as the unifying symbol of Islam by many Muslims.
84
 Muslim empires and 
influence was quickly deteriorating and giving way to Westernization. It was under 
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this perceived threat to the Muslim ideals and a „community in crisis‟ that 
contemporary Islamic activism emerged.
85
   
The propagators of the Islamic movement viewed the core of the crisis as having two 
parts: Western imperialism and Westernization nationalist Muslim leadership.
86
 In the 
early year of the movement, the most prominent theorists were Hassan al-Banna of 
Egypt and Mawlana Mawdudi of Pakistan. The groups founded by each of these 
religious scholars are Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslims‟ Brotherhood) in 1928 in Egypt 87 
and the Jamaat i-Islami (Islamic Movement) in 1941 in India;
88
 respectively remain 
the trademark of Islamic movement organizations today. Both leaders viewed their 
societies as being too reliant on the West- politically ineffectual and culturally 
defunct.
89
 Furthermore they viewed the increasing incursion of Western culture such 
as education, law, customs and values as being significantly destructive in the long 
term because they directly threatened the core of the Muslim community.
90
   
 
Al-Banna and Mawdudi believed the internal aspects of the problem were most 
pressing and therefore focused on the Islamization of the Muslim community.
91
 They 
shared the belief that Islam, by providing comprehensive guidance for every aspect of 
a Muslim‟s life, was better than capitalism and other ideologies.92 In support of this 
key principle they established organizations that promoted social and political 
activism.
93
 They also both worked to match modernization with scripture and tradition 
by reinterpreting Islam and applying it to the challenges of modernity. For al-Banna 
and Mawdudi, the solution for the crisis of the Muslim communities in their 
respective regions lay in indoctrinating people (socio religious reform) while 
changing the government (political reform) at the same time. For Mawdudi, a truly 
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Islamic state was one that recognized only the sovereignty of God (hakimiya), 
worshipped God alone and implemented His law, which means Sharia Law. Anything 
short of this was Jahiliya.
94
  
 
Another prominent scholar of Muslim radicalism was Sayyid Qutb. Following the 
assassination of al-Banna in 1949, Qutb emerged as the leader of the Ikhwanul 
Muslimin. Although influenced by Banna and Mawdudi‟s ideological theories and the 
concept of the Islamic state, Qutb saw the means for attaining their goals as requiring 
a more radical programme of action.
95
  By rejecting all forms of nationalism, Qutb in 
effect declared the Egyptian policy illegitimate.
96
 His uncompromising de-
legitimization of all man-made political communities, prompted in part by the state‟s 
violent attack on the Brotherhoods and its teaching, led many of their members to 
embrace violent struggle.
97
 Qutb wrote his most influential and radical works while in 
prison from 1954 until his execution in 1966, named Ma‟alim Fi al-Tariq 
(Milestone).
98
  As explained by Anthony Bubalo, Qutb was best known as "the man 
whose ideas would shape Al Qaeda".
99
   
 
Furthermore, the jahiliya concept formed from the cornerstone of Qutb‟s ideology has 
wider interpretations. Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy (2005b) wrote: 
 
 He developed and extended the term beyond Mawdudi‟s usage, defining all the 
societies of his era as being in a state of jahiliya. For Qutb, it was not enough for 
Muslims in a given society to be individually pious. Islam was a total system rather 
than just a religion, and any society was jahiliya if its complete way of life was not 
based on total submission to God [Allah].
100
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Qutb said the first step was personal purification: “ridding oneself of corrupting 
influences of jahiliya ideas and contemplating the correct meaning of Islam. Once this 
occurred a movement led by committed Muslims was necessary to overthrow jahiliya 
society”. 101   Qutb suggested that substantial power and Jihad was needed, as he 
argued that the conventional approach by Ikhwanul Muslilmin using preaching and 
persuasion to change ideas and faiths would not be sufficient.
102
  As Bubalo and Fealy 
wrote: “for al-Banna an Islamic system was achieved from below, that is from 
Islamization of society through reform, for Qutb, it could only be achieved from 
above, by directly removing the jahiliya system that stood in Islam‟s way”.103   
 
Undeniably Qutb‟s idea was not the only factor motivating radical Islamists towards 
rebellion and revolt. It is vital to note social, political and economic conditions at the 
time influenced the movement of radicalism groups. The internationalization of 
terrorism that occurred in the later 1960s and early 1970s was the result of Palestinian 
influence and suppression.
104
 The defeat of Arab states by Israel in 1967, which led to 
economic and social dislocation in the 1970s and 1980s, is among the factors that 
contributed to emerging radicalism.
105
    
 
The ideology of radicalism continued to flourish after Qutb‟s execution. 106  The 
Afghan-Russian war in 1979 initiated this idea. The Mujahidin movement, sponsored 
by the CIA of the anti-Soviet Islamic Afghan Forces or so the called „freedom 
fighters‟ by Washington, successfully ensured civil war and anarchy stayed alive for 
years to come.
107
 Later, a long time after civil-war, vendettas and resentment turned 
radical Muslims against the Western world, particularly America.
108
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The concept of „Jihad‟ was successfully instilled into many Muslim minds, especially 
those who fought for Afghanistan against Russia. One of the „key people‟ during this 
period was Abdullah Azzam.
109
 Azzam played a significant role in the training and 
deployment of non-Arab Jihadists, particularly through Maktab al-khidamah (Office 
of Service-MAK) which he operates with Saudi assistance in Pakistan.
110
  
 
In Azzam‟s book Ilhaq bil Qaafila (Joining the Caravan), he argued every principle or 
ideology needed by a frontline to carry it to victory. Such a group needed to however 
learn through trial by fire.
111
 Bubalo and Fealy (2005c) outlined that: “For Azzam, the 
Afghan Jihad provided just such an opportunity for training and preparation which he 
likened to the Prophet‟s 13 year period of contemplation in Mecca before he set out to 
[expand] Islam”.112  Mixing with other Muslims from North Africa, the Gulf and 
Southeast Asia reinforced the idea of radicalism and established a Muslim Caliphate 
around the world. Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) members, who later formed Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) and also KMM in Malaysia, were among the protégé of Azzam‟s 
ideals. 
 
The time they spent in Afghanistan provided practical opportunities for military 
training, indoctrination and for the establishment of international networks.
113
 Radical 
Islamism is ultimately anti-liberal in spirit and often anti-democratic. Nevertheless, it 
is important to make the distinction between radical Islamism and terrorism. As stated 
by Greg Barton (2005) “Terrorism is not an ideology, but an instrument to achieve a 
particular ideology”.114    
 
Many Islamic groups that use a Islamic revolution as a main objective have an agenda 
that is far more secular and politically driven than practising basic tenets of Islam.
115
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For example, the objectives of MILF are primarily to eject Manila from what they 
declared Sulu sultanate territory and the long battle between Chechnya and Russia in 
order to have an independent and autonomous country. Similar movements can be 
seen in the Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand where Moro and Malay 
separatists have struggled for a long time for autonomous power. People‟s movements 
and struggles must be geared by objectives. To some extent radicalism and extremism 
can be used in order to achieve what they want.
116
  
 
In a Southeast Asian context, people with radical ideologies such as Hambali, Imam 
Samudra, Amrozi, Abu Bafana, Abu Dujana, Umar Patek, Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir and 
many more were trained in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Libya during the Afghan-
Russian war in the 1980s.
117
 These „Jihadist‟ fighters have been sent to the Middle 
East to enhance their knowledge of Islamic teachings. They were influenced by the 
idea of radicalism and most of them were involved in militancy during the Afghan 
war.
118
 Most of the „maktab al-khidamah” operators in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
during 1980s and 1990s were trained not for militant operations in Western countries, 
but for warfare in their own country, such as Darul Islam (DI) members from 
Indonesia against Suharto‟s regime.119   
 
Many of them returned to their home country after the war with radical ideologies.
120
 
These groups later become extremists or separatists, as well as trainers of „young 
radicals‟.121  In addition, the Afghan Alumni played a major role in the two most 
conflicted areas in this region.
122
 The Moros in the Philippines have been involved in 
some form of rebellion against the central government for the better part of five 
centuries. Furthermore, the seeds of conflict in southern Thailand began when the 
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Pattani sultanate, inhabited by Malay Muslims, was conquered by Thailand in 
1786.
123
   
 
Both conflicts intensified in recent years with the advent of Jihad ideology and have 
become more deadly because of Jihad tactics and methodology. Whereas in earlier 
years the rebellion took on the character of a guerrilla war, now it is a campaign of 
terrorism, often involving cruel acts of murder and random killing of innocent 
people.
124
  
 
Islam has been depicted as a religion that brought violence and destruction to the 
world, especially after 9/11. However, Islam is a religion of peace. It is derived from 
the word „salam‟ (peace or safety). Salam is not only the absence of violence and 
aggression but it also means total well-being and happiness. It literally means „to be 
safe, secure, sound, wholesome, unharmed, unimpaired and intact‟. Islam also urges 
its followers to be equal regardless of race, nationality, appearance and social status as 
verse from Quran: 
 
O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made 
you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise 
each other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the 
most righteous of you. And Allah has full Knowledge and is well-acquainted (with all 
things.
125
 
This wonderful principle of Islam makes it clear that there is not a single person, race, 
or nation that is better than others. God created us equally. In God's eyes, the best of 
us are the most righteous and the mannered. God created mankind as different races 
and nations although He (God) could have created us all as one nation, with one 
language and one religion. However, as stated in the verse mentioned above, God 
created these different nations and tribes so that we could get to know each other, and 
not to hate each other because we are different. This tells us that individuals should 
celebrate the differences and not hurt each other based on them. Islam also teaches us 
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to realise that no single race or people have supremacy over others, and that we are 
judged solely on our actions.  
This verse teaches us that individuals should live peacefully with other nations and 
tribes, respect each other and agree on the differences. Individuals should learn to live 
together, get to know each other, to engage in dialogue among all nations and treat 
every human equally. Whereas, so many confuse and misunderstand religion, 
especially Islam, there is room to develop understanding and solidarity within 
diversity.  
 
 
2.3 A Typology of Radicalization   
   
The pathway to becoming a radical Muslim was divided into six degrees, beginning 
with normal followers, occasional followers, activists, extremists, radicals and 
militants.
126
 Each stage represented a different level of the faith and consistency of 
practicing Islam. These six clusters will be elaborated on to show how Muslims shift 
from one stage to another, which can be from normal to extreme or vice versa. This 
can be understood from the report by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
(2009) “Individuals can turn by stages, into sympathizers, supporters, and ultimately, 
members of terrorist networks”.127 
 
Nominal believers or „cultural Muslim‟ is the first stage and poses the lowest threat to 
becoming a radical. Normally, this type of follower is well educated, open minded 
and lives a modern style of life in all aspects. They may be recognized as „secular 
Muslims‟, which has a different meaning to modern day secular. At this stage, 
Muslims inherit Islam from their parents - the need to explore Islamic teachings more 
deeply are not applicable.  
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Nominal believers declare themselves Muslim but the ways they act and speak do not 
show their faith. This level is represented by followers, who sometimes do not 
practice fasting during the month of Ramadhan, do not wear scarves and do not pray 
regularly. They may go to the Mosque for Friday prayers, or at least twice a year at 
Eid Fitri (After Ramadhan celebration) and Eid Qurban (Pilgrimage celebration). 
 
They may not be keen to openly discuss Islam, either because they do not fully 
understand it or, to avoid misinterpretation. They like to mingle with people who have 
similar views on Islam. They are materialistic, working hard to become known as 
elite. Living in luxury and elegance can be measured from the way they dress, their 
car, house, the places they eat or meet friends, pastimes such as playing golf, 
exclusive clubs and many others. Normally, they stay in „elite‟ residential areas and 
have a connection with political leaders, businessmen or corporate people.  
 
Hence, some Muslims are involved in violence and terrorism which is the start of 
radical ideology, but not all Muslims do this. The diagram below shows the different 
levels of activism, starting with normal followers as the biggest group and militants as 
the smallest group. 
 
 
Graph 1: The Muslim‟s radical pathway.
128
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When facing difficulties in life, such as family or personal problems, Muslims return 
to the foundations of Islamic teaching. They quickly discover their Muslim identity 
and defend it, regardless of whether they really understand Islam or not. But they 
agree on Islam as the resolution and agree that the fundamental principals of the 
religion are important. For example, most normal believers in Malaysia have secular 
lifestyles; they are living in luxury, but when they have personal problems such as 
marital or moral difficulties, they return to Islam as the only way of life.  
 
Muslims in this category are easily recruited as radicals and militants. Without a 
strong foundation, they can be manipulated by charismatic leaders during their 
journey to find a new „way of life‟. Situations can be further worsened when the 
leaders have a corrupt ideology and hidden agenda. For example in the „Sauk tragedy‟ 
in Malaysia in 2002, the al-Maunah leader, Mohd Amin Ghazali displayed an image 
of kindness, generosity, humility and piety among his followers. Starting with „silat‟ 
(Malay martial art) training, he opened a free public clinic for traditional treatment 
and „Fardhu Ain (personal obligation) classes. Sometimes he claimed to correspond 
with djinns (genie) and said his soul had travelled to Ka‟abah in Saudi.129  Amin 
successfully manipulated his followers (nominal followers) to believe that what he 
was doing was right and that al-Maunah was practicing genuine Islamic teaching.  
 
Young Muslims in this category also respond to a radical message because they feel 
excluded from their societies, and sometimes feel trapped in poverty or authoritarian 
regimes in the Middle East and beyond. Others, who are well-off and well-educated, 
live in the Western democratic nations, but struggle with issues of belonging and 
identity and find that the radical message resonates with their experience and 
circumstances.
130
   
 
The second phase, which is „occasional‟, represents people who attend the mosque or 
Surau (prayer hall). People from this category are clearer about their identity than 
nominal followers. They are willing to show their identity and intent, but are content 
to live without the pressure of being „pious‟ Muslims. They have freedom of choice 
                                                 
129
 Noor, E. (2007). al-Maunah and KMM in Malaysia. In A. T. e. all. (Ed.), A Handbook of Terrorism 
in Insurgency in Southeast Asia. London: Edward Elgar. p. 176.  
130
 Op. Cit., The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2009). p. 4.  
 32 
 
and can be identified from the symbols they wear, such as the kupiah (skull cap) for 
men and scarves for women. They are quite happy to choose their own identity 
without pressure from other parties.  
 
They attend the Mosque when the need arises but do not usually pray regularly. 
People in this category are happy to take part in the rituals and the customs of their 
tradition without making a fuss of it.
131
  They put God first in their lives and strongly 
believe that God has a great and supernatural power to make everything happen, 
regardless of whether humans like it or not. They show their devotion and loyalty to 
the Shari`ah‟ and the umma as the absolute way of worshipping God. These people 
are happy to send their children to an Islamic school. Nowadays, most of the Islamic 
schools in Malaysia are filled with urban youngsters. Families prefer their children to 
have an Islamic education in order to stop immoral influences in their lives.     
 
The third stage represents „activists‟. These people can be measured by their piety and 
commitment to attend the Mosque. Compared to occasional followers, activists are 
consistent in their attendance to the Mosque and always try their best to be present.    
Activists observe the regular prayer times. They are actively involved in discussion 
with the Islamic community, either at the Mosque or other places. From their 
perspective, regular attendance is considered important and compulsory for every 
Muslim. They may be critical of Muslims who lack a commitment to prayers or 
activities at the Mosque.  
 
They attend the Friday or Jumaat prayer regularly. The Jumaat prayers are used for 
the promotion of faith and as a gathering place for the Muslim community.
132
 
Followers take this opportunity to discuss the five pillars
133
 of Islam and all issues 
relating to umma. In some states such as Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Terengganu in 
Malaysia, they have a holiday on Friday, so it is convenient for people to perform 
                                                 
131
 Veitch, J. (2007b). The Typology of Radicalism in M. M. Aslam (Ed.). Unpublished paper, 
Wellington: School of Government, p. 40. 
132
 Milner, A. C. (1993). Islamic Debate in the Public Sphere. Victoria, Aristoc Press Pty. Ltd., p. 120-
21.  
133
 Five pillars or Rukun Islam is the term given to the five duties incumbent on every Muslim. These 
duties are Shahadah (profession of faith), Solat (ritual prayer), Zakat (alms tax), Puasa (fasting during 
Ramadan), and Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). These five practices are essential to Sunni Islam. From 
Tamney, B. J. (1980). Fasting and Modernization. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 19(2), 
134. 
 33 
 
their Jumaat prayers. Activists may spend half of Friday morning learning about kitab 
(holy books) until Jumaat prayers start at about 12.30 and continue till 2.00 in the 
afternoon.   
 
They also perform puasa (fasting) for 30 days during the month of Ramadan (one of 
the holy months in Islam). They are expected to fulfil this obligation without any 
objection. They may confront others who do not correctly observe their puasa. They 
feel that by fasting for a month, Muslims are uniting, giving love and affection to one 
another and helping each other in practical ways.
134
 They view Ramadan as a month 
when people of all status and degrees of wealth are equally hungry, and believe 
fasting enables unity through the umma of Islam.  
 
People at this level are involved in Usrah (group discussions), either initiated by the 
Mosque or other groups. Matters discussed are focused largely on understanding 
Islam and common interests regarding faith, which is covered Shari`ah.
135
 Academic 
and rational debates and discussion about Islam as a way of life take place at every 
meeting at the Mosque. The main objectives are to create an Islamic environment and 
to focus on deepening piety.  
 
Normally, these people are keen to do the Hajj as a main objective. They are granted 
travel to Makkah for Hajj either from bank savings or from other sources, such as 
selling property, loans or money from their children. In this context, Malaysia was the 
only country that established a bank for Hajj, named „Lembaga Tabung Haji‟ 
(Pilgrimage Board of Malaysia).
136
 Lembaga Tabung Haji assists Muslims in 
Malaysia in saving towards their pilgrimage.  
 
People from this group also encourage their family to become good Muslims. 
Children in the family recite al-Quran as a sign of loyalty to Islam, either forced by 
                                                 
134
 Alhady, Syed. Sheikh. Ahmad. (1931). Ugama Islam dan Akal. Kota Bahru, Perchetakan Pustaka 
Dian, p. 121-122.  
135
 Sharia deals with many aspects of day-to-day life, including politics, economics, banking, business, 
contracts, family, sexuality, hygiene, and social issues. From Hassan, M. H. (2007). Imam Samudra's 
Justification for Bali Bombing. Studies Conflict & Terrorism, 30, p. 1033-1056. 
136
 The Board also invests the savings in investment activities and tools permissible in Islam. 
Established in 1962 from the proposal presented by Royal Professor Ungku Aziz titled, “Plan to 
Improve the Economy of Prospective Pilgrims” in 1959. LTH. (2005). "Background of TH."   Retrieved 
14 September, 2007, from http://www.tabunghaji.gov.my/th/bi/bi-latarbelakang_th.asp?lthmenu=0. 
 34 
 
their family or as their own choice. They may read al-Quran sometimes, but not 
everyday, because of time constraints and Quranic literacy levels. But their families 
are willing to send their children to the Mosque or to an Ustaz (Islamic teacher) house 
to learn al-Quran. Activists know how to read al-Quran and are willing to protect al-
Quran from threats.  
 
The fourth stage is „extremism‟. Extremists are more enthusiastic about their faith and 
more deeply committed than normal followers, occasionals or activists.
137
 „Islam as 
the way of life‟ is the first priority in their life, and they feel strongly that the only 
way to be loyal to God is to generate Shari`ah principles in everyday life.
138
 These 
people also make Jihad a part of their life and work hard to establish it. Jihads from 
their perspective are Jihad in economy, Jihad in social and Jihad in politics as well as 
the true Jihad (on the battle field).
139
 But they are committed to worshipping God and 
obeying all of the commandments of the al-Quran and as-Sunnah.  
 
Extremists focus on making the Hajj (pilgrimage) at least once in their life. They see 
Hajj as important and as the final destination of their life and plan to repeat the Mecca 
assembly in the future. They see the Hajj experience as the centre of all of their 
practices. Their faith will be complete when they finish the pilgrimage. These people 
have a critical view of those who do not intend to perform Hajj. Their children will 
have a personal fund to educate and foster them to do Hajj when they are ready. Most 
of the extremist children in Malaysia have their own Lembaga Tabung Haji account 
from infancy.        
 
Hajj is not just an opportunity to gain a title and to wear kupiah as an identity; it helps 
Muslims become aware of the far-reaching bonds which unite them.
140
 Their 
perspective on umma becomes wider because of the Hajj experience. Solat only unites 
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them at their own place but the pilgrimage bonds the community of mankind from all 
over the world, no matter where they come from, their race or customs. All of them 
travel to Mecca with one aim, which is to unify God and to show their obedience to 
Islamic teaching.  
 
The fifth level represents the „radical‟.141 Here social actions resulting from a feeling 
of obligation and commitment as well as duty make this level different from previous 
stages. The radical wants to help individuals, the community and to nation to seek 
redha (contentment) from God. They intend to save others from dholalah (going 
astray). The main objective is to save the umma from Thogut (Satan).  Redha is one of 
the obligations for radicals and must be used to guide people to the right path. For 
example, Front Pembela Islam (FPI) in Indonesia attacks gambling and vice premises 
during the month of Ramadhan in order to get rid of dholalah.
142
   
 
Since the era of the Prophet Muhammad, radicals have successfully expanded Islam 
all over the world through commitment and always felt an obligation to it.  They were 
keen to share Islam with others and da‟wah (preach) to the masses. Malaysia has had 
Islam since the 13
th
 century - brought by Muslim extremists who came from the 
Middle East and Southern India. They were committed to teaching people Islam and 
had an obligation to increase the number of Muslims, which led them to travel to this 
region centuries before colonization  
 
Radicals sturdily opposed everything „Western‟, especially attitudes (behaviour), 
lifestyle and goods. Part of the Jihad and their struggles were to vigorously contest 
what they saw as ignorance and they had to be carried out with implicative acts such 
as demonstration or isolation, not just discussions in Mosques or any Islamic gazebos. 
They have negative views of others who did not show their willingness to oppose 
Westernization. They encourage the joining of Islamic activities to get rid of the bad 
Western influences. Therefore, radical movements such as Front Pembela Islam 
(FPI), Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah (FKAWJ) and Kesatuan Aksi 
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Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI) were always demonstrating as part of their 
objectives.   
 
 
 
Graph 2: Veitch‟s Pathway to Radical Religion. The red circle represents militants, 
orange radicals, yellow extremists, grey activists, green occasional and blue normal 
followers.
143
 
 
 
The most influential level in the typology of radicalism is the „militant‟; one who 
takes to the next step into violence. It is the radical who has grown impatient with the 
pace of change.
144
 After growing up and being influenced by radical scholars or 
teachers, they may transform themselves from radical to militant. This level can also 
refer to militants who organize themselves in vigilante groups who are ready to resort 
to violent methods to protect and further what they see as Islamic goals. The most 
extreme version of this level is terrorism.
145
   
 
Normally they believe that the umma needs a major jolt to bring it into line with true 
faith. Militants also consider violence and brutality as part of their tools to bring about 
change, either in politics, society or the economy. They have different perspectives on 
the meaning and interpretation of al-Quran compared to others. In addition, they carry 
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out a political agenda based on an extreme understanding of the al-Quran and al-
Sunnah.
146
 Militants would take whatever steps necessary to make sure their 
understanding of Islam is implemented by others.   
 
Militants only see the final objective, and then look for a way to achieve it no matter 
what happens. Regardless of death or physical destruction, the target must be 
obtained. This is why killing, bombing, hijacking, kidnapping, stealing and 
destruction are not unusual in militant movements. They may use any weapons such 
as a bomb, pistol, machine gun, Molotov cocktails or chemical bombs in order to 
achieve their objectives. Furthermore, they may commit suicide bombings as one of 
the effective methods for destroying their enemy.
147
 Enemies range from invaders, 
non-Islamic governments to Western people, military, police and civilians.
148
 The 
9/11 tragedy clearly showed innocent people were victimized by militants in order to 
fulfil their political objectives.   
 
Militants urge people to follow extreme Islamic teachings (their own interpretation of 
Quran). Their final objective is to establish a world with absolute obedience to God‟s 
principles through the al-Quran and al-Sunnah as was done by JI.
149
  
 
With help from al-Qaeda, JI aimed to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Southeast 
Asia. JI also worked hard to remove all American values as well as hoping to end the 
Israeli occupation in Palestine.
150
 The method of using suicide bombings and guerrilla 
attacks as part of their activities were considered acts of „terrorism‟. The Bali 
bombing in 2002 showed the level of radicalism in JI operatives. JI members have 
been trained to be radical since they were in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Later, they turned to militants after spending some years in Afghanistan. They were 
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influenced by radical ideologies from militant scholars and were shaped by the 
objectives of movements they joined.
151
   
 
KMM was militant in their actions and most of their activities. A series of attacks 
have shown the level of militancy and aggression of their movement.
152
 KMM‟s 
operation copied exactly what JI members did. KMM members in the Klang valley 
cell followed the same method of operation after being consulted by Hambali and 
Abu Jibril. Not only did it abide by JI‟s militant ideology, KMM also shared similar 
violence and radical operations as that of JI‟s top position.  
 
 
2.4 Radicalism in Indonesia   
Indonesia has a long history of dealing with radicalism since colonization centuries 
ago. Islam was successfully embraced by Indonesians during the Achehnese Sultanate 
in the late 12
th
 century and gradually influenced domestic society and politics. Dutch 
colonization since 1602 repressed Indonesian Muslims, and later created conflict, 
including the Anglo-Dutch Java War (1810-1811) and the Acheh War (1873-1904).
153
  
 
On 17 August 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender, influential nationalist 
leader Sukarno unilaterally declared Indonesian‟s independence. Since then, there has 
been an emergence of Islamic nationalist groups in Indonesia. Some of these groups 
are categorized as activism, extremism, radicalism and also militants.
154
 The first 
radical group is Darul Islam (DI) or Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), formed by 
Kartosuwirjo with a main objective to build an Islamic State in Indonesia.
155
  
 
JI have had a notorious reputation around the world since the Bali Bombing in 2002, a 
disaster which changed human thoughts and beliefs. The „global war on terrorism‟ has 
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made Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI) the second most wanted terrorist group after the Middle 
Eastern based al-Qaeda. JI has historical roots with the DI.
156
 The origins of JI can be 
traced to a pesantren founded in Solo, Indonesia in 1973 by two radical Muslim 
clerics, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir.
157
 The two radicals were deeply 
affected by the DI movement and have since attempted to carry on in its 
tradition.  Both men were born in Indonesia to families of Yemeni heritage. Sungkar 
was born in 1937 in Solo, Central Java, and Bashir in 1938 in Jombang, East Java.
158
 
 
Southeast Asia, for its part, has had its fair share of terrorism emanating from 
separatist movements carried out by Christian and Muslim ethnic minorities, armed 
anti-government opposition groups and radical Islamist groups. Given the link 
between some local radical Islamist groups (such as JI) and international terrorist 
groups such as al-Qaeda, the new terrorism can be said to have penetrated Southeast 
Asia.
159
  
 
JI was founded in Malaysia with the ultimate goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate 
within Southeast Asia that would be centred in Indonesia, with its Muslim majority. 
However it also aimed to encompass Islamic communities in Malaysia, Singapore, the 
southern Philippines, Brunei and Southern Thailand.
160
 JI undertook Jihad in order to 
establish a pan-Asian state based on Islamic Law.
161
 Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir and 
Abdullah Sungkar were seen as the descendants of earlier Muslim radicals and 
fundamentalists through Darul Islam.
162
 As Abuza (2003) wrote in his book, “both of 
them spent decades working to promote Islamic fundamentalism in Southeast 
Asia”.163  
 
Although more than 400 men with links or suspected links to it are now in custody in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and the US, JI is far from 
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destroyed.
164
 Indonesian police and their international counterparts have succeeded in 
seriously damaging the network, but JI remains capable of planning and executing a 
major operation in a large urban centre.
165
  
 
The death of Dr. Azhari in December 2005 in Batu Malang, Indonesia, weakened JI 
instantly. JI does not have a new generation to generate violent activities after Amrozi 
was sentenced to death, Abu Bakar Baa‟syir and Ali Imron were imprisoned and 
Fathurrahman al-Ghozi was killed in a joint police-military operation in the Southern 
Philippines in 2003. To date, Azyurmardi Azra (2007) also said, “The role of the late 
Dr. Azhari made JI deselect”.166 
    
JI was purposely set up as a military organization. JI as an Islamic-based militant   
group was split into divisions known as Mantiqis and Wakalahs. As written in 
International Crisis Group Asia No 63 (2003): “originally defined as districts and sub 
districts – was actually a territorial command structure of brigades, battalions, 
companies, platoons, and squads.  
 
All senior members of the central command trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, before JI formally existed. It was in the camps of the Saudi-financed 
Afghan Mujahidin leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf that they developed Jihadist fervor, 
international contacts, and deadly [guerrilla] skills.
167
   
 
When JI set up a Hudaibiyah camp in Mindanao, Afghanistan‟s veterans such as 
Nasir Abas and Mustafa became the trainers of a fresh cohort of Mujahidin.
168
 Instead 
of JI members, like-minded Jihadist organizations from Southeast Asian countries 
including Malaysia, Singapore, Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia were trained in this 
camp. They were trained to use explosives for bombings, guerrilla war tactics, 
shootings, sabotages and lots of violence acts.
169
  
 
                                                 
164
 Effendi, B. (2008b). Combating Terrorism in Indonesia: Where Are We Exactly Now? Wellington: 
Series of Talk by Visiting Professor: School of Government. 
165
 International Crisis Group, (2003). JI Damaged but Still Dangerous. Jakarta/Brussells: International 
Crisis Group. 
166
 Azra, A. (2007). The Challenges Promoting Pluralism, Tolerance and Multiculturalism in 
Indonesia and Lesson for the Religion. Wellington, School of Government Seminar. 
167
 Op. Cit., International Crisis Group, (2003). 
168
 Abas, N. (2007c). Interview on 31 October at Hotel Kemang in Jakarta Selatan. Jakarta. And bid., 
International Crisis Group, (2003). 
169
 Ibid., Abas, N. (2007c). And Op. Cit., Singh, B., (2003), p. 24. 
 41 
 
 
JI PROXY IN SEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) work closely with Southeast Asian‟s Islamic groups 
for their political objective, to establish Islamic caliphate in this region 
 
Anti-terror authorities struck a blow against JI when they arrested its operational 
chief, Nurjaman Isamudin aka Riduan, also known as Hambali, in Thailand in August 
2003.
181
 More recently, authorities in Jakarta arrested JI‟s leader, Abu Dujana, and 
seven other group members in June 2007.
182
 JI is alleged to have attacked or plotted 
against the US and Western targets in Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines. The 
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COUNTRY PROXY 
Malaysia  KMM170 
DIS171 
Indonesia MMI172 
Laskar Jundullah173 
Laskar Jihad (Disbanded)174 
Thailand PULO175 
BRN-C176 
GMIP177 
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Australia JI-Australia180 
 42 
 
most recent is believed to have been carried out by JI operatives on October 1, 2005, 
when a series of suicide bombings killed at least 19 people and wounded more than 
100 in Bali, a beachfront city and international tourist destination.
183
 
The deadliest incident was on October 12, 2002 at Kuta, Bali with 202 deaths - most 
of them Australian.
184
 A month after the Bali bombing, Amrozi and Imam Samudra 
were captured by Indonesian police authorities in November 2002. In December, 
Mukhlas was caught and his brother Ali Imron was arrested a month later in January 
2003. Amrozi was found guilty and sentenced to death by the Denpasar District Court 
for his involvement in the terrorist attack.
185
  JI is also suspected of being responsible 
for the August 5, 2003, car bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta which killed 
12 individuals, and the September 9, 2004, attack, which supposedly targeted the 
Australian Embassy in Jakarta.
186
  
 
Picture 1: The Jemaah Islamiyah‟s map of ultimate objective to create an Islamic 
Kingdom in Southeast Asia.
187
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JI was established in 1973 after two Muslim clerics, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu 
Bakar Ba‟asyir, formed a pesantren called Pondok Ngruki, located near Solo, Central 
Java.
188
 Abuza (2003) outlined that the school could be described as “opened with 30 
students, grew rapidly and in 1976, it moved to a four hectare compound outside of 
the city. It now has 1900 students with plans to expand”.189 JI had its roots in the DI 
rebellions in the 1950s, which aimed to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.
190
 JI 
initially began as part of the clandestine Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) movement. It 
was established with the assistance operatives of the Suharto regime using former DI 
activists to discredit the Islamic based political party (United Development Party-
PPP), competing in the 1977 Indonesian general elections.
191
  
It is not entirely clear to what extent JI is a real organisation with a well-defined 
membership and structure of authority. Its alleged leader, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, has not 
been afraid of openly proclaiming his admiration for Osama bin Laden, but he denies 
any direct contact with him.
192
 A BBC (2006) report stated “I support Osama bin 
Laden's struggle because it is the true struggle to uphold Islam, not terror - the 
terrorists are America and Israel”.193 
Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir, who jointly led a pesantren (private Islamic boarding school) 
near the town of Solo, was arrested in the late 1970s for his involvement in a violent 
underground movement popularly known as Komando Jihad.
194
 This movement 
aimed to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia and carried out a number of bombings 
of cinemas, night clubs and churches.
195
 Interestingly, Komando Jihad was to a 
considerable degree controlled by one of the intelligence services and served the 
useful function of legitimatizing clampdowns on less radical and non-violent Muslim 
politicians. Komando Jihad consisted mostly of men who had been active in the DI 
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movement, which from 1949 to 1962 opposed the secular Indonesian republic and 
fought for an Indonesian Islamic State.
196
 
   
Sungkar and Ba'asyir joined late, but contributed to the movement‟s ideas using 
borrowings from the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun).
197
 The 
struggle for an Islamic state according to these ideas was a step-by-step process, in 
which the activist had to first engage in moral self-improvement, then to be part of a 
„family‟ (Usrah) of like-minded people who guided, helped and controlled one 
another. These were steps towards the building of an Islamic community (JI), which 
in turn is a precondition for the establishment of an Islamic state. From their Islamic 
school near Solo, Ba‟asyir and Sungkar set up a network of committed young 
Muslims, some of them quietist, some of them militants, all of them opposed to the 
Suharto regime.
198
 They were organised in „families,‟ that together were to constitute 
a true community of committed Muslims - a JI. Following a wave of arrests, the 
authorities spoke of the „Usrah movement‟.199   
 
Information about what came to be known as the Usrah movement comes primarily 
from court documents prepared for the trials of Usrah members who eventually were 
arrested on chargers of trying to establish an Islamic state.
200
 Members were required 
to follow Islamic law as outlined in a manual written by Ba‟asyir called Usrah, 
derived from the teachings of Hassan al-Banna.
201
 A key teaching was that Usrah 
members should avoid any non-Islamic institutions, such as schools or courts, and all 
laws other than Shari`ah should be disobeyed.
202
   
 
Ba‟asyir and Sungkar remained under detention for several years, and upon release in 
the mid-1980s escaped to Malaysia. This move may have been related to their 
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recruitment for the Afghan JI,
203
 which occurred around the same time. Between 1984 
and 1985, few Saudi recruiting officers visited Indonesia and discovered the Darul 
Islam movement as the definite Islamic-based group located outside the Middle East 
that was capable of Jihad.
204
 International Crisis Group (2002b) stated in their report 
“the exiles also decided to send Sungkar and Ba‟asyir to Saudi Arabia to seek 
additional funds. At the same time, they decided to strengthen the JI military by 
sending volunteers from Jakarta to train in Afghanistan”.205                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
  
In 1985, a Saudi representative offered Sungkar and Ba‟asyir financial support to send 
off 50 jihadi fighters to Afghanistan. Only four men were willing to participate in this 
first ever Jihad. However the number doubled the following year and then slightly 
larger groups of fighters were sent until Russians withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. 
Then Sungkar and Ba‟asyir found the Southern Philippines as an alternative and 
convenience training place. With help from Hambali and Ba‟syir, Sungkar sent 
batches of Jihadi fighters to the Southern Philippines for military training with MILF 
in Hudaibiyah and Abu Bakar camps.
206
  
   
For 14 years, Sungkar and Ba‟asyir remained in Malaysia, living in a village with a 
circle of their closest disciples and travelling around delivering religious sermons. The 
group close to them mainly consisted of other refugees from Indonesia; they were 
visited by radicals from Indonesia and other regions of Southeast Asia.
207
 The spirit of 
democratization in the post Suharto era (known as „reformasi‟ in Indonesia) led 
Abdullah Sungkar and Ba‟asyir to return in October 1999. Sungkar died in Jakarta 
during his first return visit; Ba‟asyir settled again in his pesantren boarding school at 
Ngruki near Solo, Central Java.
208
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The establishment of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in August 2000 gave 
Ba‟asyir a very public profile. MMI essentially operated as the general public 
organization that aimed to put Shari`ah into practice in the Indonesian governmental 
system. MMI‟s main objective was to be an umbrella organization in coordinating any 
activists and Islamic groups that are entrusted with the establishment of an Islamic 
khilafah in Indonesia.
209
 As Ba‟asyir said in his interview with Abuza (2002a): 
 
The MMI is an institution where a lot of people from a lot of Muslim groups including 
the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and muhammadiyah gather at one table to discuss how to 
get our vision of sharia implemented into national laws…..the long term strategy is to 
get Indonesia 100 percent based on sharia. As long as Muslims are the majority, the 
country should be ruled by sharia.
210
  
 
While Ba‟asyir is the Emir (leader) in every sense of the word, he is more the  
spiritual leader of JI. However, for a long period, the field commander and operations 
chief of JI in Southeast Asia was Hambali.
211
 As Hambali was appointed by Sungkar, 
a person whom Hambali looked up to and from whom he took his orders, following 
Sungkar‟s death, there appears to have been a schism between Ba‟asyir and Hambali, 
with the former being unable to control the latter.
212
  
 
While the focus of the media is on Hambali as the operations chief in JI, Ba‟asyir is 
unlikely to be the mastermind behind the series of attacks in this region, particularly 
the Bali bombing in 2002.
213
  Ba‟asyir did however play a big role in establishing the 
“Ngruki Networking”, which is meant to have bonded JI members in terms of loyalty 
to the teachings of Sungkar and Ba‟asyir.214 Their commitment to the cause of JI and 
shared experience radicalized by repression during Suharto‟s regime are the important 
formulas for establishing radicalism through JI.
215
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2.5 Radicalism in the Southern Philippines     
Radicalism in the Southern Philippines started in 1521 after the Spaniards, led by 
Ferdinand Magellan, settled in the Philippine islands, whose existing inhabitants 
comprised of Indo-Malays and Chinese merchants.
216
 The Spanish established a 
colonial government in Cebu in 1565, prior to the administration of government being 
transferred to Manila in 1571.
217
 Filipinos opposed the Spanish ruled-government and 
embarked on Asia‟s first nationalist revolution in 1896.218 During this time, Emilio 
Aguinaldo announced the Philippines independent and declared himself President in 
June 12 1898. However, the Philippines were controlled by America until July 4, 
1946 with the declaration of Philippine independence.
219
 
 
The influence of the colonization of the Philippines by the Spanish remains evident 
today, given that it is still the only predominantly Christian country in Southeast 
Asia.
220
 The Spanish influence is further evident in the terminology Moros, Moro, 
Moors or Bangsamoro, used to describe the country‟s Muslim population.221 This 
community is one that predominantly resides in the southern islands. However, 
notwithstanding such geographical predominance, the Bangsamoros‟ have, 
historically, inhabited a diverse range of environments from jungle villages to densely 
populated cities, since their initial presence as traders and missionaries in the 13th 
century. Indeed, the modern day Muslim community comprises a sizeable percentage 
of the population as a whole; currently 10 million people of the total Philippine 
population of around 84.5 million.
222
 
 
As a result of a lack of assimilation with the Spanish colonizers, Philippine Muslims 
comprise the largest category of non-Hispanic inhabitants of the Philippines and share 
                                                 
216
 Abu Zahir, S. (Producer). (1998, 21 July 2009) The MORO Jihad: Continuous Struggle for Islamic 
Independence in Southern Philippines Podcast retrieved from 
http://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ph1.htm.  
217
 Melendy, H. B. (Producer). (21 July 2009) Filipino Americans. Podcast retrieved from 
http://www.everyculture.com/multi/Du-Ha/Filipino-Americans.html.  
218
 Guerrero, A. (1970). Philippines Society and Revolution. Manila: Revolutionary School of Mao 
Tsetung Thought. 
219
 Ibid., 42.  
220
 Milligan, J. A. (2003). Teaching between the Cross and the Crescent Moon: Islamic Identity, 
Postcoloniality, and Public Education in the Southern Philippines. Comparative Education Review, 
47(4), 468-492.  
221
 Ibid. 
222
 Buendia, R. G. The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines Unresolved National Question or 
Question of Governance? Manila: De La Salle University. 
 48 
 
their religious culture with the neighbouring majority Muslim nations of Indonesia 
and Malaysia.
223
 Furthermore, it is of interest to note the Bangsamoro population has 
retained aspects of an indigenous pre-Islamic and pre-colonial Philippine culture. This 
is expressed in dress, music, political traditions and a variety of folk beliefs and 
practices which are similar to those found elsewhere in Southeast Asia, but are today 
almost entirely absent among Christian Filipinos. Thus, while Philippine Christians 
and Muslims inhabit the same regions, provinces and cities, they are separated by an 
inherent cultural gulf that is subsequent to historical perspectives.  
 
This cultural gulf has been partially exacerbated by Christian Filipinos (including 
representatives of the Philippine state) who have tended to view Philippine Muslims 
as socially backward and untrustworthy because of their history of resistance to 
Hispanicization.
224
 For their part, Philippine Muslims have tended to be highly 
suspicious of the intentions of the Philippine government and generally wary of 
Christian Filipinos.
225
 Despite these prejudices and suspicions, the co-existence 
between Muslims and Christians in the Southern Philippines is one that has been 
largely peaceful.
226
       
 
Despite this primarily peaceful relationship, the conflict in Mindanao has substantive 
roots in the history of the Philippines and has largely been concentrated in the Muslim 
majority areas of the centre and South-West.
227
 Specifically, the areas of conflict have 
been region IX (Western Mindanao), region XII (Central Mindanao), the Autonomous 
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and region XI (Southern Mindanao), which 
consists of Davao del Sur, Sarangani, South Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat.
228
  
 
Resentment resulting from a number of factors, namely a) the increasing number of 
Christian settlers b) centralized control and c) logging and mining activities, which 
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were a predominant source of export earnings, prompted the development of a 
resistance movement under the aegis of the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF).
229
 The MNLF, founded and led by Nur Misuari, is the original underground 
political front of the Muslim separatist rebellion. Misuari is a signatory to the Tripoli 
Agreement of 1976, the first peace agreement signed between Muslim separatists and 
the Philippine government.
230
 Abu Bakar Carmen (2002) wrote: “Until recently the 
MNLF was the only separatist group with which the Philippine government was 
willing to negotiate in any substantive way”.231  
 
The MILF dates from 1984 as a separate organization, but its roots can be traced back 
to the beginnings of modern Muslim separatism. Its leader, Hashim Salamat, was 
second in command of the MNLF until 1979.
232
 The MILF headquarters are based in 
central Mindanao and as a movement it is well organized and retains broad popular 
support in rural villages.
233
 Although the MILF has stressed the Islamic aspect of the 
separatist movement, the goals and policies of the MNLF and the MILF do not differ 
significantly.
234
  
 
It is interesting to consider that the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is of relatively recent 
origin, appearing only in 1995 and centring on the island of Basilan. Abu Sayyaf was 
considered to be a small, radical and somewhat mysterious group with limited popular 
support.
235
 While the ASG has garnered more headlines in the past five years with its 
killings and kidnappings of Christians, it is by far the smallest of the three groups and 
the MNLF and the MILF have condemned the activities of the Abu Sayyaf.
236
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In 1998, Joseph Estrada declared an “all out war policy” as a result of the 
confrontation with MILF.
237
 Then, in April 2000, large military armies were 
mobilized to Mindanao and raided several MILF camps.
238
 Although the assault was 
successful on the surface, it failed to crush the MILF, which strategically chose to 
avoid direct confrontation by splintering into smaller groups and hiding in remote 
areas of the region.  
 
Arroyo‟s administration‟s initially announced an “all out peace policy”.239 Following 
this, in June 2003, Manila and MILF created a ceasefire agreement under the 
patronage of the Malaysian Government. The International Monitoring Team, led by 
the Malaysian government was put in place soon after the Arroyo government was 
willing to talk with MILF, followed by the “Joint Government-MILF Ceasefire on the 
Cessation of Hostilities” (JCCCH).240   
 
The ongoing effort of the Bangsamoro to establish an Islamic State was caused by 
several factors, dating back to the colonization of the Philippines by the Spanish and 
the Americans. More recently it was worsened by the United States declaration of the 
„War on Terror‟ and the declaration of Southeast Asia as the „second front‟ in the war 
against terrorism.
241
  
 
The first factor was deprivation. Historically, the Bangsamoro of the Philippines have 
been associated with financial and environmental deprivation factors that have proved 
pivotal in their determination to establish an Islamic State. Since the Spanish colonial 
period the Government has been concerned with both political domination and 
religious conversion, particularly in the previously Islamic-dominant province of 
Mindanao
 
.
242
 As stated by Syed Serajul (1998): “This domination continued after 
independence, with the migration of thousands of Catholics to the area at the request 
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of the Government.
243
 Today, the Bangsamoros makes up only 22 percent of the 
population in Mindanao.
244
  
 
The Philippine government also adopted repressive measures in Mindanao. At the 
beginning, a commission for national integration was established in 1957, but rather 
than earning the loyalty of the Moros, it only deepened their sense of deprivation.
245
 
T.J.S. George described the Southern Philippines conflict: “two decades after the 
Philippines became independent, Muslims in Mindanao were a devitalized people, 
their economic conditions stagnant, their social conditions in jeopardy, their laws and 
customs in danger of disintegrating”.246  
 
The second factor was the institutional strength. A key cause of the exacerbation and 
continuation of the conflict concerns the characteristics of the Moro movement itself 
as a complex and adaptable institution. Moros were brilliant in managing their 
institution. The leadership was shifted to new generations, which were more educated 
and radical and had clear political views-a good combination compared to the 
leadership of other movements, which stayed in the hands of religious leaders who did 
not have stern political strategies.
247
 For example, the Muslim Independence 
Movement (MIM) was founded in 1967 by Datu Untog Matalam, an affiliate of a 
traditional aristocratic family with other Muslim elites.
248
 In other words, MIM was a 
platform for the long-established Moro supremacy elite, who endeavoured to regain 
their lost political power.
249
  
 
However, MNLF emerged in 1972 led by Nur Misuari and played a significant role in 
the struggle of Moro political power.
250
 MNLF was proven as very strong and 
responsible in upholding the Moro social, economic and political movement at least 
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until it attained its goal in 1996, with the signing of the Peace Accord Treaty between 
MNLF and Ramos government.
251
  Instead of Nur Misuari as the head, young 
educated men who returned from the Middle East and other Southeast Asian countries 
with new paradigms and better political strategies managed the MNLF. Syed Serajul 
(1998) also stated: “Its leadership is derived from educated youths who understood 
political tactics and strategy”.252  Consistent struggles in the Moro movement meant it 
relied on sturdy and organized groups like MNLF.   
 
The third factor was support from many Islamic countries including, Malaysia, Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia. Moro‟s long-decades of struggle were also supported by 
international organizations such as the Muslim World League (MWL), the Muslim 
World Congress (MWC) and the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC).
253
 As 
stated by Syed Serajul (1998) again “At the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Minister, held in Jeddah in July 1975, the MNLF was given formal recognition by the 
OIC”.254 Following this, the Philippine Government was forced by the international 
community, especially Muslim countries, to participate in a peace treaty with MNLF. 
Finally, two treaties signed in 1996, The Tripoli Agreement and the Davao Peace 
Agreement established an autonomous region to create stability and peace in this 
region.
255
    
 
A fourth key factor in the exacerbation and continuation of the conflict concerns the 
geographic topology of the Philippines, which is comprised of 7107 islands, thereby 
rendering the task of controlling separatists problematic.
256
 The Southern Philippines 
alone are comprised of 3,000 islands including Basilan, Cotabato, Mindanao, and 
Zamboanga, all of which are recognized as safehavens for extremists where they may 
engage in activities such as terrorist training.
257
 It is reported that the beneficiaries of 
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such safehavens include Dulmatin and Umar Patek, who are believed to be connected 
to the Bali bombings of 2002 and who met up with two notable JI fugitives, the 
Malaysian Zulkifli bin Hir and Asep, an Indonesian, both of whom fled after the 
bombing of the Atrium Mall in Jakarta in September 2001.
258
 Another notable 
beneficiary of the safehaven is Abdul Rahman Ayub, the former Australia JI leader in 
Sydney, who assisted in the running of terrorist training prior to the interception of his 
telecommunications by the Australian authorities.
259
  
 
A fifth principal factor was the collaborative arrangements, particularly the historical 
relationship with the US.
260
 Philippine president Arroyo is renowned for developing a 
strong alliance with the US and in particular with the Bush administration. Arroyo 
engineered the US return to the Philippines and in the post 9/11 environment has 
perceived them to be a key ally in the fight against both international and domestic 
terrorism within the Philippines.
261
 However, the Moros perceived this alliance as one 
in which the government of the Philippines was collaborating with an „enemy‟ adding 
further fuel to calls for the establishment of an Islamic state and revenge against the 
crusaders.
262
 The extensive presence of the US military in the Philippines was 
compromised by the clause within Article 10, Section 21 of the Philippine 
Constitution that in effect excludes such military presence stating: 
 
 
The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of 
the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and 
utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defence and security of the regions 
shall be the responsibility of the National Government.
263
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Subsequently, the US military presence is restricted to a training and advisory role, a 
position which unites the opinions of both Moros and other Filipinos.
264
  
 
 
2.6 Radicalism in Southern Thailand     
The Southern Thailand crisis can be seen from insurgency in the southern provinces. 
Insurgency occurs between groups of separatists that centred in Pattani, Yala and 
Narathiwat-the three regions in Southern Thailand with a Muslim majority. Ninety-
five percent of the population are Muslim and the rest are Buddhist, accounting for 
1.3million of the 1.7million population.
265
 Altogether, Muslims in these regions 
constitute 3.2million or about 5 percent of the total population in Thailand.
266
 More 
than 4000 have died since the insurgency started in 2004.
267
 Many more were 
detained by the Thail Government and some evacuated to Malaysia and other 
countries to avoid punishment.
268
 This crisis has had a significant impact on Southeast 
Asian security.      
 
The situation in Southern Thailand arose out of what had occurred hundreds of years 
earlier. In the 11
th
 century, the Pan Pan Kingdom was transformed into the Pattani 
Sultanate.
269
 The close relationship between Pattani and the Siam kingdom broke 
down after the change of the ruling dynasty and the political ideology in Siam. Pattani 
was the symbol of Malay resistance to Siamese power.
270
 A number of Pattani and 
Malay people were pressured and tortured by Siamese until recently.
271
 The Bangkok 
Treaties of 1902 and 1909 between Bangkok and the British Government significantly 
reduced the power of the Pattani Kingdom.
272
 Kelantan and Terengganu, part of the 
southern provinces of the Pattani kingdom, were given to the British and three more 
provinces, Pattani, Yala and Bangnara (later changed to Narathiwat) came under the 
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rule of Bangkok.
273
 Duncan McCargo (2008) outlined that an insurgency in Southern 
Thailand could be described as: “an insurgency not a Jihad, it is not about Islam but 
about the position of Malay Muslims in the Thai state and society”.274 
 
Since then, insurgencies and rebellions between the Malays and the government of 
Bangkok have continued. Southern Malays still want to have their own government or 
at least total autonomy in executive and legislative power.
275
 However, Siamese 
leaders have always treated the Southerners harshly. Clashes of identity and culture 
between Buddhists and Malay Muslims have been frequent and continue to escalate.  
 
Since the 13
th 
century, history has recorded Siam as a super power in this region.
276
 
Siam has a huge territory including Burma and Laos in the north and the Malay 
peninsular in the south.
277
 Few states in southern Siam including Pattani, Kelantan, 
Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis were under the King of Siam‟s sovereignty.278 Fixed 
„Ufti‟ (obeisance) must be attributed to the King of Siam every three years as a proof 
of Siam sovereignty.
279
 But then, historically these states acted according to Malay 
culture, language, religion (Islam) and administration in their daily life. The British 
Empire forced the King of Siam to make a treaty in 1909 called the Anglo-Siamese 
Treaty.
280
 This treaty ceded Siam sovereignty of Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and 
Perlis to the British, except Pattani.
281
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Pattani was divided into three provinces, which were Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala in 
1933.
282
 Since the „1909 Bangkok Treaty‟, people in these monthon (provinces) have 
assimilated with Thai culture. They speak Thai, have Thai names as well as Muslim 
names,
283
 write in Thai better than Jawi
284
 and many more „Thailandisms‟ were 
adopted. However, people in this province still practice Malay culture, feel they are 
Muslim Malay and sometimes feel better staying with Malaysian customs rather than 
Thai.
285
 This created a group of separatists a few decades after the 1909 Treaty in 
Thailand.
286
  
 
Interestingly, this history between Siam and Britain was revealed before and after the 
1909 treaty. In the late 19
th
 century, many Western imperialists came across the 
continent to claim new territory and to realize the 3G‟s287 concepts. At that time, the 
British already had supremacy in Penang from the Sultan of Kedah and Singapore 
from the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty.
288
 This treaty has had a vital impact, especially on 
the boundaries and quest for identity for Southeast Asian people.
289
 Britain and Siam 
secretly formed a treaty in 1897 that recognized Thai sovereignty over Kelantan and 
Terengganu as long as Thailand denied making any business deals with other 
imperialists such as France, Spain, the United States and Germany.
290
 In 1902, one 
more treaty was signed between Siam and Britain, however,  most important was the 
1909 treaty, the implications of which still have impact today.
291
  During World War 
II, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu were taken by Thailand as an advantage 
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of being aligned with the Japanese. After WW II, Britain took back all of this country 
based on the treaty of 1909.
292
   
 
From 1930 until today, various actions and groups have been founded in Southern 
Thailand with the purpose of agitating and escaping from Siam sovereignty. This 
separatist movement began with the attempts of Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin in 
1930s, a prominent Pattani leader who was the son of the last Raja of Pattani.
293
 He 
allied himself with the British during WWII hoping that the allies would win, but then 
the British were beaten by the Japanese.
294
 Thailand, the only country in Southeast 
Asia not invaded by any imperial power, imposed much of the Thai culture on the 
Pattani province.
295
 Grievances and intent to have their own state and autonomy 
dragged on until the 1960s and became serious from the 1990s onwards. Groups such 
as The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), Barisan Revolusi Nasional-
Koordinasi (BRN-C), Gerakan Mujahideen Patani / Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani 
(GMP/GMIP), The Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), New PULO and Jemaah Salafi 
have become fringe and major players in the Southern Thai insurgency.
296
  
 
Rebellions in Southern Thailand have demonstrated all of the characteristics of long 
running conflicts such as religious disputes, separatist activities, crime, unfair 
treatment, personal vendettas and many more. Resistances to negotiation settlements 
have caused grievances and a sense of separateness that created such rebellion in the 
first place.
297
 The undeniable fact is all of the conflict in this region, especially in 
Southern Thailand, is because ethnic and religious minorities located at the periphery 
of large states have continued this conflict.
298
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The first factor that caused rebellion in Southern Thailand was religion.
299
 Buddhism 
is the major religion in Thailand with more than 95 percent of the population being 
Buddhist and less than 5 percent Muslim.
300
 Aside from the freedom to follow Islamic 
teachings, Muslims felt unfairly treated.
301
 They felt Buddhists did not like them, 
especially those in the police and the army.
302
 However, Buddhists also felt 
uncomfortable with the series of murders on their side. Many Buddhist monks and 
Ustazs were victimized. It is not known whether these series of deaths were caused by 
separatists or criminal gangs that took advantage of the incidents. Separatist groups 
not only attacked Buddhists and civilians but also Muslims. Government statistics 
show that two-thirds of people being killed are Muslim.
303
 Militant groups are thought 
to be attacking locals who do not share their ideals.
304
  
 
Rebellions have also targeted fellow Muslims suspected of conspiring with the 
military, known for its brutality in dealing with Islamic militants. In contrast, former 
Thai Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, publicly denied the role of religion in the 
attacks, when quoted as saying before the election he did not "think religion was the 
cause of the problems down there because several of the policemen killed were 
Muslim".
305
 This statement was revealed by separatists as a method of calming the 
people in the South.
306
  
 
The second factor is drug trafficking and criminal groups.
307
 Thailand is among the 
countries in this world with lenient laws about arms and weapons.
308
 People can easily 
get access to arms in Thailand, especially in the Southern Provinces.
309
 In several 
cases, Malaysians, especially criminal groups, also use the lack of enforcement in 
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Southern Thailand to buy arms. Thailand is known as a country awash with weapons, 
with some armies involved in black market weapons trading.
310
 This has played a key 
role in transporting surplus Chinese weapons to the Khmer Rouge regime in 
Cambodia. The Tamil Tigers (LTTE) rebel groups had an office in Thailand for many 
years just to purchase weapons for their insurgents.
311
 The breakdown of law and 
order and incipient corruptions led to a loss of control over state arsenals in 
Thailand.
312
 As proved in 2002, there were discoveries of weapons in bulk numbers 
such as M-60s, M-16s, AK-47s and many more in Thailand. They have been exported 
to Aceh, the Philippines and Myanmar.
313
  
 
These matters gave civilians an opportunity to have their own arms and later create 
groups of criminals or become rebels.
314
 Drug smugglers take advantage of the 
conflict in Southern Thailand to expand their businesses.
315
 Respondent A3 said in an 
interview on December 5, 2007: “drug traffickers use these incidents as a convenient 
market for drugs”.316 Thailand has become important for drugs traffickers because 75 
percent of drugs produced each year in the Golden Triangle are transported through 
Bangkok to reach the rest of the world.
317
  
 
Traffickers have also played a major role in causing rebellions in Southern Thailand. 
Police were forced to control the movement rather than their own business.
318
 
Respondent A3 also said “traffickers gunned down Muslims, Buddhists and police to 
create conflict between religion and rebellion against the government”. 319  Former 
Interior Minister Purachai Piemsomboon attributed some attacks on the police as 
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relating to drug control, saying the "police are making serious efforts to make arrests 
over drugs trafficking”.320 
 
The third factor is poverty and „dualism‟. The southern provinces, which are Yala, 
Narathiwat and Pattani are recognized as the poorest provinces in Thailand.
321
 
Southern Thailand has always lagged far behind the rest of the country in its growth 
of economy. With poverty rates of 45.6 percent, Narathiwat is known as the poorest 
district in Thailand. Second poorest is Yala with 37.9 percent.
322
 The question is why 
have the Southern provinces become the poorest area of Thailand? Is it lack of 
economic infrastructure or is it due to being overlooked by the central government? 
Narathiwat-based human rights lawyer, Peerawat Praweenamai said, “The 
government didn‟t look after the local people here, they just sent officers from 
Bangkok who did things for their own benefit, not that of the locals”.323 These people 
felt the government neglected them intentionally, which caused anger and grievance. 
This situation made it easier for militant groups to exploit them. People become 
involved in militancy and rebellion to get equality in economic distribution and to 
avoid hunger.      
 
A fourth factor was separatism.
324
 The separatist movement in Southern Thailand was 
recognized as a major cause of what has happened today. Besides the Hill tribes on 
the border with Myanmar, who also requested their own country, separatists in 
Southern Thailand have had a big impact on government policy.
325
  Separatist groups 
calling for the emergence of a separate Islamic state first emerged in the 1970s.
326
 
However the movement for separatism of Pattani from the Kingdom of Thailand had 
already appeared in the 1890s.
327
 The Sultan of Pattani, who lost his sovereignty and 
power to Thailand, fought for the rights. But this movement was not supported by 
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either groups from the army, Thai administration or the British in Malaysia. 
Grievances became legitimate since Pattani was put under the sovereignty of the King 
of Thailand and felt left out of the Buddhist Thai nation.
328
  
 
The first separatist group founded in Southern Thailand was the Pattani United 
Liberation Organization (PULO) in 1968.
329
 A new separatist group that opposed the 
nationalist agenda of PULO was founded in 1984 named Barisan Pembebasan Pattani 
Nasional (Pattani National Liberation Front, BNPP).
330
 Other separatist groups were 
founded later, such as Gerakan Mujahideen Pattani or Gerakan Mujahideen Islam  
Pattani (GMP/GMIP), The Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK), Barisan Revolusi 
Nasional Koordinasi (BRN-C), New PULO and Jemaah Salafi.
331
 
 
Separatists struggled for an independent Islamic state, the right to implement Islamic 
pillars and to get full autonomy in the province.
332
 Hundreds of bombings and arson 
attacks have happened since 2001. In January 2004, unidentified gunmen raided an 
army ammunition depot in the Narathiwat Province in the early morning, and stole 
more than 100 rifles and other ammunition.
333
 Since then attacks, killings, explosions, 
robberies and other criminal acts have taken place every day. Mahkota Kasturi, a 
PULO foreign affairs spokesman in exile in Sweden, says separatists seek to disrupt 
Thai society as a way to finally win freedom: “The killings and the violence will 
continue until we reach our goal, and that is independence”.334 
 
The last factor is personal vendettas.
335
 Two main causes of conflict between Muslims 
and non Muslims in Southern Thailand are the Tak Bai and Kerisik Mosque incidents 
and a series of kidnappings and killings of Muslims. Seventy-eight Muslims were 
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killed in the October 2004 incident.
336
 This started after police detained six Muslim 
men who were accused of having supplied weapons to rebels.
337
 Hundreds of people 
gathered in front of Tak Bai police station to demonstrate and demand their release.
338
 
The Army was called and then tear gas and water cannons were used on the 
demonstrators, followed by shooting. Seven people were killed and hundreds were 
arrested. They were thrown into army trucks with their hands tied behind their 
backs.
339
 Seventy-eight people died on the long journey to the army camp. This 
incident sparked widespread protests in the south and across Thailand.
340
  
The second cause of conflict in Southern Thailand is the series of killings and 
kidnappings by the Army and the police.
341
 Locals believe they are the contributing 
factor for some deaths of Ustaz and Ulama. They also believe dozens of Ustaz, Ulama 
and Islamic scholars were kidnapped by the Army.
342
 Many of them were scared and 
felt they had been treated unfairly by security forces. Local Muslims complained the 
forces treated them as enemies, shooting first and asking questions later. Currently 
20,000 soldiers are serving in this province and most of them come from other 
areas.
343
 Locals had a bad impression of them and felt outsiders Armies were not 
familiar with their culture.
344
  
 
 
2.7 Radicalism in Singapore       
Singapore has faced at least six conflicts with various Islamic movements since the 
1950s. These started with the Maria Hertogh riots in 1950,
345
 followed by the 
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agitation of the Malay National Party and Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) for 
Melayu Raya in 1950.
346
 This was followed by the threats of Angkatan Revolusi 
Tentara Islam (Revolutionary Islamic Army) in 1961, the communal riots in 1964 and 
1969, threats by the Singapore People‟s Liberation Organization in 1981 and the 
attempts by Hizbollah to recruit Muslim Singaporeans for American interest 
bombings in 1990 and 1998.
347
   
 
Singaporean Muslims who made up 16 percent of the population were involved in 
radical activities for various reasons. The main reason was feeling separated by the 
government. Bilveer Singh (2007) stated: “…many Singapore Muslims believed that 
they have been systematically marginalized and discriminated by the Chinese 
dominated government...”348 Singaporean Muslims who are mostly of Malay ethnicity 
felt unfairly treated by the Chinese-dominated government when it came to social, 
economic and political aspects. Most of them compared this to Malays in Malaysia 
who had the extra benefit of a Malay-dominated government.
349
  
 
Geographically, Singapore is located in the heart of Malay Muslim majority countries 
including Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the Southern Philippines and Southern 
Thailand. Ali Imron in his interview stated: “The Muslim axis needs to be developed 
and strengthened regardless of boundaries and who dominates the government”.350 
Any movement regarding Muslims in this region should view Singapore as the centre 
and important hub in the Malaysian kingdom.
351
 Singapore‟s foreign policies always 
support their Western counterparts, especially the US and Israel, which are deemed 
anti-Islam.
352
 Many of Singapore‟s decisions to support US foreign policy, especially 
in the Middle East and Israel, were regarded as a threat to Islam.
353
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Most Muslim majority countries in this region have their own radical groups such as 
KMM in Malaysia, JI in Indonesia, MILF in the Philippines, GMIP and PULO in 
Thailand. However, Singapore has only a JI cell that later played a big role in 
establishing and planning violent activities.
354
 The Singapore branch of the JI, 
originated from the brotherhood and kinship relationship between Johorean and 
Singaporean Muslim Malays. It started with JI Wakalah Singapore by family 
members of JI Wakalah Johor and ended up with the emergence of seven more Fiah 
(cells). JI successfully operated in Singapore undetected from the early 1990s, with 
Ibrahim Maidin as the founder.
355
 
 
JI Wakalah Singapore was formally established in 1993, at the same time as JI‟s first 
emergence in this region.
356
 Ikhwan programmes including Usrah and Tamrin (short 
course) were constantly established in Johor through Pak Abas and Ustaz Harun‟s 
connection in the 1990s.
357
 This meeting always included ikhwan (brother) members 
from Singapore. Hashim Abas, the brother of Nasir Abas (leader of Mantiqi Tsalis) 
and a few members who lived in Singapore had already established the Wahhabism 
ideology and indirectly supported the idea of establishing an Islamic Caliphate. Later, 
Ibrahim Maidin (ex Mujahidin) established JI Wakalah Singapore through the 
Afghan-alumnus network.
358
           
 
For the first decade, JI Singapore was organized into five functional units, which were 
the Missionary or Education Unit, Economy Unit, Operation Unit, Security Unit and 
Communication Unit.
359
 Tajnid or the Security Unit was responsible for their 
members‟ security from infiltration and detection.360 Meanwhile, the most significant 
section was an Operation Unit - used for intelligence and spy activities.
361
 The 
Economic Unit carried out financial matters, especially sourcing money for 
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„operation‟ costs and fund raising. 362  The Missionary or Education Unit was 
responsible for Usrah, Tamrin and other internal training.
363
 The Communication Unit 
was responsible for JI‟s explanations and propaganda as well as looking after the 
networking between members using electronic and non-electronic devices.
364
    
 
JI Singapore did not operate on its own as JI in Malaysia. JI Singapore was grouped 
under JI Mantiqi Ula (Johor branch) and worked in the same line as other 
Wakalahs.
365
 All decisions came from JI Mantiqi Ula, which were Ba‟asyir and 
Hambali. Besides five crucial units, JI Singapore also formed seven „Fiah‟, which 
were Fiah Ayub, Fiah Musa, Fiah Ismail, Fiah Ya‟akub, Fiah Syuaib, Fiah Daud and 
Fiah Nuh.
366
          
 
The Singapore government has detained 13 JI members under the ISA since 2002
367
. 
They are Ibrahim Maidin, Mohamad Anuar Margono, Khalim Jaffar, Ja‟afar 
Mistooki, Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana, Mohammed Ellias Khan, 
Nazir Uthman, Adnan Musa, Halim Hussain, Hashim Abas, Andrew Gerard aka Ali 
Ridhaa and Othman Mohamed. Except for Faiz, a Singaporean-born Malaysian 
national, the rest were Singaporean.
368
  
 
These individuals were arrested between December 9 and 24, 2001 and detained for 
two years from January 6, 2002 for terrorism-related activities.
369
 However, two 
others who were caught were later freed the same day on a Restriction Order (RO) for 
two years. Singaporean authorities revealed this information after a series of 
interrogations. They discovered JI members were trying to get 17 tonnes of 
Ammonium Nitrate after obtaining four tonnes in Malaysia from businessman, Faiz 
Abu Bakar Bafana
370
. The total of 21 tonnes of Ammonium Nitrate would have been 
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used for truck bombings as was used in the Oklahama bombing in 1995.
371
 Their plan 
was ruined when Mohammed Ellias tried to buy the chemical from a local shop and 
was arrested by the Internal Security Department (ISD).
372
  
 
The group targeted a shuttle bus service used by US personnel to travel between 
Yishun MRT stations in the north to the Sembawang wharf.
373
 A videotape of the 
shuttle service and debriefing notes written in Arabic were discovered in the bombed 
house of an al-Qaeda leader in Afghanistan.
374
 The second target was US naval 
vessels in the northeast of Singapore.
375
 ISD also found maps with observation posts 
marked in Johor and Singapore and a „kill zone‟ between Changi and Pulau Tekong, 
which is now being used for military training.
376
 
 
The ISD also said this group had a list of “over 200 US companies in Singapore with 
three marked targets because the office-bearers were prominent members of the 
17,000 US communities”.377 Mohamed Khalim, one of JI‟s key Singaporean players 
when arrested, had two faked Singaporean passports on him, as well as 15 forged 
Malaysian and Filipino immigration stamps and writing and drawings about bomb 
making written in Malay and English.
378
               
 
JI Singapore is also believed to have had a direct network with Hambali.
379
 Malaysian 
based regional „Syura‟ or consultative council led by Hambali organized weekly and 
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monthly meetings either in Singapore or Johor.
380
 But JI Singapore members also 
travelled up to Kuala Lumpur and Selangor to meet Hambali, Sungkar and Ba‟asyir. 
Some exercises and physical training were coordinated between Hambali and JI 
Wakalah Johor in a few places in Johor.
381
 Furthermore, some JI Singapore members 
were also trained in Afghanistan and in camps Hudaibiyah and Abu Bakar, run by the 
JI Mantiqi Tsalis and MILF in the Southern Philippines.
382
     
 
JI also had their own plan to prepare Malaysia and Singapore as a centre for a series 
of attacks.
383
 Targets in Singapore would include the water pipelines in Tambak Johor 
(Johor Causeway) and the Ministry of Defence.
384
 The main objective was to create a 
situation in Malaysia and Singapore that would be conducive to overthrow the 
Malaysian government so the Islamic state could rise in Malaysia.
385
 To some extent, 
JI members were also playing with racial issues aimed to stir up ethnic conflict 
between Chinese and Malays that would create another „Ambon‟ in this region.386 If it 
did happen, the benefit would go to militants who saw the opportunity for new 
„Medan Jihad‟ to perform holy war and to find syaheed (martyr).387         
 
At least eight of the 13 JI Singapore members were confirmed to have been trained by 
the JI members in camp Sadda in Afghanistan to use AK-47s and mortars along with 
guerrilla war tactics.
388
 Through coordination by Ba‟asyir and Sungkar, they attended 
short courses about Jihad and took the oath or bai‟ah in Madrasah Ittiba‟us Sunnah, 
Kuala Pilah before taking part in the Afghan war as Jihadist fighters.
389
 Hambali, with 
help from JI members in Karachi and the Pakistani Embassy staff in Kuala Lumpur 
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arranged all of the necessary documents for them to fly to Karachi before entering 
Afghanistan.
390
    
 
 
 
Chart 1: The links between JI (Malaysian cell) with Southeast Asian militant groups 
in regional contact and with al-Qaeda as international indirect contact since 
1990s.
391
  
 
 
At least three Fiahs were assigned to terrorist support or terrorist related activities by 
the JI Singapore cell.  They are known as „Fiah Musa‟, „Fiah Ayub‟ and „Fiah Ismail‟. 
Four more Fiahs („Fiah Yakub‟, „Fiah Syuib‟, „Fiah Daud‟ and „Fiah Nuh‟) were 
„feeders‟ - to prepare for any needs that arose from the first three Fiahs.392 The oldest 
operation cell called „Fiah Ayub‟ was led by Khalim bin Jaffar. This cell started 
exploring targets in Singapore as early as 1997, keeping an eye out for locations 
frequently visited in Singapore by Americans.
393
  
 
„Fiah Musa‟ was known as the second most important operation cell for JI 
Singapore.
394
 Among JI Singapore members who were placed in this cell were Fathi 
Abu Bakar Bafana, Mohd Nazir and Adnan Musa
395
. Foreigners of Arab origin, 
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codenamed „Sammy‟, headed this cell from 1997 until 2001.396 His counterpart, a 
Filipino of Indonesian origin called „Mike‟, was responsible for getting ammonium 
nitrate for operations
397
. Sammy was believed to be linked to al-Qaeda while Mike 
was a trainer and bomb maker for the MILF.
398
 Sammy and Mike identified as Fathur 
Rahman al-Ghozi and Jabarah Mohamed Mansur were arrested in the Quiapo district 
in the Philippines and in Oman in January 2002.
399
    
 
The JI Singapore members held a meeting at a car park by the waterfront, where they 
discussed targets for potential attacks in the city, including Western embassies and a US 
warship in a Singapore harbour.
400
 The Canadian Broadcasting Centre reported “Jabarah, who 
was already listed in Canadian police files as an al-Qaeda suspect, became the object of an 
international manhunt”.
401
 He was arrested three months later in the Persian Gulf state of 
Oman, and brought back to Canada in April 2002, where he was interrogated for several days 
by Canadian intelligence agents.
402
 After four days, Jabarah was taken to the US-Canada 
border, where he was handed over to American authorities. He has been in US custody ever 
since.
403
 
 
Fiah Musa was responsible for gathering information for the targets of their attacks in 
Singapore
404
. Andrew Gerard, a JI member who was a technician in Singapore 
Technologies Aerospace (STA), took more than 50 digital photographs of the Paya 
Lebar airbase and American aircrafts.
405
 Sammy, Mike, Gerard and his cell members 
conducted surveillance of several premises linked to the West, such as the US 
Embassy, Australian High Commission, British High Commission, Israeli Embassy, 
commercial buildings with American companies and the Defence Complex at Bukit 
Gombak.
406
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The other operation cell was called Fiah Ismail. It was formed after 9/11. Fiah Ismail 
was considered immature (at an early stage) when the series of arrests by the ISD and 
other authorities in Southeast Asia took place. Fiah Ismail carried out preliminary 
surveillance of several targets, including U.S related premises, for future attacks.
407
 
However, the crackdown of JI by Malaysian authorities stopped these plans from 
happening. Then, the few „key players‟ fled the country to avoid arrest.408  
 
Extensive efforts and competent surveillance by the Singapore government made JI 
weaker and unable to rebuild. The series of arrests and detention under the ISA 
paralyzed JI in Singapore.
409
 Co-operation with authorities from neighbouring 
countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand successfully stopped the threat of 
JI in Singapore.
410
    
   
2.8 Conclusion 
Experience shows long-standing civil conflicts have prevented lasting peace, 
particularly when land and other natural resources are in dispute. Realistically 
however, internal governance in the Philippines, conflict fatigue on both sides, and 
international political and security concerns have emerged since 9/11. These factors 
offer an opportunity to come to terms with the reality of pluralism in the Southern 
Philippines, and to finally bring peace to the second longest communal conflict on the 
globe.
411
 The human and economic benefits would be substantive, not only for the 
Moro population of the island and the inhabitants of the directly affected areas, but 
also for the Christian areas of Mindanao and the Philippines as a whole. The impact of 
a conflict resolution in the Philippines may extend to other countries in Southeast 
Asia as a positive example to Southern Thailand, Indonesia and others, and an 
improvement in the international image of the region.  
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The peace process between MNLF and the Philippine Government is an important 
step towards building lasting peace and development of the southern Philippines. The 
long history of and failed approaches to stop conflict have so deeply divided the 
people of the southern Philippines that any peace agreement is likely to be met with 
failure. Whether the peace process will be any different depends on the enthusiasm 
and the ability of the parties to go beyond their political agenda. It is only when there 
is real national consensus that the terms of the peace pact can be implemented in a 
way that directly addresses the grievances of the Moro people.
412
  
 
Finally, the success of the most recent peace agreement has the potential to change 
both the political and the social climate across Southeast Asia. It has a significant 
impact on the containment of radical and terrorist activities in this region. The 
emergence of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Rajah Solaiman Movement 
(RSM) was a result of a new paradigm shift in militant movement.
413
 Moreover, al-
Qaeda and JI use MNLF and MILF as well as ASG as their associates in establishing 
an Islamic state using terrorist means.
414
 However, such success is totally dependent 
on the implementation of the agreement and the extent to which the Bangsamoro is 
capable of managing its autonomy effectively.
415
 Notwithstanding this, neighbouring 
Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Myanmar and Singapore are 
eager to see positive developments in the Southern Philippines and the economic 
benefits that will ensue.  
 
Issues in Southern Thailand have changed the political and economic movements in 
Southeast Asia as every country in the region already makes an effort to solve this 
problem. But the reality is that from time to time the situation is dangerous and is 
often getting worse. The impacts are not just on the Thai government but have also 
affected all of the nations in this region. One of the initiatives undertaken by the Thai 
government was on March 2005, when former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun 
                                                 
412
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was appointed chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), and was 
given the task of ensuring peace was brought back to the South. 
416
 
 
Transparent enquiries into the 78 casualties on April 28, 2004, the Tak Bai tragedy 
must be conducted as this incident is regarded as a turning point for separatist acts 
that were more violent than previous ones. The Thai Government has to establish a 
special task committee in order to probe the disappearances of Ustazs and Ulamas as 
well as Muslim and Malay activists. Muslims believe that these disappearances are 
cases of kidnappings by government officials.
417
 Furthermore, the Thai government 
has to stop sending dishonest military officials to the southern provinces and provide 
them with sufficient cultural awareness training. Malay southerners have to be part of 
the administration and security forces, particularly in Southern Thailand.
418
   
  
However, the coup in Thailand on September 20, 2006, brought hope to Southerners, 
Muslims, Buddhists and countries in Southeast Asia. Many perspectives and reactions 
from all over the world were focused on the coup. The hope is that the new 
government will put its full commitment and concentration towards tackling problems 
in Southern Thailand. ASEAN and Thailand‟s neighbours such as Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Myanmar and Singapore are eager to see positive initiatives carried out by 
the new government to promote peaceful life in Southern Thailand and Southeast 
Asia.     
 
Radicalism is a portion of grievances. Many countries in Southeast Asia are not really 
concerned with radicalism. It is not seen as a threat either locally or regionally, but 
radicalism will lead to militancy and eventually to acts of terrorism. To control this, 
all countries in Southeast Asia have to look at the needs of this group - the reasons 
contributing to activism. It is also important to understand that there are more 
hospitable environments in this region for terrorists and radicals to operate from. The 
total number of radical groups operating with impunity outside of the legal political 
system is cause enough for a security threat.   
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The emergence of a regional terrorist network affiliated with al-Qaeda that has been 
operating in secret for more than a decade is a new challenge confronting Southeast 
Asia. The JI is more dangerous and difficult to manage because of its ability to 
camouflage its activities behind Islamic practices. Careful action should be taken by 
Southeast Asian countries to show their resistance to threats posed by terrorism and 
not by Islam, as Islam opposes terrorism.   
 
At this time, the struggle of KMM and JI with Southern Thailand are completely 
different. JI and KMM‟s long term struggle is to establish an Islamic caliphate in this 
region. However, for Southern Thailand separatists, their struggle is to re-establish 
their ruined kingdom. Meanwhile the Southern Philippine resistance is for a total 
region of autonomy and legitimate Sulu Sultanate. KMM focused their struggle more 
on achieving the Islamic political aims of PAS and protecting PAS leaders from 
danger. JI was a transformation of NII, and their goal was to establish an Islamic 
caliphate consisting of Southeast Asian countries.  
 
The insurgency in Southern Thailand is more about the group of people who are the 
descendents of the Pattani Kingdom, fighting for their own autonomous government.  
However, direct contact was developed by some KMM members, especially from the 
K3M branch with Southern Thailand separatists for arms supplies but they never 
discussed militant and violent operations. Meanwhile, JI through Hambali and Yazid 
Sufaat established networking with Southern Thailand‟s Afghan alumni for newly 
regional connections. Abdul Fatah, the Afghan alumni‟s representative rejected this 
idea because of his interest in nationalist movements, and he was also reluctant to get 
al-Qaeda involved in domestic problems.      
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Chapter III- 
RADICAL ISLAM IN MALAYSIA 
 
As far as we know, their intentions are to create trouble and to try and 
overthrow the government by terrorist means…KMM had the idea of setting 
up a so-called Islamic country through the union of three countries, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines.
419
  
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction      
Malaysia has significant experience in tackling militant threats either brought by 
terrorist or communist organizations.
420
 This experience in handling terrorism and 
militancy highlights the government's ability to face such issues. For example, 
successful negotiations between the Malaysian government and the Communist Party 
of Malaya over time explain how peaceful methods and diplomacy operate within 
Malaysia's socio-political system.
421
 As a result of these careful controls, between 
1948 and 1989, there was only one armed rebellion caused by the Communist Party of 
Malaya.
422
 
 
However, significant radicalism emerged in Malaysia in the 1970s and since this time 
several radical groups have been formed including Tentera Sabiullah, Koperasi 
Angkatan Revolusi Islam Malaysia (KARIM), Golongan Rohaniah, Kumpulan Crypto, 
Kumpulan Mohd Nasir Ismail. Kumpulan Jundullah, Kumpulan Revolusi Islam 
Ibrahim Libya, Kumpulan Mujahidin Kedah (KMK), Kumpulan Perjuangan Islam 
Perak (KPIP), Al-Maunah, KMM and JI.
423
 Some of these groups have tried to stir up 
trouble related to ethnic relationships in Malaysia and some have been involved in 
terrorist activities. 
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As the Malaysian government controlled these radical groups, they were mostly 
unable to develop or increase in numbers.  However, there have been 13 militant 
groups identified by the Home Ministry as having planned and/or attempted a violent 
takeover of the country‟s administration since 1967.424 Islamic-related violence in 
Malaysia has gradually increased since this time.  Religious radicalism in Malaysia is 
normally connected with Islam rather than any other religion.  However, the eruption 
of sporadic violence in Malaysia has no connection with the theological needs among 
Muslims or government-shaped policy. After the Malaysian independence, the 
Islamic norms and dakwah (preaching) became vital and necessary for the people of 
Malaysia who needed such spiritual support after hundreds of years of colonization.
425
 
The British colonization era strongly influenced and shaped Malaysia's political, 
economic and social systems but the country needed to find its own way and Islam 
provided such a means. 
 
In the late 1960s and 70s, Malaysia was hit by several militant activities including 
arson attacks and rallies, and suffered from ethnic conflict and societal instability.
426
  
The government believed that Middle Eastern elements were involved in these 
activities, working via Malaysian students who had studied in the Middle East.
427
 
Malaysia also alleged that aggressive elements from Libya, Pakistan and India were 
successfully convincing Malaysian students to turn into extremists.
428
  
 
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is also recognized as being one of the factors that 
brought religion-based violence to Malaysia.
429
 This movement was an attempt to 
spread the ideology of revolution abroad to countries such as Malaysia. Many of the 
students who studied in the Middle East, especially the Islamic Party, or Partai Islam 
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Semalaysia (PAS)'s children, were influenced by this ideology.
430
 The incidents in 
Kerling and Kelang, Selangor and Batu Pahat, Johore in 1980 seem to be outcomes of 
the Iranian Revolution's influence in this country.
431
  
 
Between 1980 and 2000, organized Islamic violence became even more extreme and 
caused more deaths than in previous decades. During this period, the Islamic culture 
and theological understanding became more relevant and was strongly followed by 
Malays. Pious Muslims in Malaysia saw the ruling government as not being useful to 
Islam. This kind of thinking is believed to exist because of „Gerakan Turki Muda‟ or 
the Young Turk‟s Movement's432 influence on young Malay Muslim students who 
studied in the Middle East.
433
  
 
The new millennium has seen a new dimension of Islamic-related violence, especially 
in Malaysia. Radical Muslims have wider connections throughout the country and 
region, as well as throughout the world. The 9/11 tragedy has changed the whole 
world's perspective of political and international relations, including Southeast Asia. 
President Bush remarked that Southeast Asia was a „Second Front in the War on 
Terrorism‟.434 In Malaysia, the US-launched war on terrorism was accepted to some 
extent as it was connected to several key security issues in the region.
435
  
 
The first decade in this millennium was marked by organized Islamic-related violence 
in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The militant Islamic group JI orchestrated 
and effectively operated regionally linked terrorism through „heaven nests‟ in the 
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Southern Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.
436
 Malaysia was initially stunned with 
the efficiency exhibited by terrorist group al-Maunah when it carried out an arms heist 
operation at the Malaysian Army Reserve camp at Temenggor Dam in Gerik, 
Perak.
437
  
 
Just a year after entering the new millennium, Malaysia was shocked by two Islamic 
related violence groups in the year 2001. KMM emerged in Malaysia in the 1980s and 
soon became infamous for its religiously-based violence. This home-grown radical 
group was „dismantled‟ three months prior to 9/11. JI also experienced a crackdown 
six months after KMM was discovered by a series of arrests and raids in collaboration 
with the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) in several countries 
including Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines.
438
 Both 
KMM and JI followed the main objectives of establishing „Shari`ah Law‟ and 
„Islamic Caliphate‟ (Islamic governance) as well as bringing back the pristine notion 
of the noble values of Islam.
439
  The Washington Institute for Near East Policy also 
commented on this as “Unifying their disparate states into a caliphate under a single 
ruler, and then waging war from the caliphate on the rest of the world”.440. 
 
Malaysia‟s role in being a haven for militant activists, which facilitated the terrorist 
attacks in US, was uncovered after the investigation of 9/11's terrorists.
441
 
Undoubtedly, it has been indicated that since the early 1990s, Osama bin Laden 
established Southeast Asia, and especially Malaysia, as a comfortable platform for 
operations since militant ideology has been able to graft onto a small but growing 
community of Islamic radicals in the region.
442
 An international terrorist, Wali Khan 
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Amin Shah, who is noted as having had close contact with Ramzi Ahmed Youssef, 
the man who was responsible for the 1993 New York World Trade Centre (NYWTC) 
bombing, was captured in Malaysia in 1995.
443
 
 
He was told that there would be no attacks in Malaysia, because al-Qaeda wanted to 
maintain good relations in the Muslim country, retaining it as a base of operations. 
Then he was taken to the Indian quarter of the city, where he stayed in a small 
hotel.
444
 
 
There is evidence to suggest known terrorists Zacharias Massaoui, Khalid Midhar and 
Nawaf al-Hazmi entered Malaysia during January and September 2000.
445
 All of them 
have been accused of conspiring to launch terrorist attacks on US civilians.
446
 During 
their stay, all their movements were monitored by Malaysian intelligence officers and 
all records were given to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
447
  
 
Yazid Sufaat, one of the JI cell‟s leaders, was accused of providing shelter to all three. 
Yazid Sufaat is also believed to have sheltered Taufiq bin Atash, who was identified 
as being one of the key players in the USS Cole attack in October 2002 in Yemen.
448
  
Although Yazid Sufaat gave shelter and let out accommodation in Hazel Evergreen 
Park, located on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur, to the three terrorists, it is not clear 
whether he actually knew about the history or plans of every visitor he 
accommodated.
449
  
 
Everybody was secretive about what they doing or what they had done. Even 
people who slept in the same room and in the same bed, such as wives of the JI 
and KMM member did not knows. We did not even question every command 
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and we put aside curiosity and suspicionss, the only thing we obeyed was to 
carry out every instruction.
450
   
 
 
 
 
3.2 The Militant Groups in Malaysia 
Malaysia‟s post independence history recorded at least 13 militant groups operating 
nationwide since the first one emerged in 1967.
451
 A major factor of the fanatical 
ideology that emerged was Islamic revivalism.
452
 Islam remained the principal factor 
in dominating socio-politics in Malaysia some decades ago. Malay Muslims believe 
that Islamic revivalism gave a sense of going back to the basic tenets of Islamic 
teaching. It is important to purify oneself from maksiat (disobedience to God) and 
discard hedonistic and materialistic values brought by Westerners.
453
 Furthermore, 
Islam also recognized syumul (total or complete) or the perfect way of life.
454
  „Islam 
is a Way of Life‟, a set of universal, timeless, complete and fully detailed moral and 
wise values for the benefit of mankind. It is part of a voluntary charter or mutual 
contract between the Creator and His creation. One should maintain morality and faith 
in the ultimate justice and in return, he will receive salvation from his Creator. Jansen 
(1979) in his book „Militant Islam‟ also gave an immaculate definition of Islam as: 
“…a vast and integrated system of law, it is a culture and a civilization; it is an 
economic system and a way of doing business; it is a polity and a method of 
governance; it is a special sort of society...”455   
 
In addition, the creed that Islam is a syumul religion in every aspect of a Muslim‟s life 
including politics and governance has become the prominent theme of Islamic 
revivalism in Malaysia as well as worldwide.
456
 Islam is widely known as a religion 
that does not admit any separation between politics and religion. However, separation 
was implemented during colonization and also in the post independence era in many 
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countries including Malaysia.
457
 The grievances of political leaders in post 
independence and the struggle to establish the purifying Islamic political system have 
been among major factors in creating a radical Islamic ideology.  
 
3.3 The Tentera Sabilullah (Holy War Army) 
Tentera Sabilullah was formed in 1967 as the first Islamic-related militant group in 
Malaysia.
458
 The existence of this group can be traced to the Persatuan Melayu 
Semenanjung (Peninsular Malay Organization) incident. On January 21, 1965, the 
Persatuan Melayu Semenanjung (Peninsular Malay Organization) was banned by the 
government, as it was considered a racially-based movement; however, the tipping 
point, causing Tentera Sabilullah to become extremists, was the „Hartal‟ (general 
strike) incident in 1967.
459
  
 
Linked with the devaluation of Malaysian currency after the economic crisis in 1967, 
the municipal government had been torn apart by factionalism and charges of 
corruption, criminal elements, and secret society thugs, which in turn, increased 
tension in Penang.
460
 The Labour Party, whose members were mainly Chinese, called 
for a Hartal. On 24 November 1967, five people were killed and 92 injured. The 
government made a prompt decision to put Penang under curfew and sent in 
additional soldiers and police.
461
  
 
However, the tension in Penang spread to neighbouring states including Kedah, Perak, 
and Kuala Lumpur. A month after the anarchy and militant acts on this small island, 
authorities discovered Tentera Sabilullah, a secret Islamic religious group operating 
in Kedah and Penang.
462
 Tentera Sabilullah aimed to create chaos and tension 
between religions in Malaysia at that time. Their intention was to take revenge for the 
Muslims who died as a result of the Hartal incidents in Penang and Kuala Lumpur. 
An official report released by Tunku Abdul Rahman in January 1968, said that during 
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the riots 29 people had been killed, more than 200 people injured, and about 1,300 
arrested by the police.
463
  
 
Members of Tentera Sabilullah were unhappy with the arrest of their leaders. Most of 
the leaders were detained due to public accusations that  a racialist nature had 
emerged during the period of Hartal.
464
 Tentera Sabilullah made arson attacks on 
several Mosques; Surau in Kubang Pasu, Kubur Panjang and Tanah Merah in Kubang 
Pasu district, and Kedah in 1967.
465
 The main objective of these attacks was to 
suggest that non-Muslims had participated in attacking Muslims‟ sacred places, which 
would later turn into an ethnic clash.
466
  
 
However, this plot was uncovered not long after the incidents. Fourteen leaders of the 
Tentera Sabilullah were arrested and 281 surrendered to the authorities for their part 
in stirring up racial violence.
467
 Most of the Tentera Sabilullah members were also 
part of the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), a legitimate right wing extremist party, 
as reported in the Straits Times on 27 December, 1967 and Eastern Sun on December 
28, 1967.  
 
This group did not immediately dissolve following the raids of 1967 and 1972. This 
group re-activated under the new leader, Isa bin Hussein, who was known as „Bong 
Isa‟. He successfully expanded his influence to re-establish the new Tentera 
Sabilullah in Kota Setar, Jitra, Gurun, Kulim, Baling, Sungai Petani, and Kangar in 
the northern states of Malaysia. The principal objective of this group was to build an 
„Islamic State‟. He was publicly favoured and received mass support from much of 
society especially in rural areas.
468
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Tentera Sabilullah gained strong support after PAS agreed to joint „Alliance‟ with 
UMNO, MIC and MCA in 1973.
469
 However, on 30 October 1978, the right-wing of 
Tentera Sabilullah formed a new radical group called Pertubuhan Angkatan 
Sabilullah, otherwise known as P.A.S. This new group shared the same crucial 
objective with Tentera Sabilullah, which was to establish an „Islamic State‟ through 
militant means.
470
 On 23 January 1980, riots in Kedah by farmers protesting against 
the government's move to introduce a forced-savings scheme, were traced and linked 
to P.A.S. A peace demonstration in front of Wisma Negeri in Alor Star, Kedah turned 
into chaos, which resulted with the arrest of 14 P.A.S. and three PAS members.
471
 
 
 
3.4 The Golongan Rohaniah (Spiritual Group)  
The Golongan Rohaniah was established in 1971 by Haji Abdul Talib bin Haji 
Ahmad aka Haji Abdul Mutalib Naim in Kelang, Selangor.
472
 Most of their activities, 
preaching on Islam, were based on a book written by Ahmad entitled „Mengenal Roh” 
(Knowing Soul).
473
 After five years of existence, Golongan Rohaniah successfully 
gathered wide-spread support from society, including government officers and 
villagers around Kelang valley.
474
     
   
Golongan Rohaniah initially posed no threat to other parties but soon evolved to 
become a militant movement after Abdul Mutalib forced his followers to establish an 
“Islamic State” by toppling the incumbent government through militant activity.475 
Furthermore, the group aimed to demolish the Constitutional Monarchy and 
Parliamentary Democracy system in Malaysia.
476
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After their radical and militant strategy was uncovered by police in 1978, 11 people, 
most of whom were leaders with top positions, were arrested under the ISA. 
Following their arrest, 11 automatic revolvers, 743 bullets, and a hand grenade were 
unearthed by several raids in a few places in Kelang valley. Moreover, many group 
symbols, a drafted manifesto, military uniforms and 60 group flags were confiscated 
by authorities.
477
    
3.5 The Koperasi Angkatan Revolusi Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic 
Revolutionary Front-KARIM) 
Another group whose elucidation of Islam threatened the Malaysian government was 
the Koperasi Angkatan Revolusi Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Revolutionary 
Front-KARIM). KARIM was founded in 1974 by Mohd Ali bin Abdul Rani in Kuala 
Lumpur and later headed by Kamarudin bin Abdul Manaf who ruled until 1983.
478
 In 
the early 1980s, KARIM gained massive grassroots support including former 
Malaysian Military commando elite. KARIM preached of ousting the ruling 
government through acts of violence and militant activities.
479
  
 
Furthermore, KARIM established their target as assemblage of a new republic in the 
country, known as the Government of Islamic Republic in 1983.
480
 They also worked 
to prepare a new government led by Kamarudin Abdul Manaf. In January 1980, 
KARIM was banned after 14 of their members, including five leaders, were detained 
under the ISA. A large supply of ammunition, including 282 bullets, a hand grenade, 
and a bayonet were seized by the authorities. KARIM was recognized as the grass-
root of armed militant operating in Malaysia.
481
  
 
 
3.6 The Kumpulan Crypto (Crypto Group) 
Crypto Group emerged in 1977 with an operation centre in Penang, and later 
expanded into the mainland of Malaysia, particularly prominent in Seberang Perai, 
Kulim, Selangor and Kuala Lumpur.
482
 Mokhtar bin Hassan formed this group with 
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the argument that the Malaysian government was not giving Islam its appropriate and 
rightful dues. Mokhtar used magical power or „black magic‟ as part of his method to 
gain support from the masses and  sustain his objectives.  
Mokhtar claimed he was the Imam Mahdi (an Awaited Saviour) who comes into the 
world to save people. He also claimed the 30 days of fasting during the month of 
Ramadhan as constituting a form of torture. Moreover, he declared the Kaabah in the 
Saudi Kingdom as a stone and nothing of significance. He posited that those who 
perform Hajj are only worshipping an idol and waste their money by traveling to 
Saudi only to perform deviance.  
 
Mokhtar continued by claiming that the „five pillars‟ in Islam should not be followed, 
excluding zakat (giving alms). Shahadah (preaching of faith), prayer, pilgrimage and 
fasting were optional, not compulsory. Heaven is in this present world and there is no 
more life after death. People should enjoy their life in this world. Every marriage will 
be witnessed by the moon and the stars as the greatest creature of God.
483
 The 
functions of priests at the wedding ritual were not required.
484
  
 
Furthermore, Mokhtar also planned to set up a „Theocratic Government‟ by Jihad.485 
Theocratic order also known as „The Government of Jesus” collected strong support 
from police and military members in order to oust the ruling government in the future, 
if necessary.
486
 In order to make preparations for the returning of Jesus into this 
world, Crypto followers needed to establish their own government with a focus on 
politics and the economic system.  
 
After five years of operating in Malaysia, the authorities clamped down on the 
movement. The raid successfully uncovered the items used for the preparation of their 
own government, including flags, special identity cards, „Crypto‟ currency, and 
uniforms with their own style.
487
 The group was halted, and dissolved after nine of its 
leaders were arrested under the ISA on March 23 and 24, 1982.
488
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3.7 The Kumpulan Mohd Nasir Ismail (Mohd Nasir Ismail Group)  
The militant group with the shortest lifespan in Malaysia was identified as the 
Kumpulan Mohd Nasir Ismail. This group was founded in the early 1980s by 
Mohamad Nasir Ismail, a former Cambodian Military officer. He lived in exile in 
Malaysia from the Pol Pot regime that ruled Cambodia between 1975 until 1979. He 
then claimed that he was an Awaited Saviour who has been chosen by God to protect 
human beings from disaster and Dajjal (Imposter).
489
  
 
Thirty members from this group established „God‟s Army in the Earth‟, which 
operated in Batu Pahat, Johor;
490
they performed their operations secretly. The 
authorities discovered this group only after the attack at the Batu Pahat Police Station 
on October 16, 1980. They used parangs or long knives during the attack, and 
believed they were immune from all types of weapons.
491
 They made this attack as a 
starting point towards their ultimate goal of controlling the whole of Malaysia 
establishing an Islamic State.
492
 
 
Eight of the members of Mohd Nasir‟s group were shot dead by the police and eight 
more were detained. Seventeen policeman and civilians were injured during the attack 
that was recognized as the first Islamic-based militant attack in Malaysia.
493
 Only one 
report was published about the existence of this group,, the Malaysian Government 
White Paper. In November 1980, the group was declared „deviant' and was banned by 
the Malaysian government. A number of followers were arrested during a series of 
raids that took place in the vicinity of the Batu Pahat district in Johor Bahru.
494
             
 
  
3.8 The Kumpulan Revolusi Islam Ibrahim Libya (Ibrahim Libya Islamic 
Revolution Group) 
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Kumpulan Revolusi Islam Ibrahim Libya was founded by Ibrahim Mahmood or 
'Ibrahim Libya' as he was popularly called, in April 1985.
495
 He was a member of the 
strong Islamic opposition party called PAS. He had previously held senior positions in 
PAS, at Baling district and Kedah state levels. Ibrahim Libya Islamic Revolution 
Group was associated with the Memali incident that had happened on November 19, 
1985. Fourteen people, including Ibrahim Libya, were killed in the Memali 
incident.
496
 The incident sparked a long-run conflict between the government and 
PAS members. PAS described those who were killed as Syaheed (martyrs). Ibrahim 
Libya was called al-Syaheed Ibrahim Libya by his followers, contrary to the 
Government‟s stance of calling those who died militants.497 
 
Educated at the University of Tripoli and Al-Azhar University, Ibrahim Libya was a 
popular religious teacher based at a Madrasah in Kampung Memali in Mukim Siong, 
Baling Kedah. However, Ibrahim Libya was accused by the Malaysian government of 
manipulating Islam by the distribution of radical teaching in the states of Kedah, 
Penang, and Perak. Among the Kumpulan Revolusi Islam Ibrahim Libya‟s objectives, 
extracted from the Malaysian Government White Paper,
498
 was to encourage Muslims 
to perform Jihad against any government who does not implement Islam in their 
administrations. The group also aimed to protect Ibrahim Libya from arrest by police 
in any circumstances. Furthermore, this movement also sought to expand the teaching 
of Ibrahim Libya and the ideology of radicalism. Finally, they also aimed to 
overthrow the Malaysian government in order to establish an Islamic Revolution 
Government in the future.
499
 
 
The Malaysian government reacted by claiming Ibrahim Libya as a 'deviant'. 
Government also declared his ideology as untrue and later restricted his activities. 
This stance reached its pinnacle when government security forces raided the Markaz 
(Ibrahim Libya residence complex) while Libya was conducting religious lessons.
500
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The Markaz was guarded by hundreds of Ibrahim Libya‟s followers; they tried to 
protect him from arrest by the police.
501
   
 
Eighteen people were killed during the disastrous confrontation between Ibrahim 
Libya‟s supporters and the police. Police reported 14 deaths from Ibrahim Libya‟s 
members and four from police.
502
 Thirty-seven people were injured and 166 arrested 
after the incident.
503
 The Malaysian Government White Paper reported dozens of 
traditional weapons that had been confiscated during the raid, including pump guns, 
long knives (parangs), swords, short chopping knifes (parang kontot), arrows, and 
Molotov cocktails.
504
  
 
 
3.9 The Kumpulan Jundullah (Jundullah Group) 
Kumpulan Jundullah (An army of God) was formed in Pantai Cahaya Bulan in 
Kelantan by Abdul Latiff bin Mohammad. Abdul Latif, a former Deputy 
Commissioner of Terengganu PAS, established this group on August 29, 1987, two 
years after the Memali Incident.
505
  
 
Most of the members were drawn from people from the regions of Kelantan and 
Terengganu who had been influenced by Abdul Latif.
506
 Abdul Latif was described as 
a charismatic, clean, and committed-Islamic cleric leader, especially to Kelantan and 
Terengganu PAS members. Most of the members were recruited through the 
militancy activities that happened at every meeting. Jundullah‟s members also had 
training in Southern Thailand with separatists and rebels from time to time because of 
the convenience of the border.
507
     
 
The main objective was to topple the ruling government with violence and to 
construct the „Islamic state‟ in Malaysia. They were willing to fight with authorities in 
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order to achieve these objectives. However, this group ended after most of its leaders 
were detained under the ISA in October 1987 by the „Operasi Lalang‟.508 Operasi 
Lalang,
509
 also referred to as „Ops Lalang,‟ started on October 27, 1987 by the 
Malaysian police to crack down on opposition leaders and social activists. The 
operation saw the arrest of 106 persons under the ISA, including Abdul Latif and 
Jundullah‟s leaders, to prevent ethnic tension and riots in Malaysia. 
 
 
3.10 The Kumpulan Mujahidin Kedah (Kedah Mujahidin Group) 
Kumpulan Mujahidin Kedah (KMK) was formed in February 1986 after a secret 
meeting held at Manir Mosque, Terengganu.
510
 This meeting was organised on 
January 24, 1986 by an ad-hoc team including Zainon Ismail.
511
 KMK played a 
crucial role in establishing KMM on April 1996 after it was instructed to do so by 
Abu Bakar Chik and Zainon Ismail.  
 
Teachings formerly emphasized Jihad as a main goal and necessity for every Muslim. 
The true Islamic state can only be created by the „ruh Jihad‟ (soul of Jihad). KMK 
also encouraged its members to find Syaheed as the highest point of faith in order to 
gain good reciprocation or rewards from Allah. On the basis of finding Jihad, this 
group attacked and set ablaze the Semarak
512
 stage in Sik, Kedah on June 5, 1988.
513
  
 
Malaysian authorities discovered this group after spying and monitoring KMK 
members following the Semarak incidents. In May 1989, KMK disbanded after 23 of 
their leaders and members were detained under the ISA. Eighteen of them surrendered 
within a few days of a thorough police operation. The entire operation took more than 
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28 days and its cost was estimated at around RM500, 000.
514
 Three hand grenades and 
six pistols were found along with some quantity of ammunitions and bomb-making 
paraphernalia. PAS activists (from youth wing) such as Mohammad Rus Jaafar, 
Shahrul Fuadi Zulkifli, Samsul Bahrin Shaari, and Samsul Kamal Jamhari were 
detained.
515
  
 
However, a few figures escaped from arrest and were living in exile for some years. 
They went to places where they could get shelter and avoid being spied on by the 
police and authorities.
516
 Among them was Zainon Ismail and Zulkifli bin Mohammad 
who later flew to Argoon, Pakistan before entering Afghanistan to join Jihad against 
Soviet Russia. They took part in the war under the instruction of Commander Khalid 
Zubir from the Pakistani-Punjabi Camp.
517
  
 
 
3.11 The Kumpulan Perjuangan Islam Perak (Perak Islamic Movement Group-
KPIP) 
A month after KMK was established in Kedah, Kumpulan Perjuangan Islam Perak 
(Perak Islamic Movement Group or KPIP) emerged in Perak state in March 1986.
518
  
KPIP was formed by Sidek bin Mohd Noor, a Chamber of Perak PAS Youth leader in 
correlation with establishing KMK. KPIP gathered at least 50 youths especially from 
Felcra Lekir, Pangkor Island, and Pasir Salak in Perak Tengah.
519
  
 
KPIP‟s main objective was to physically and mentally prepare their members through 
intense military training. These preparations were vital in order for KPIP to topple the 
Malaysian government and ensure  a pure Islamic-based government.
520
 To make sure 
these goals were achieved, they were involved in violent activities in Perak, 
521
 such 
as 1) setting fire to the Sports Toto (Malaysian Legal Lotteries and Gambling) outlet 
at Jalan Silibin, Ipoh Perak on April 10, 1988 and again on October 15, 1988.  2) The 
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arson of two cars outside of the Ipoh City Council in Perak to protest the Nation 
Lottery Concert on October 19, 1988. 3) Arson attacks on the Hilir Perak Malay 
Teachers‟ Union building in Teluk Intan, Perak on October 31, 1988. 4) Setting fire to 
the temporary offices of the proposed Taiping Funfair on November 11, 1988 and 5) 
Attempting to set ablaze a bus from Roadways Company in Ipoh on November 27, 
1988.
522
 
 
This group was banned and dissolved in May 1989 after 27 people, including KPIP 
leaders and members, were detained by the police in Operasi Kenari II (Kenari 
Operation II) between October 1988 and May 1989.
523
 Although this group was 
broken down physically, but not destroyed, some of their members were believed to 
have fled to live in exile in Afghanistan rather than be arrested under the ISA.
524
   
 
   
3.12 The Kumpulan al-Arqam (al-Arqam Group)  
Ashaari Muhammad founded Al-Arqam in 1968.
525
 Al-Arqam was banned by the 
federal government in June 1993. This occurred after their Islamic teaching was 
considered too deviant based on the mystics of al-Aurad Muhamadiah.
526
 By August 
1994, al-Arqam was officially blacklisted in Malaysia but had gained an estimated 
100,000 followers.
527
 More than five Al-Arqam members including Ashaari 
Mohammad were arrested under the ISA after raids at the group‟s main camp at 
Kampung Sungai Penchala, Kuala Lumpur.
528
 
 
However, the main reason the government banned this group was due to al-Arqam‟s 
persistence in building the "Badar" military unit. This special military unit consisted 
of 313 members, with the long-term aim of toppling the government in order to 
establish an Islamic nation.
529
 Al-Arqam established networking in almost all 
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Southeast Asia countries including Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore and also in 
Cairo, Egypt.
530
  
 
He cited as his inspiration the works of the Sufi Sheikh Muhammad Bin Abdullah as-
Suhaimi, who died in Kelang, Selangor in the 1920s.
531
 By declaring as-Suhaimi as an 
awaited saviour, Ashaari was already manoeuvring into the realms of Islamic heresy. 
Ashaari also told his followers that he was receiving dreams directly from prophet 
Muhammad. Audio of Ashaari's conversations with prophet Mohammed had 
circulated in which it was suggested that Allah had chosen Ashaari to become the 
leader of Malaysia's Muslim community.
532
 He declared himself a prophet, saying he 
had the power to forgive people's sins. Members worked for small money at the 
numerous businesses which Ashaari owned
533
and were permitted to live only in Al-
Arqam "communes".
534
 By the time of Ashaari's arrest, he had established 48 of these 
communes across Malaysia. Each commune had its own school, business, and health 
clinic.
535
  
 
Al-Arqam members were intelligent and managed their company wisely. They 
gathered 400 trading companies, including 56 manufacturing companies, 20 
department stores, 52 retail shops, and 18 restaurants, as well as several publishing 
companies. The company gathered assets worth $8 billion.
536
 During the 1980s, stress 
between the government and Ashaari increased. Al-Arqam was barred from operating 
in any government premises and its publishing permit was cancelled.
537
  
 
The end of the line for Al-Arqam had come in 1994, when Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad decided the group posed a threat to national security.
538
 Al-Arqam had 
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gathered a fighting force in Thailand and was ready to overthrow the government.
539
 
Ashaari had openly stated his intention to come from Thailand and challenge the 
leadership in Malaysia. He stated confidently that he would lead the country one 
day.
540
 Furthermore, al-Arqam also informed the Badar military unit in the Kingdom 
of Thailand to prepare for the establishment of an Islamic country with Ashaari as the 
next Prime Minister of Malaysia.
541
   
 
Ashaari was officially detained under ISA on September 2, 1994. Interpol 
collaboration managed to arrest Ashaari and his entourage while they were in hiding 
at Chiangmai, northern Thailand.
542
 Then, Ashaari was deported to Malaysia and was 
subjected to interrogation by Islamic authorities, along with seven other prominent 
members of Al-Arqam. Ashaari Muhammad was then placed under a form of virtual 
house arrest on the island of Labuan, under strict supervision of the government.
543
  
 
With vast support from followers both domestic and regional, it was strong enough to 
create chaos and long running problems. Malaysian authorities acted carefully as they 
were well aware that this group had strong grass-root support and fanatical 
perspectives on Ashaari. Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi had said “legal action will 
be taken against anyone who tries to re-establish the Al-Arqam group.
544
  
  
 
3.13 The Kumpulan Persaudaraan Ilmu Dalam Al-Maunah (Brotherhood of Al-
Ma’unah Inner Power) 
Al-Maunah was formed as a legal inner power group on April 15, 1999. Al-Maunah 
was an organization that "implemented the teaching of martial arts particularly the 
development of one‟s inner power and the practice of Islamic customary medicine".545 
The group declared membership of more than 1,000 people spread throughout 
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Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
546
 It also claimed to be a Non 
Governmental Organization (NGO) involved in martial arts with international and 
local members, including civil servants, security service personnel, and even some 
members from UMNO coalition party.
547
      
 
Al-Maunah was led by Mohd Amin bin Mohd Razali, a former army corporal who 
came from Kampung Sauk, Grik Perak. This group became known by their audacious 
raid on July 2, 2000 at the Malaysian Army Reserve Camp at the Temenggor Dam, 
Grik Perak.
548
 Al-Maunah members, instructed by Mohd Amin, managed to enter the 
camp's security infrastructure by disguising themselves in military uniforms and 
driving jeeps painted in camouflage green, disguised to be Malaysian Army Jeeps. 
Masquerading as senior army officers, they claimed to be making a surprise 
inspection of the Battalion 304 in the Rejimen Askar Wataniah (Malaysian Army 
Reserve) camp.
549
 This group successfully removed a large cache of firearms and 
ammunition, including 97 M16 assault rifles, two Steyr AUG rifles, four GPMGs, six 
Light Machineguns, five grenade launchers, 182 M16 magazines, eight extra barrels 
of GPMGs, three extra barrel of LMGs, 26 bayonets, 9,095 rounds of 5.56mm, and 60 
rounds of 40mm ammunitions.
550
  
Alongside this audacious raid, al-Maunah members attempted to detonate the 
„Carlsberg‟ factory in Shah Alam with a rocket-launcher; causing damage to the 
„Guinness Stout‟ refinery in Sungai Way and the Hindu temple in Batu Caves, 
Selangor.
551
 Al-Maunah strongly opposed the idea of elections; in his opinion, only 
true and pure Islam should be implemented in Malaysia by terrorist means as had 
been done by al-Maunah members.
552
  
Zabidi Mohamed, one of the defence counsels on the al-Maunah trial said al-Maunah 
members were manipulated by Mohd Amin. Al-Maunah members were loyal and 
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blinded by their leader. Fanaticisms was cited among the reasons why people joined 
al-Maunah. As he said: 
…In the promise of a better afterlife, and believe on their leader 
have a “mystical powers”, and the group would be assured of a 
better enrolment...the followers would believe that the leader is 
purist. They would idolise him. „Taksub‟ [fanatic] with the leader 
can make them break the law as what had happened to Al-Maunah 
members...
553
 
 
Members believed Al-Maunah was the only way to set up an Islamic state in 
Malaysia. To achieve this, it must be done through force and use of terrorist tactics. 
Al-Maunah members became frustrated when the authorities refused to give Ulama a 
larger role in government and socio-politics.  
Malaysian security forces launched a high-status action against the al-Maunah Camp 
in Sauk, Perak in July 2000.
554
 During the confrontation, 19 members were arrested 
and two deaths were reported. Al-Maunah took four hostages; two were police 
personnel, Sergeant Mohd Shah Ahmad and Detective Corporal Saghadevan, and the 
other two civilians, Jaafar Puteh, and army personnel, trooper, Matthews anak 
Medan.
555
 A judge presiding over the case, Zulkefli Makinudin, stated his opinion: 
 
Mohd Amin was responsible for shooting to death Special Branch police officer R. 
Sagadevan, and in directing to Jemari to shoot to death Special Operation Force 
Ranger, Matthew anak Medan…Mohd Amin as a leader of the al-Maunah 
movement, was the mastermind behind the mission to overthrow the government 
by force in the name of Jihad
 
.
556
  
Following this, members of al-Maunah apprehended in the raid were later charged 
with treason and plotting to overthrow the government in order to bring into being an 
Islamic state. They were found guilty of waging a war against the Yang Dipertuan 
Agong (King of Malaysia).
557
 Mohd Amin Mohd Razali, Zahit Muslim and Jamaludin 
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Darus received the death penalty, while the remaining 16 were sentenced to life 
imprisonment.
558
  
 
3.14 The Kumpulan Militan Malaysia 
KMM was one of the crucial and influential militant groups that operated in Malaysia. 
Less than a month since the botched robbery of the Southern Bank Branch in Jalan 
Gasing, Petaling Jaya Selangor, nine members of a new militant group were 
discovered. The group orchestrated several criminal and militant acts and later 
claimed to be a defender of the creation of a purist Muslim society in Malaysia via 
'Jihad'.
559
  
 
Picture 2: Abdul Rashid Ismail shot by security guard, Abdullah Mahmood on the 
May 18, 2001 at the botched Southern Bank robbery. Both Rashid and Zainan Harith 
(back) were charged with offences under the Firearms Acts which carries a death 
penalty.
560
   
The police discovered KMM, founded by Zainon Ismail, on October 12, 1995. 
561
 
KMM had roots with Halaqah Pakindo, a clandestine movement formed as an alumni 
association for Malaysian graduates from religious institutions in Pakistan, India, and 
Indonesia.
562
 Zainon Ismail, who was involved in the Semarak attack in 1988, 
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established this group in conjunction with a meeting at Kuala Lumpur with Abu 
Bakar Chik in 1996.
563
 The evidence gathered from police interrogation and 
investigations consequently exposed the fact that these group members were 
Malaysians who were educated in the Middle East and India as well as Pakistan.
564
 
They performed Jihad in Afghanistan during the Russia-Afghan war and more 
recently in the cities of Ambon and Maluku in Indonesia during the religious tensions 
that began in 1999.
565
 A newspaper article in The Malay Mail (7 June 2001) stated 
“...They were believed to have been indoctrinated and recruited into the Afghanistan 
based Mujahidin whilst studying in universities in Pakistan, Egypt and India...
566
  
 
 
Picture 3: A picture of KMM member Zainon Ismail (right) learning to use Dasyaka 
during a stint in Afghanistan.
567
 
 
KMM has been linked to an array of crimes since 1999, including the bombing of 
churches, an Indian temple, a video centre, an attack on a police station, the murder of 
a local politician, an attempt to attack the US Navy convoy, an attempt to murder two 
                                                 
563
 Respondent F. (2007). Interview on the 10
th
 of December at Restaurant in Bangi Selangor. Bangi. 
564
 Ibid.  
565
 Morais, L., Raja, G., Abas, M., & Spykerman, N. (2001a, 7 June). Graduates in Terrorism. The 
Malay Mail, p. 2. 
566
 Ibid. 
567
 Lourdes, C., & Wai, W. C. (2003, 1
st
 January). Hambali Plotted Terror Campaign. The Star Online. 
 97 
 
ethnic Indians, armed robbery and many more.
568
 Their aim was to weaken the 
government through acts of terrorism including agitating ethnic and religious divides.  
 
3.15 The Jemaah Islamiyah 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has made Malaysia one of their important bases for 
orchestrating attacks and operating militant activities in Southeast Asia.
569
 Several 
months after the uncovering of the KMM, Malaysian police discovered another 
Islamist-militant group operating under-ground called JI.
570
 This group was uncovered 
after interrogation and further investigation by police on the arrest of KMM members 
for an attempted robbery at Southern Bank in Petaling Jaya Selangor in May 2001.  
Yazid Sufaat, a Bio-chemistry graduate from the California State University, 
Sacramento was detained on December 9, 2001 and uncovered as the real face of 
JI.
571
  
 
Historically, JI has strong roots with the Pertubuhan Darul Islam Indonesia (DII).
572
 
Sungkar and Ba‟asyir migrated to Malaysia in 1985 to avoid further prosecution by 
the Suharto regime.
573
 They established JI in 1993 after they laid foundations in Ulu 
Tiram, Johor and Kuala Pilah, Negeri Sembilan. The ideology for establishment  of an 
Islamic State and the Jihad concept were preached by Sungkar and Ba‟asyir from a 
series of Usrahs and religious classes.
574
 Furthermore, this group produced a book 
called Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al-Jamaah al-Islamiyyah (General Guidelines for 
the Jemaah Islamiyyah Struggle or in short PUPJI), a crucial source in their Jihad 
guidelines.
575
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According to PUPJI,
576
 JI was supposed to have been lead by Amir who appointed 
and controlled four councils,;governing, religious, fatwa, and disciplinary councils.
577
 
The governing council was headed by a central command that oversaw the leaders of 
four territorial divisions or Mantiqis. The Mantiqis followed by Wakalah, Sariyah, 
Katibah, Kirdas, Fiah and Thoifah. JI also comprised four major divisions, which 
were Mantiqi 1 – Peninsular Malaysia, Singapore and Southern Thailand. Mantiqi 2 – 
Indonesia (except Sulawesi and Kalimantan). Mantiqi 3 – Eastern Malaysia, 
Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Southern Philippines and Mantiqi 4 – Australia and Papua 
New Guinea.
578
 JI organized special tasks for every Mantiqis. Mantiqi 1 had 
responsibility for fund raising, Mantiqi 2 was given the primary mission on the 
promotion of Jihad, and Mantiqi 3 created a logistical and the place for Jihad. 
Mantiqi 4 was never established but JI planned for them to develop future 
expansion.
579
    
 
Malaysia was the location for three meetings of the Rabitatul Mujahideen, a coalition 
of Jihadist groups from Southeast Asia organized by JI in 1999-2000.
580
 The alliance 
facilitated co-operation and the sharing of resources among the groups, in terms of 
training, procurement of arms, financial assistance, and terrorist operations. The 
objective was to unify the Islamic militant groups in the region, with the ultimate goal 
of realizing the Daulah Islamiyah.
581
 Members had short term military training in 
various places in Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Johor, Pahang, Kelantan and Sabah.
582
 
 
From Malaysia‟s perspective, JI‟s radical ideology represented a threat to security. 
Their teachings in tended to encourage militancy rather than attempting to keep 
society living in harmony and tolerance. To establish Daulah Islamiyyah in Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Southern Philippines, Singapore and Brunei, JI preferred their members to 
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only follow Salafus Soleh doctrine as the trueness of Islamic preaching.
583
 Others, 
such as contemporary sects like Ahli Sunnah wal Jamaah, Tareqad, and Shiah, were 
regarded as deviant.  
 
They needed to establish a total Islamic State through Jihad and dakwah. Malaysia 
and Indonesia were recognized as un-Islamic countries because the Quran and the 
Sunnah were not implemented in the legislation or administration.
584
 JI‟s members 
were willing to wage war on the Indians and Chinese in Malaysia because they were 
averse to accepting Islam
585
 and regarded a democracy as a Western tool in the new-
colonialism era; in other words, as deviant from true Islamic teaching. Islamic 
caliphate has been broken down by British and Western super powers since the 14
th
 
century, leaving Muslims and their territories weakened and paralyzed.
586
 JI sustained 
Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda‟s anti-US sentiment. JI also strongly believed that the 
Salafus Soleh approach was the only way to generate and enlarge an Islamic Caliphate 
again.
587
    
 
JI formally halted from active operation in Malaysia following the raids of 2001. But 
the threat of JI still exists, especially because some of the members are still at large in 
Indonesia and Southern Philippines.
588
 Malaysian police listed at least 337 JI 
members either still residing in Malaysia or who used to be in Malaysia including, 
Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir, Nordin Mohd Top, Hambali, and the late Dr. Azhari Hussin.589 
Only 68 have been detained, while most of the others have been released under the 
restriction order.
590
   
 
3.16 Conclusion 
13 groups in Malaysia, engaged in militant activity, have appeared since Malaysian 
independence in 1957. These militant and extreme groups with various methods and 
different modus operandi all shared the same ideology; struggle to establish an 
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Islamic state through violence, create chaos and panic, and aim to cause national, 
social, and political instability. Most of these groups declined the constitutional law 
and the system of democracy implemented by the Malaysian government. They 
accused it of being inherited from the British system, which is based in 
Westernization and secularization and therefore, does not follow principles of Islam.      
 
As alluded to above, the common goal shared by these radical Muslim groups in 
Malaysia is politically motivated. Their major aspiration is to change ruling 
government suited to their own definitions.  Although the Mahathir administration 
declared Malaysia an Islamic country, there have always been sentiments of 
disagreement, dissatisfaction, anger, and resentment felt by the extremists; this action 
alone has not been sufficient enough to convince them. In their opinion, the 
Malaysian government only made this gesture in order to retain political power, rather 
than practising pure Islamic principles.     
 
None of these groups have any association with a political party;
591
 however, 
Malaysian authorities have proof that most members of these groups are affiliated 
with Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). Yet others were leaders in PAS, such as Zainon 
Ismail and Nik Adli. Moreover, the electoral system has always associated itself with 
corruption and un-transparent methods, as accused by radicals.   
 
KMM was regarded as the most dangerous group out of the 13 radical movements 
that operated in Malaysia. Its new paradigm as a radical movement can be seen in its 
thinking and operation. Other than KMM and JI, all of these groups were operated 
with Malaysian focus. JI operated in Malaysia but had no recorded attacks on the 
country; however, KMM successfully attacked and repeatedly threatened the country. 
Questions regarding KMM and its threats to the Malaysian government will be 
highlighted in Chapter four.          
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Chapter IV- 
THE CORE RADICAL MALAYSIAN MOVEMENT 
 
 
Violent Islamist groups include, al-Maunah, Kumpulan Militan Malaysia and 
Jemaah Islamiyah has close links with al-Qaeda, al-Maunah described as a 
deviant Muslim sect by the Malaysian government…
592
                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Radical Islam emerged in Malaysia in the 1960s, however, few political groups such 
as Parti Islam Semalaysia (PAS)
 593
 and Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API)
594
 who worked 
for Malaysian independence, put Islam as a core centre in their struggle. These group 
struggles for independence in coalition with the United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress 
(MIC). Except for the API, all of these groups worked for independence without 
radical, religious thinking or actions
595
.         
 
But, Malaysia‟s post independence history was to also witness militant groups 
operating nationwide.
596
 Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM), a home-grown Muslim 
movement played a significance role as a core radical movement during this period. 
Islamic revivalism was the group‟s major focus. 597  In addition to cells in most 
Malaysian states, KMM also established its own regional networks. At least two 
groups were connected to KMM, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF).  
 
The KMM was also associated with a series of crimes including an attempt to attack a 
US Navy convoy, the murder of a Member of Parliament from Kedah, a series of 
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bombings places of worship including churches and temples, an attack on a police 
station, armed bank robbery and lesser known incidents.
598
 KMM was the local 
Malaysian militant movement with the main objective of weakening the Malaysian 
government through militant means, if necessary. We will now turn to a detailed 
discussion of the KMM.  
 
 
4.2 The Origins of the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) 
KMM was only exposed after an attempted robbery at Southern Bank, Jalan Gasing; 
Petaling Jaya was botched and discovered by police on May 18, 2001.
599
 The poorly 
planned robbery resulted in a member of the group being fatally shot and the rest 
arrested.
600
 Following that, 19 members of KMM were arrested nationwide including 
Nik Adli bin Nik Abdul Aziz, the son of Kelantan‟s Menteri Besar. Arrests also 
uncovered the connection of the KMM to unsolved violent crimes of temple and 
church bombings, the murder of Dr. Joe Fernandez, and an attack on the Police 
Station, among others.
601
  
 
This group has created wider networks with JI and MILF, which are directly linked to 
al-Qaeda's network in Southeast Asia. The long-term plan was to establish the Daulah 
Islamiyah Nusantara and confirm the return of an Islamic Caliphate to Southeast 
Asian countries.
602
 Indonesian clerics in exile in Malaysia during the 1980s and 1990s 
established the foundation of returning this caliphate. Abdullah Sungkar, Hambali, 
Abu Jibril and Ba‟asyir influenced young Malay Muslims with the ideology and wise 
understanding for the Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara (Regional Islamic Kingdom).
603
                                                                                                                                                      
 
KMM was founded by Zainon Ismail, who was a member of the PAS Youth State 
Committee in the Kedah state from 1991 until 1996. Zainon, who is referred to as 
“Cikgu Non”, was very charismatic and respected both in his village in Kampung 
Memali, Mukin Siong, Baling Kedah and by the opposition party (PAS). He was in 
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Afghanistan for a year between 1989 and 1990.
604
 He also had good writing skills and 
wrote at least three books, which were Dagangnya Diterima Allah (1990), Jihad Anak 
Melayu di Afghanistan (1997) and Perisai Memali (1989).
605
 These books have been 
banned by the Malaysian government because the government feared the spreading of 
radical Islamic ideology especially after KMM was uncovered in 2001.
606
  
 
Since then, Cikgu Non‟s books have undergone refinement and elaboration and 
include hands-on experience either gathered by him or other Mujahidin in „medan 
Jihad‟ (Jihad battle-field).607  People who really want to know and explore Islam 
endeavour to get information and search for the best way to follow Islamic teaching. 
In this search they may find moderate Islam or Sufism-Islam but they may also find 
radical Islam. As shared by respondent A:  
 
In the middle of the 1990s, I was looking for the true and pristine Islam after 
returning from Sabah, I was acknowledged as the naughty boy by my family, 
and had to build a new chapter in my life. Cikgu Non‟s books were attractive 
and made me eager to know more about Islam and Jihad. Then, with three 
others we went to Kampung Memali in Baling to meet him [Cikgu Non] and 
asked how to join the Afghan war and become Mujahidin.
608
     
 
On the way to exploring the trueness of Islamic teaching, inexperienced followers 
easily followed the „hard‟ and „extreme‟ Islamic pathway. In their understanding of 
Islam as a universal religion, KMM preached the need to practice Islam in a way 
known as Islam Kaffah.
609
 Within this framework, they hoped to achieve peace in the 
worship of Allah in the widest sense of the word by accepting the Quranic guidance 
not only towards the spiritual good of the hereafter, but also with regards to the 
spiritual, physical and social aspects of life.
610
 In pursuing this aim, KMM stressed the 
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need for individual Muslims to be in a group focused on establishing an Islamic state. 
The concept of Iman (belief), Hijrah (emigration in the way of God), I‟dad 
(preparation for the struggle on the way of God) and Jihad must be carried out by 
KMM members.
611
  
 
KMM was influenced by the Indonesian Ustazs who were imacted by the Wahhabism 
ideology. These Ustazs were successfully propagated by KMM members to follow the 
orthodox interpretation of Islam.
612
 Furthermore, KMM urged its followers to go to 
war against the enemies of Islam especially to the people or institutions and 
governments who resisted the application of Islamic law and applied secularism and 
non-Islamism, by appealing to the Jihad, emphasizing the meaning of armed struggle.      
 
 
4.3 The connection between the KMM and ‘MASSA Pakindo’ 
KMM had strong connections with KMK and KPIP.
613
 Although these two groups 
were dismantled by „Ops Kenari‟614 between October 1988 and May 1989, the key 
radical idealists were able to flee to Middle Eastern countries and avoid arrest. They 
participated in the Afghan-Russian war as Mujahidin.
615
 Some of these idealists were 
Zainon Ismail, Solehan Abd Ghafar and Zulkifli Mohammad. Zainon and Zulkifli 
believed they were the first Malaysians there as Mujahidin and they were ordered to 
join the Punjabi Mujahidin Camp.
616
    
 
In the Afghan-Russian war, they presented themselves as Filipino.
617
 The main reason 
they claimed to be Filipino was to hide their identity from the public. They were 
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always suspicious of the police from the Special Branch Unit who were sent to spy on 
their activities.
618
  
 
Zainon Ismail however returned to Malaysia because of health problems. He was too 
old to continue fighting in Afghanistan. Zulkifli and Solehan remained in Afghanistan 
between 1989 and 1993.
619
 Besides taking part as Jihadi fighters, they also recruited 
new students, who joined the war during the school holidays.
620
 Some of these 
students funded their study by doing part-time work while studying; others were 
sponsored by their family. Most of the students who studied in Pakistan normally took 
part in the Afghan-Russian war at the Mujahidin Camp. Most of these were PAS 
children who did not have enough money to travel back to Malaysia during holidays 
and spent their time at the Mujahidin Camp.
621
 Zulkifli aka Musa Khir, Haji Murad 
Halimuddin, Abu Bakar Che Doi (ABCD), Md Lotfi Ariffin, Asfawani Abdullah, Nik 
Adli Nik Abdul Aziz and Alias Ngah were among the students who trained and took 
part in the battle in Afghanistan as Mujahidin between 1988 and 1995.
622
   
 
Islamic madrasahs (institutions) and universities such as the University Abu Bakar in 
Karachi, Pakistan; Maahad Salman al-Farisi in Peshawar, Pakistan; Da‟wah Academy 
in Islamabad, Pakistan; and Darul Uloom Madrasah in Lucknow, India had a Salafus 
Soleh approach in their method of  teaching. These lecturers, who follow salafi-
wahhabism ideology, implemented the hard and radical concept of understanding 
Syariah and Jihad.
623
 Muallim (lecturer) also urged students to join the Jihad fi 
sabilillah and gain experience during school or university breaks.
624
 Zainon illustrated 
this idea in his book: 
 
Two days after the attack, we were visited by more than a hundred students 
and leaders from the Harkat-ul-Jehad-el-Islami umbrella based in Islamabad, 
Pakistan from various ages as early as ten years until age 70…they came for 
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simple military training, discussion, fieldwork experience and to some extent 
trying to find syaheed…625 
 
They held the training in Konar, Khaldan and Khost in Jalalabad during the university 
break for at least two weeks and up to two months with Malaysians and Indonesians 
who were searching for a martyr.
626
 They learned and were trained using small 
weapons such as M16s and AK47s. They were also taught how to use a Dasyaka (the 
anti-tank weapon from Russia), along with the important components of bomb-
making, including how to make pipe bombs.
627
 Students learned how to make bombs 
from Potassium Chlorate or KClO3 and operate Runchnoi Putemyot Detyaryev (RPD-
a type of anti missile weapon), mortar and many more Russian-based weapons from 
either the Indonesian JI-link camp or the Malaysian Halaqoh-Pakindo link camp.
628
   
 
In September 1993, 18 Malaysian students from Maahad Salman al-Farisi in 
Peshawar were invited to join the military training at Kunjab, in Afghanistan. The 
training was held with Arab Mujahidins. The Malaysian students who participated 
were, among others, Faizul Anisham (who was shot dead by police in the botched 
Southern Bank Robbery), ABCD, Mat Taiwan, Pak Teh Mat Piah, Alias Ngah, Md 
Lotfi Ariffin and Muhammad Azian bin Abdul Rahman.
629
 After finishing their 
training, these students stayed in Afghanistan and fought alongside the Mujahidin 
until Russia was defeated in 1993. Then, political anarchy continued for three years 
until the Taleban took over the country in 1996.  
 
After returning from Afghanistan, Zainon and his Malay-Jihadist friends were 
surprised the Mahathir administration was trying to stop the use of the word „Islam‟ in 
any NGOs and political parties in Malaysia.
630
 This proposal was viewed by Zainon 
and his friends as a gradual attempt to demolish the Islamic movement. PAS had been 
regarded by Zainon and his friends as the only party that struggled for the overall 
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implementation of Islamic Law based on the Quran and Sunnah in Malaysia. Any 
attempt to weaken PAS meant an attack on Islam.
631
     
 
Later in April 1996, initiated by Zainon Ismail and an ad-hoc team including Alias 
Ngah and Solehan Ghafar, MASSA-Pakindo was founded. MASSA Pakindo was also 
previously known as Halaqoh-Pakindo. Its main objective was to play the role of the 
right-wing of the PAS Youth Section.
632
 Under Abu Bakar Chik‟s command and 
along with seven more local ex-Mujahidin members, MASSA-Pakindo was formed to 
protect PAS leaders from attack and arrest by police, similar to what had happened in 
the „Ops Kenari‟ in the 1980s.633 Halaqoh-Pakindo was established in the early 1990s 
in Afghanistan to gather students who were studying in Pakistan, Indonesia and India 
in one Jamaah (together in one group).
634
 Halaqoh-Pakindo had coordinated training 
and organized suitable Jihad camps for Malaysian students to join.       
 
The MASSA-Pakindo was first mooted as an underground movement by Abu Bakar 
Chik in the late 1980s in Malaysia.
635
 He suggested the idea by inviting ex-Mujahidin 
and Alumni Halaqoh-Pakindo (Persatuan Bekas Pelajar Pakistan, India dan 
Indonesia) or the Alumni of the Malaysian Graduate Students Association from 
Pakistan, India and Indonesia to join the movement. The MASSA-Pakindo was set-up 
with several characteristics such as the requirement for all the meetings to be 
organised in „secrecy‟ and not be publicly mentioned regardless of family, society or 
the PAS itself. Thus, in the early stages, MASSA-Pakindo was only known by Abu 
Bakar Chik and his teams.
636
 Members believed that if they raised this kind of 
movement and activities as planned with the PAS leaders, they may not be granted 
approval for such activities.
637
 To this end, their meetings and Usrah were not even 
mentioned to their closed family members such as fathers, mothers or wives.
638
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All of the members needed to perform Jihad during their life. It was stressed in every 
meeting by Abu Bakar Chik, Zainon Ismail and  other ex-Mujahidin members. The 
spirit of Jihad was invoked amongst KMM members and was shared and discussed 
deeply in the Usrah. Opportunities to gain more experience and to perform Jihad 
were discussed extensively at every meeting.
639
 The racial-religious tension in 
Maluku and Ambon in Indonesia was regarded as a good chance to revive Jihad after 
Afghanistan. To some extent, they discussed how to perform Jihad in Malaysia as 
they wanted to seek religious purity, and in the future planned to implement Shari`ah 
law and subsequently create an Islamic state.
640
 
 
As part of the Jihad operation, KMM was also willing to launch an attack on Muslims 
who were regarded as an „apostate‟. Being an apostate was seen as a betrayal to Islam. 
KMM took radical action in Malaysia on the considered “infidels” in Hartina 
Kamarudin and Noraishah Bokhari attacks in January 1998 and June 1999.
641
  
 
The involvement of ex-Mujahidin fighters in MASSA-Pakindo was crucial - they 
were already exposed to military training and weapon handling during the Afghan-
Russian War.
642
 Ex-Mujahidin used their expertise to train protégés for long and short 
term use, as illustrated in their secret meetings.
643
 KMM members had to be prepared 
to do any radical activities in organized Jamaah if needed, even if force had to be 
used. This was important because some of the members were influenced by JI leaders 
who envisaged an Islamic state in Southeast Asia, which included Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Southern Thailand, Singapore and Mindanao in the Southern Philippines.
644
  
 
KMM believed PAS could achieve their Islamic agenda through democracy using 
elections as a tool.
645
 On this matter, KMM and JI took different standpoints. JI totally 
denied the usefulness of the democracy system and the value of elections in an 
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Islamic country.
646
 JI recognized Jihad with radical means as the only way to 
establish an Islamic state. Mahathir‟s cabinet had been engaged with the opposition 
parties in an ideological contest over representations of authenticity.
647
 MASSA-
Pakindo also mentioned that they would consider radical and extreme action in order 
to protect their ideology, especially in response to Mahathir‟s harsh policy against 
opposition in the late 1990s. KMM could become „the man behind the scene‟ to help 
PAS achieve this target especially with the involvement of Abu Bakar Chik and Nik 
Adli.  
 
MASSA-Pakindo operated in Malaysia without any problems during the early stages 
of their establishment. However, due to his fear of police monitoring and arrest for 
involvement in „Semarak 1988‟, Zainon handed over the MASSA-Pakindo leadership 
to Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz in 1999. At this stage, KMM agreed not to be recognized 
as MASSA-Pakindo, or with any other name. This was done to avoid raids and arrest 
by authorities.
648
 Since then, without a proper name, KMM organized their meetings, 
Usrah, and some small „projects‟ such as donations, a series of talks, and visits 
including discussion for the establishment of a Malaysia-Jihadi camp in the Southern 
Philippines, in total secrecy.
649
  
 
Operating without a name, KMM gathered support from PAS Youth and people who 
wanted to know more about Jihad. Later, KMM insisted that some of the followers 
attend Jihad in Maluku and Ambon.
650
 For them, it was important to get exposure and 
Jihad experience to continue the struggle to establish an Islamic state in this region.   
 
MASSA-Pakindo members always denied that they were members of KMM. Even 
without a name, this group was easily identified because most of its members were 
ex-Mujahidin. Whether they had a proper name or not, it was clear they operated 
secretly and were willing to topple the government via a long-term plan to create 
domestic chaos.
651
  Thus, what started out as MASSA-Pakindo later came to be called 
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Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia by the Malaysian government.  As it became more 
militant, the name was changed to Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM).
652
 
 
   
 
The Malaysian government tried to keep the word „Mujahidin‟ pure as it has a good 
meaning in Islam.
653
 It means “a military force of Muslim guerrilla warriors engaged 
in a Jihad"
654
. Some countries call them Mujahidin Islamic warriors but others just 
call them terrorists.
655
 The Malaysian government understands that not all Mujahidin 
are militant, and for this reason, the government wanted to avoid the use of 
“Mujahidin” in KMM's title.656  
 
Furthermore, there was a tendency for the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) to sort out 
the case of militancy domestically. Malaysian police were confident they had enough 
strong manpower to counter radicalism and terrorism amid the „war on terrorism‟ 
launched by the US. RMP proved their capability through massive raids and arrests 
around the country. There was a main problem in „grouping them‟. To make the 
„work‟ easier, police put all of them in one group called “Kumpulan Mujahidin 
Malaysia‟. Not only KMM, but also JI members were detained as a Mujahidin Group 
and a few months later, it was separated into KMM and JI.
657
  
 
Malaysian authorities also grouped them into Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia in order 
to avoid these people being extradited to the US as al-Qaeda linked group 
members.
658
 Close ties between the US and Malaysia will be challenged as the US has 
always asked Malaysia to hand over these detainees to be interrogated and detained in 
US custody. But most of these Mujahidin members were grouped as KMM, which is a 
home grown militant group. This can be seen in the case when the US asked Malaysia 
to extradite Yazid Sufaat to the US to be detained in Guantanamo Bay.
659
 Malaysia 
refused, and convinced the US that the authority needs Yazid for local investigation 
and to help in the rehabilitation program. This issue ended with the U.S sending a 
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CIA team to go to the Kamunting Detention Centre in Kamunting, Perak for 
investigations and interrogation.
660
     
 
In the early stages, the Malaysia authorities were confused about the differences 
between KMM and JI. KMM was discovered earlier than JI. Within the first few 
months of interrogations, unclear differences between these two groups emerged, for 
example, both KMM and JI were influenced by the same clerics - Hambali, Abdullah 
Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir. A media report released on April 6, 2002 clearly 
stated that “14 More KMM Members Detained”.661 Later the 14 were charged as being 
members of JI and claimed to be JI as told to the writer by Nasir Abas and Ali 
Imron.
662
    
  
The emergence of KMM was denied by its members especially from the right-wing 
section of KMM (formed from Nik Adli‟s group). Although KMM worked under the 
Halaqoh-Pakindo and MASSA-Pakindo banner from the beginning, its efforts to 
remain secret and avoid publicity about its operations confused its members. Most of 
them reluctantly revealed the existence of KMM after a series of arrests and 
interrogations. However all of them agreed that they were in the group as ex-
Mujahidin and had several operations planned including the establishment of a KMM 
Jihadi camp in the Southern Philippines.  This plan was later abandoned because of  a 
lack of money and logistic issues.
663
    
 
This group also held an Annual General Meeting with representatives from all over 
the country.
664
 MASSA-Pakindo established an organizational structure headed by 
Zainon Ismail, followed by a Deputy Head, then Lujnahs and Cells.
665
 Lujnah was 
divided into five sections which concentrated on Economy, Operations, Tarbiyyah 
(Training), Communications and Mu‟askar (Military).666 Because of the small number 
                                                 
660
 Sahat, Y. (2002, 5 February). Yazid Tak Akan Dihantar Ke AS: Dia Perlu Ditahan Di Malaysia 
Kerana Terlibat Dengan KMM - TPM Utusan Malaysia, p. Front Page. 
661
 Saari, S. (2002, 06 April). 14 Lagi Ahli KMM Ditangkap: Dipercayai Mahu Melakukan Sabotaj 
Operasi Pelabuhan Klang. Utusan Malaysia, p. 2. 
662
 Op. Cit., Imron, A. (2007). And Op. Cit., Abas, N. (2007). And Mohamad, K., Eg, T., & Sinyang, 
A. (2002, 25 January). Sayap Kedua KMM Lebih Radikal. Utusan Malaysia, p. Front Page. 
663
 Op. Cit., Respondent F. (2007). 
664
 Op. Cit., Respondent B (2007). 
665
 Ibid. 
666
 Op. Cit., Respondent J. (2008). 
 112 
 
of members from Perlis, Negeri Sembilan, Penang, Melaka and Pahang, cells were not 
created in these areas; however, six cells were established with representatives from 
Kedah, Perak, Kelantan, Selangor, Terengganu and Johor as below: 
 
 
 
Chart 2: The Organizational Structure of KMM and KMMM.
667 
 
The chart above shows the KMM was led by Zainon Ismail‟s before handed to Nik 
Adli.
668
  Nik Adli was elected leader by the KMM at a meeting of 12 senior members 
in Kampung Seri Aman, Puchong, in early 1999.
669
 However, the government 
contends that the real leadership came from Abu Bakar Bashir and Hambali.
670
 Aside 
from his image as the son of Kelantan Menteri Besar (Chief Minister), Nik Adli was 
recognized as transparent and moderate in administration but somewhat extreme in 
action. He was reportedly willing to launch a war against the government if the 
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Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition government decided to announce an emergency 
decree in the states of Kelantan and Terengganu.  
 
Zainon Ismail was known as slow and unaggressive in his actions but radical in 
thought. This was put down to his advanced age
671
 and the fact that he avoided 
extreme actions that might make him detectable to the authorities.
672
 During the four 
years that KMM was commanded by Nik Adli, little positive movement was 
identified. During this time the Selangor cell was influenced and transformed by 
Indonesian clerics into a much more militant and separate group – later to become 
known as K3M or KMMM (Kumpulan Mujahidin Militan Malaysia).  
 
 
4.4 The Separation of the ‘Puchong Group’     
Under Nik Adli‟s leadership, the structure of KMM became better organized. His 
good image made it easier for him to gather support from society and to organize 
KMM competently; he was also under considerably less pressure than Zainon.
673
 
Under Nik Adli's administration, five lujnah sections were successfully created, which 
are Economy, Operations, Tarbiyyah, Communications and Muaskar:
674
 
 Lujnah Muaskar  
This Lujnah was headed by Tajuddin Abu Bakar. He was a leader of KMM‟s 
Perak branch.
675
 Tajuddin and Respondent E were given the task of obtaining 
weapons, explosives and ammunition gradually from 1996. With the main target 
to get prepared to overthrow the ruling government, they had to find suitable 
weapons either from trade or robbery as they did at Guar Chempedak Police 
Station in the Kedah state in 2001.
676
 As early as January 1997 and until June 
2001, at least 10 deals of arms trading were made between KMM members under 
Lujnah Muaskar with arms traders from Thailand and Indonesia.
677
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Tajudin, Zulkifli aka Musa Khir, Adnan Mohd Daud, Zainuri Kamarudin Zainon 
Ismail, Nik Adli, Fauzi, and respondents A, D, E, F and J were involved in  
dealing arms, especially with representatives from Southern Thailand who were 
believed able to help them find arms.
678
 Respondent D with Zainon Ismail 
bought Smith & Wesson .38 revolvers and a large number of bullets from 
Southern Thailand in the early 1990s.
679
    
 
They also bought one more revolver, two M16s, gun magazines, more than 200 
M16 bullets, 4 kilograms of TNT explosive materials, and one hand grenade 
from Southern Thailand, in total costing over RM20,000.
680
 Ten detonators, two 
timers, four tons of Ammonium Nitrate and 2 kilograms of TNT were smuggled 
in by Zainuri Kamarudin and Musa Khir from Batam Island, Indonesia.
681
 Imam 
Samudera, one of the Bali bombers, handed over those weapons to KMM for 
operations in Kuala Lumpur in October 2000.
682
 The explosives were afterwards 
used to bomb Sri Ganesha Hindu Temple at Puduraya Bus Station, Kuala 
Lumpur on October 25, 2000.
683
       
 
We bought weapons from Indonesia, but not many, I am not the person who did 
the deal maybe Zainuri and a few leaders in Puchong made it, that‟s why when 
we saw that al-Maunah got heaps of weapons through the raid at Grik in year 
2000, we felt bad and imagined if that kind of weapon was on us at that time.
684
   
 
Respondent A was involved in the deal to buy a hand grenade from a person in 
Kuala Lumpur.
685
 It was handed over to Zainuri Kamarudin for bombing the US 
Navy convoy at Lebuhraya Shah Alam (KESAS) Highway in April 2001.
686
 That 
bomb was later hidden at the Batu 12, Puchong Selangor under a number of 
cement bricks to avoid being identified by people or police.
687
 Lujnah Muaskar 
also bought several big bags of Ammonium Nitrate (fertilizer) from Kelantan for 
bomb-making purposes. Nik Adli and Alias Ngah were believed to be the people 
                                                 
678
 Op. Cit., Respondent B1 (2007). 
679
 Op. Cit., Hashim, R. (2007). 
680
 Op. Cit., Respondent A. (2007). 
681
 Op. Cit., Respondent B7 (2007). 
682
 Eg, T. (2002, 13 February). Baja Ammonium Nitrate Boleh Jadi Alat Pengganas. Utusan Malaysia, 
p. 16. 
683
 Op. Cit., Morais, L., Raja, G., Abas, M., & Spykerman, N. (2001b, 07 June), p. 3. 
684
 Op. Cit., Respondent A. (2007). 
685
 Ibid.  
686
 Ibid.  
687
 Ibid. 
 115 
 
responsible for purchasing this fertilizer and storing it at Manir in Kuala 
Terengganu in 2001.
688
  
 
KMM members were involved in smuggling some of the weapons and bullets for 
future projects in Malaysia.
689
 Faizul Anisham, who was shot dead by a security 
guard at the Southern Bank robbery in Jalan Gasing in May 2001, smuggled a 
Smith & Wesson .38 revolver together with four rounds of ammunition and 148 
rounds of ammunition for the 9mm Colt semi-automatic pistol and more than 
100 M16 bullets from Indonesia after returning from Ambon in 2001.
690
  
 
Besides automatic and other modern weapons, KMM members also bought and 
kept traditional weapons such as arrows, keris (traditional Malay swords), 
parang (machete) and lastik (slingshot) as alternative weapons for Jihad 
preparation.
691
 Alias bin Ngah reportedly had an archery set at his house in 
Wakaf Tembusu, Kuala Terangganu as a tool for „life protection‟ and for urgent 
needs including Jihad.
692
 Some of the KMM members were encouraged to bring 
small weapons with them for their instant protection and preparation for any 
danger.
693
      
 
In addition, with support from Lujnah Muaskar, Zid Sharani made more than a 
dozen hand-made pipe bombs for KMM projects in various places such as the 
bombing at Dataran Seni, Klang on July 20, 2001.
694
 During that bombing, one 
female Indonesian was injured after glass from a nearby building broke and fell 
on her leg. Zid Sharani, recognized as KMM‟s expert on making home-made 
pipe bombs, was detained by the Indonesian police in September 2001 after 
police discovered pipes, detonators and an amount of sulphur at his residence.
695
 
Taufiq Abdul Halim aka Dani along with Zid Sharani was accused of an attempt 
                                                 
688
 Op. Cit., Respondent J. (2008). 
689
 Op. Cit., Respondent B8 (2007). 
690
 Abas, M., & Raja, G. (2001, 01 June). Armed for Terror. Malay Mail, p. 1. 
691
 Op. Cit., Hashim, R. (2008). 
692
 Ibid. 
693
 Op. Cit., Respondent J. (2008). 
694
 Utusan Malaysia (2002d, 05 January). Zid Sharani Ditahan Dua Tahun Bawah ISA. Utusan 
Malaysia. 
695
 Ibid.  
 116 
 
to bomb the Atrium Mall in Jakarta and was detained under the ISA for two 
years and later under a Restriction Order which ended in December 2007.
696
 
 
 
 Lujnah Communication 
Solehan Abdul Ghafar headed the Lujnah Communication and the Terengganu 
cell under the command of Nik Adli from 1999 until 2001.
697
 Solehan was the 
deputy head of KMM from 1996 until 1998 under Zainon‟s administration and 
these two closely knew each other as they had both been involved in the 
Afghanistan war between 1989 and 1993.
698
  
 
Nik Adli instructed Solehan to recruit new students, who had come back from 
Pakistan and India, to be trained as new KMM members.
699
 The established 
contacts between Solehan and people in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as 
India were able to know every movement of the students. The students were also 
instructed to find Solehan and join KMM when they went back to Malaysia.
700
 
Malaysia was regarded as a place to continue their aim as Jihadi fighters and to 
fulfil objectives in establishing an Islamic caliphate in the region.  
 
 Lujnah Economy 
This Lujnah was an important section of KMM as it generated funds for social 
and militant activities. It was headed until 2001 by Zainuri Kamarudin, the 
Second Deputy Head of the KMM Puchong division, which carried out a number 
of militant operations in the Klang valley and the northern part of Malaysia.
701
   
Zainuri was sentenced to 10 years' jail and 18 lashings for unlawfully possessing 
firearms, explosives and ammunition by Kuala Lumpur High Court on October 
1, 2004 and remains the only KMM member still in jail.
702
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Zainuri and his Lujnah members were involved in collecting money through 
donations by people who were sympathetic to the movement. They collected 
donations through a series of speeches given by visitors from Afghanistan, 
Kashmir, the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, Ambon and Maluku.
703
 
This does not indicate, however, that KMM had close contact with such 
separatists or fighters, but members showed their sympathy and tried to let 
people know about the current situation in these places.   
 
Zainuri also gathered money from contributions and membership fees from 
KMM members. Each member was required to contribute at least 30 to 50 
Ringgit Malaysia (RM) a month or a donation equal to one day's salary a 
month.
704
 They had to contribute this money to show their trust in the Jamaah 
(movement) and it was considered as part of their Jihad.  Most of the KMM 
members were poor and did not have a good salary or consistent income every 
month, but their willingness to help the community and movement was great. 
 
The funding situation also effected KMM‟s plans to have their own training 
camp. Nik Adli is reported to have gone to the Southern Philippines in 1998 to 
establish the KMM Jihadi camp after a secret meeting held in Puchong with 
Hambali.
705
 However this project was abandoned after KMM was unable to 
afford the amount of money requested by Salamat Hashim of the MILF. Salamat 
Hashim asked for RM3, 000 for each person sent to their camp.
706
 Norian Mai, 
the Inspector-General Police of Malaysia, said that 19 of the 23 KMM members 
arrested had received training in Afghanistan and the Southern Philippines. Nine 
of them had received training at the Ubaidiah and Abu Bakar camp in Mindanao 
which belonged to the MILF.
707
  
 
But it was clear KMM members were in the Southern Philippines for military 
training, performing Jihad in the name of Islam and to help their brotherhood. 
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The establishment of a Jihadi camp was not easy due to lack of money and the 
unstable situation in the Southern Philippines. The struggle and negotiation to 
establish the camp was evidence that KMM aimed to make sure their members 
had enough preparation and alternative „medan Jihad‟ (Jihad battle-field). 
Respondent A, who had not studied in Pakistan or India and had not performed 
Jihad in Afghanistan, went to the Southern Philippines in order to gain Jihad and 
help Moro Muslims, who were suppressed byManila.
708
 
 
KMM also had no direct funding from al-Qaeda or Osama bin Laden compared 
to their similar ideological and political partner, JI.
709
  It is known that JI was 
funded by al-Qaeda through Hambali for a series of attacks in the region.
710
 But 
KMM only gathered a small amount of money through monthly members' 
contributions and donations for activities as respondent A said: 
 
I strongly believe that KMM had no funding from Osama bin Laden, because 
we contribute our pocket money for various activities, I do not know whether  
Musa (Zulkifli aka Musa bin Khir) contacted Osama Bin Laden or not, 
however if he did,, it does not mean that all KMM members were involved on 
that deal.
711
  
 
 Lujnah Tarbiyyah 
Nik Adli headed KMM from 1999 and led Lujnah Tarbiyyah at the same time. 
Because of his credibility and charisma, he was accepted as the Naqib (leader) 
for Usrah between KMM members. Nik Adli was not keen to speak with 
strangers and preferred to keep quiet rather than talk too much. He was very 
respected for such behaviour. However, some of the KMM members, especially 
the Puchong group, did not really agree with him and he was accused of being 
too slow and a reluctant leader.
712
     
 
Nik Adli was engaged in persuading university students, especially from 
Pakistan and India, to join the KMM when returning from their study.
713
 He also 
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tried to get local university students to joint KMM.
714
 Nik Adli and his team used 
talent-spotting approaches where prospective, capable student leaders were 
trained through their Usrah activities, especially in the Selangor cell located in 
Puchong and Kelantan cell located in Kota Bharu in Kelantan.  
 
  
 Lujnah Operation   
Besides Lujnah Muaskar, the Lujnah Operation was considered a crucial section 
in KMM as a special unit for special tasks. This Lujnah was headed by Zulkifli 
aka Musa Khir, who is still believed to be hiding in a remote area of the Southern 
Philippines or safely protected by MILF fighters.
715
 Zulkifli Khir was born in 
Jeram Masjid, Bakri, Muar Johor. He then settled down in Seksyen 17, Shah 
Alam Selangor and strengthened this Lujnah with help from Hambali, Abu Jibril 
and Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir in the 1990s.716   
 
The Lujnah Operation was responsible for at least four projects including armed 
attacks on the Guar Chempedak Police Station which left two policemen injured 
in February 2001: the gunning down of Dr. Joe Fernandez on November 4, 2000 
at Jalan Maju Bukit Mertajam, Penang, a bomb blast at Sri Ganesha Temple in 
Jalan Pudu Lama on October 25, 2000, the botched robbery at Southern Bank on 
May 18, 2001 in Petaling Jaya, Selangor and many more.
717
  
 
With a science background and experience working as a Senior Engineer with 
Maxis Telecommunication Sdn. Bhd. in Kuala Lumpur, Zulkifli showed his 
tendency to evaluate the world in black and white – or as only „Positive or 
Negative‟.718 The likes of people such as Dr. Azhari, Nordin Mat Top, Wan Min 
Wan Mat and Zulkifli believed Muslims must do the good things, avoid the bad 
and that there is no wasatiah (in between or border line). Muslims must perform 
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ma‟ruf or what Allah commands them to do and abandon mungkar which is what 
Allah tells them to avoid.  
 
Zulkifli strongly opposed any non-Muslims because for him, they did not follow 
what Allah revealed to human beings as „the way of life‟. Moreover, Zulkifli 
became very angry with people who denounced Islam or left Islam for another 
religion or „murtad‟ (apostate).719 People who committed murtad were subject to 
being killed as commanded by Zulkifli to his KMM counterparts. The attempted 
gunning down of Rajeswaran a/l Jeyaraman on the May 20, 1998 (conversion to 
Hindu) and Noraishah Bokhari (conversion to Christian) clearly showed their 
anti-infidel ideology.
720
  
 
The military and operation experience Zulkifli got from Afghanistan in the late 
1980s and support from young lujnah members made this section effectively able 
to carry out a series of projects.
721
 Zulkifli and Adnan Daud worked together to 
establish secret agents in their lujnah to collect information and plan new 
projects.
722
 Some KMM members worked undercover as normal citizens and 
followed their suspects for long periods of time until they reached their target 
and gathered the information they needed.
723
    
 
Utusan Malaysia newspaper‟s headline published on January 25, 2002 blatantly stated 
KMM had a new branch or leftist branch which was more radical and had militant 
ideology.
724
 The „Puchong Group‟ was referred to as the KMM Selangor branch led 
by Zulkifli Khir centred in Puchong, Selangor. This group was involved in various 
serious criminal activities in Malaysia starting from 1998 until their last bank robbery, 
discovered by police in May 2001.
725
  
 
In the early stages, the Malaysian government called the „Puchong Group‟ KMMM or 
K3M which means Kumpulan Militan Mujahidin Malaysia. At the beginning, the 
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statement confused the public, but after further explanation and evidence, it became 
understood especially after a number of press releases published through government 
mainstream newspapers. Zulkifli was responsible for the duty as Naqib for Lujnah 
Operation. He also headed this branch with Zainuri Kamarudin and Adnan Mohd 
Daud and established connections with Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir and Hambali.  
 
This writer's research found there was a separation between KMM and K3M 
sometime in 1998. Some of the KMM members in Kelang Valley thought that KMM 
was too slow under the apparently reluctant leader Nik Adli. They felt that while 
KMM was under Zainon Ismail, and later under Nik Adli, few improvements were 
gained by KMM either through public support or funding and activities. Although Nik 
Adli did manage to establish five more Lujnah sections, he was still shackled with 
PAS ideology to establish an Islamic state through democratic means. After some 
time, K3M openly opposed the idea of democracy, and they felt more comfortable 
with the Salafi-Wahhabism approach to the arms struggle in Malaysia.
726
    
 
The Indonesian clerics cleverly influenced the members of K3M to act differently 
with their counterparts in northern and eastern Malaysia. Nik Adli was based in 
Kelantan, which is about 350 kilometres away from Kuala Lumpur so communication 
and administration between KMM Selangor cells was difficult. Members in K3M 
often followed the direction from Zulkifli Khir, Zainuri and Adnan rather than Nik 
Adli.
727
  
 
The „operations‟ were the big problem regarding separation of KMM and K3M.  The 
Puchong group under Zulkifli actively planned their operation from time to time with 
advice and guidance from JI leaders. Zulkifli, Zainuri and Adnan had an aggressive 
plan and were eager to perform another Jihad.
728
 They believed the place for Jihad 
was „open‟ widely in Malaysia since independence in 1957. But under the leadership 
of Nik Adli, KMM concentrated on only two actions that would open the way to 
Jihad. Firstly, if PAS leaders were arrested by police as had occured in „Ops Lalang‟ 
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in 1987 and second, if the government declared an „emergency‟ in Kelantan or any 
PAS ruling state as had happened in Kelantan on February 10, 1978.
729
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
As a result, on May 29, 2001, police successfully seized guns, ammunition, a  Smith 
and Wesson .38 revolver, an M-16 rifle and home-made explosives including pipe 
bombs and bomb-making paraphernalia from Taman Tenaga, Batu 9, Puchong 
Selangor.
730
 Police discovered arms and home-made bombs believed to have been 
prepared for use in future attacks and acts of sabotage. All these weapons were hidden 
in the bush near the Surau at Batu 9, and at a secondary jungle near Taman Tenaga, 
Puchong Selangor.
731
 The assault rifle and several rounds of ammunitions were found 
in a guitar case hidden in one of the spots in Puchong, Selangor, while the revolver 
together with several rounds of ammunition was found in a bag at another location.
732
  
 
 
Picture 5: Petaling Jaya (PJ) police chief Senior Assistant Commissioner Sheikh 
Mustafa Sheikh Ahmad and PJ CID senior investigating officer, Assistant 
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Superintendent R. Retnakumar with the firearms, ammunitions and bombs seized 
from KMM based in Puchong.
733
  
 
The bomb-making paraphernalia which included an assortment of chemicals, wires, 
detonator caps and night goggles were found in separate bags.
734
 That raid identified 
K3M as being one of the biggest threats to national security and resulted in a couple  
dozen KMM members being arrested and jailed under ISA for several years.
735
 
Zainuri Kamarudin as the mastermind in K3M's arms activities was arrested in May 
2001 and was charged with possession of an assortment of arms and sentenced to ten 
years imprisonment under the Firearms Act of 1960.  He is currently due for release in 
2014.
736
  
 
 
4.5 The Influence of the Indonesian Ustaz in ‘K3M’   
There are two methods for differentiating between KMM and K3M. Nik Adli in the 
Kelantan and Terengganu cell as well as the Kedah and Perak cell under Md Lotfi 
Arifin and Ahmad Tajuddin, concentrated on finding the purest Islam and at the same 
time acted as a special unit to protect PAS leaders during a series of speeches on those 
states. However K3M under Zulkifli Khir in Selangor, indirectly shared the same 
spiritual leaders as JI who were Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir, Hambali and Abu Jibril aka 
Muhammad Iqbal Abdurrahman.
737
 On January 5, 2002, the Inspector General of 
Police, Tan Sri Norian Mai stated: 
 
The new wing was different from KMM group headed by Nik Adli but was still led by 
the same three directing figures. The three figures are Indonesian Mujahidin Council 
head Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir aka Abdus Samad, independent preacher Hambali aka 
Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin who hails from Indonesia and another independent 
preacher , Indonesian born Muhammad Iqbal A.Rahman, who has been in detention 
under the Internal Security Act (ISA) since last June, Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir and 
Hambali still at large.
738
  
 
Investigation into K3M exposed the fact that these three masterminds successfully 
moulded this group to become combined with Malaysia-Indonesian and Malaysia-
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Singaporean wings. A few months after exploration and interrogation, Malaysian and 
Singaporean police believed there had been KMM, which was led by Nik Adli and 
had a mixed membership of Malaysians and Indonesians, was based in Malaysia and 
was responsible for a series of crimes including robberies and murders.
739
  
 
At the beginning, Usrah was a key activity for the K3M members organized by 
Zulkifli Khir in his house at Taman Selasih, Fasa 1, Gombak Selangor.
740
 Abu Bakar 
Ba‟asyir, Hambali and Muhammad Iqbal were appointed as permanent teachers to 
guide the K3M members in every Usrah. Sometimes, if the three preachers had their 
own activities or were „out stationed‟ (teaching in other places or having meetings), 
Abu Umar, Abu Yusof and Ishak aka Umamah were called to assist the Usrah as 
commanded by Abu Bakar Baasyir and Hambali.
741
 But all these teachers were 
actually Indonesian and part of the DII leaders and had the same objectives to 
establish Negara Islam and Indonesia and later Negara Islam Nusantara.  
 
However, after a few months of organizing their Usrah in Gombak, Zulkifli agreed to 
change their meeting place to Puchong, despite the fact that many of the K3M 
members were staying in the vicinity of Puchong.
742
 Furthermore, Hambali and Abu 
Bakar Ba‟asyir also lived in Banting Selangor, which was situated half an hour away 
from Puchong and preferred this new location for preaching activities as getting to 
Gombak took an hour's drive.
743
 Faizul Anisham, who was shot dead in the attempted 
robbery at the Southern Bank, Jalan Gasing, Petaling Jaya, Selangor in May 2001, 
allocated his house in Kampung Sri Aman, Puchong as an alternative Usrah place for 
the K3M members.
744
  
 
Zulkifli Khir, Zainuri Kamarudin, Faizul Anisham, Respondent A, Respondent J, 
Zainan Harith, Adnan Daud, Sobri Hassan, and Rasid Ismail were among the active 
members who attended most of the Usrah.
745
 There were regular and occasional 
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attendees who joined and supported the ideology implemented in the Usrah. This 
Usrah lasted about five years, and before the Lujnahs were formed by Nik Adli in 
1998, this group was influenced by these Indonesian preachers indirectly. But after 
Zulkifli Khir was appointed as the head of the Lujnah Operation, the role of these 
preachers became crucial in every meeting.
746
  
 
Following the establishment of the JI camp in Ulu Tiram, Johor in 1991, Abu Bakar 
Baasyir and Hambali flew to Selangor to get a new base to expand their NII ideology. 
The Maahad Ittibaussunnah at Kuala Pilah, Negeri Sembilan, established by Ustaz 
Hashim Ghani, was not competent at gathering mass support and gaining funds for 
their critical agendas. After several discussions and Usrah, both decided to find a new 
base and to new protégés. Via the sympathy and support from followers who had 
worked with Jabatan Bekalan Air (JBA) Selangor (Selangor Water Supply), they 
rented the house in Banting, Selangor.
747
 The handy location in Kelang Valley helped 
them to expand their teachings and directly influence K3M especially after Adnan 
Daud and Zulkifli Khir were attracted to their teaching methodology and radical 
ideology.
748
  
 
 
Picture 6: Hambali‟s house in Kampung Sungai Manggis, Banting Selangor, a semi-
detached house side by side with Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir.749  
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Hambali and Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir always made Jihad a priority in their teachings. 
Nothing was more important in the Shari`ah system than Jihad and performing this 
was crucial for every Muslim regardless of ethnicity or geographical border.750 Abu 
Bakar Ba‟asyir and Hambali impressed on their followers, in either JI or K3M, to 
believe there was no Islam without Jihad and urged them to carry out Jihad in areas 
of conflict such as Ambon, Maluku, Southern Thailand, Southern Philippines as well 
as the Middle East and throughout the world where Islam was suffering from 
oppression and interference from „infidels‟.751     
 
Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir and Hambali also stressed Jihad as the only political way for 
Muslims in Malaysia and the entire world. They were strongly opposed to democracy 
and acknowledged the democratic system was purely secular and should be thrown 
away.
752
 They believed Muslim countries that followed democracy as the political 
system should be toppled through Jihad and replaced with the Syariah system.
753
 This 
differentiated greatly with KMM‟s political ideology, as Nik Adli and his followers 
(except those in the Puchong cell) struggled to create an Islamic country through 
election and via allowing people to make decisions by ballot. PAS struggled with the 
same concept since independence until the last election held on March 8, 2008. To 
summarise, KMM agreed with democracy and accepted the electoral system but K3M 
opposed democracy and urged its followers to perform Jihad as the true Islamic 
political way.
754
 
 
Hambali and Ba‟asyir made a religious edict about the possession of non-Muslim 
properties. It said banks and businesses owned by non-Muslims, which operated 
without following Islamic Shari`ah principles, could be confiscated and seized by 
Muslims.
755
 All of the seized property could be shared by Muslims for the sake of 
Islam and 20 percent of it must be contributed to the Jihad agenda. This is why 
Zainuri Kamarudin, Zulkifli Khir, Faizul Anisham, Rafi Udin, Zid Sharani and Adnan 
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Daud robbed the bank twice in December 2000 at Hong Leong Bank, Petaling Jaya 
and May 2001 at Southern Bank Jalan Gasing, Petaling Jaya Selangor.
756
 They 
believed the money in the secular banks could be taken and later channelled to Jihad 
in Maluku and Mindanao.
757
      
 
Hambali and Ba‟asyir also urged K3M members to perform Jihad in Ambon against 
Christians who were trying to carry out „Muslim cleansing‟ or ethnic cleansing.758 
Besides this, K3M believed Muslims needed to help their brotherhood in any 
conflicted areas in the world, especially in Malaysia. Jihad was stressed as Fardhu 
ain, which means an action which is obligatory for every Muslim.    
 
Hambali and Ba‟asyir implemented the method of „secrecy‟ in K3M. Everybody was 
obliged to be „secretive‟ in order to protect the Jemaah from penetration by 
enemies.
759
 Besides this, KMM would take any suspicious acts to the Special Branch 
(SB), which was always trying to infiltrate the K3M organization.
760
 Whether JI or 
KMM and K3M members, they all sought to be careful in any action taken and avoid 
publicising what they did, where they went or who they met. For these reasons, some 
of the KMM members never understood or knew exactly what had happened in their 
group until they shared all the information in a detention camp, were told by an 
interrogator or  saw  information released by the media.
761
  
 
Most of the „militant‟ members had this kind of „secrecy‟ concept in their minds. 
They also believed that if they freely or actively talked about their daily movements, 
especially their projects, to anybody, it would cause takabbur (feeling snobbish).
762
 
As a Muslim, avoiding this kind of attitude is compulsory and needed especially when 
united in Jemaah with special objectives likes JI and KMM as well as al-Qaeda and 
many more militant organizations in the world.
763
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At this stage, it is crucial to understand the relationship between „secrecy‟ and 
„bai‟ah‟.764 Both K3M and JI followers were required to pledge allegiance through a 
bai‟ah laden with religious recitation. They were cautioned against questioning their 
leader‟s guidance, orders and actions. Absolute loyalty was further cemented through 
Zulkifli Khir and Adnan Daud as directed by Hambali‟s concepts of „secret within a 
secret‟.765 Followers were often directed to attend Usrah and occasionally physical 
training courses, tailored to improve their individual confidence and preparation for 
future Jihad. Details of these courses were often revealed by Zulkifli Khir or Adnan 
and Zainuri only at the last minute along with the operation they carried out.
766
   
 
Moreover, K3M members were also taught to understand the principles of war in 
Prophet Muhammad‟s era in 600 B.C.767 Creating stratagem and tricks were important 
in the movement as shown by Muhammad and his companions before him. The 
strategy to keep the leader protected was crucial in every war attended by Prophet 
Muhammad and his companions. That‟s why Nik Adli and Zulkifli Khir agreed KMM 
must protect the PAS leader in every public occasion nationwide or any „emergency‟ 
decree that might be declared by the Malaysian government in the future.
768
  
 
In addition, US policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was shown by the KMM to be 
unequal and more beneficial to Israel rather than Palestine.
769
 A US Military Base was 
placed in Singapore and the Southern Philippines and has patrolled the Malacca 
Straits since 9/11. This military base was regarded by KMM as an attempt to launch a 
war on Islam in this region.
770
 The feeling of „hatred‟ towards the U.S people 
regardless of where they were or what they were doing as well as boycotting 
American products has seeped into many Muslims, especially the members of KMM. 
They are willing to attack any US-linked properties such as factories, bars, firms, 
hotels and restaurants to show their anger. Bombings and attacks on the J.W. Marriott 
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Hotel and the US Embassy in Jakarta showed an attempt at revenge taken by JI and 
KMM members for their suppressed Muslim brotherhood.
771
             
 
As we know, the long term agenda for the Indonesian preachers was establishing 
Darul Islam Nusantara. An Islamic Caliphate consisting of Malaysia, Southern 
Thailand, Indonesia and the Southern Philippines, can only exist with strong material 
and spiritual support from local Malaysians. Malaysia was acknowledged as having 
good access to a large labour market and freedom to do da‟wah (preaching). To 
achieve this, four stages have been implemented in KMM by Hambali and Abu Bakar 
Ba‟asyir.772 
 
Stage one was to obtain any province or Indonesian state which was granted 
independence by the government such as Acheh and many more in the future.
773
 In 
order to achieve this, JI and K3M had to help each other create chaos in Indonesian 
society and politics. Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir was appointed as the person to be 
responsible for achieving total independence from Indonesia.
774
      
 
Stage two was gathering support from Malaysian people to help in the realization of 
K3M's agenda. Relations between Hambali and Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir with Zulkifli 
Khir, Adnan Daud and Zainuri Kamarudin were crucial on the basis of K3M as the JI 
proxy especially in the Lujnah Operation. Furthermore, Hambali organized K3M to 
help the struggle in Maluku Indonesia.
775
 
 
Stage three was to force K3M to make preparations for the future struggle in 
establishing an Islamic Caliphate.
776
 Most of the JI members had comprehensive 
military training in Afghanistan.
777
 K3M members were trained during the school 
holidays whilst studying in Pakistan and India. Recently, most of the new K3M 
members such as Respondent A and J never had such training. This is why Hambali 
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encouraged them to go to Maluku and Ambon in Indonesia or Mindanao in the 
Southern Philippines to gain experience in performing Jihad.  
 
The last stage involved the toppling of the Malaysian government after JI successfully 
established NII.
778
 K3M commanded members to create chaos and stir the stability in 
Malaysian society to phase in the coming of JI. Later JI and K3M combined to create 
Daulah Islam Nusantara headed by one Caliphate before expanding their territory to 
Mindanao and Pattani.   
 
K3M members were initially given a month's military training by the Indonesian 
Mujahidin in Pulau Moti Halmahera, North Maluku Island in April 2000.
779
 This 
course was requested by Hambali.
780
 The Ambon incident occurred on March 2, 2000. 
This incident finally opened the door of Jihad for the JI and K3M. As a result, 10 
K3M members were identified to be sent to Ambon for military training. Rafi bin 
Udin, Zainuri Kamarudin, Zainan Harith, Rasid Ismail, Zid Sharani and Taufik Abdul 
Halim were sent to Ambon as the first batch of Jihadi fighters from KMM.
781
  
 
In addition to actively taking part in battle between Muslims and Christians in 
Maluku, they were taught how to make home-made bombs and constantly had 
military and physical training during their breaks.
782
 They were taught by Hambali 
and JI members about jungle survival-knowledge such as cooking, farming and 
catching fish as a value added to their life for future use, especially if they had to 
attend another Jihad after Ambon.
783
 At the end of the year 2000, some of them, 
including Rafi bin Udin, returned to Malaysia from Batam Island with an arrangement 
by Amran aka Saputra (JI members from Wakalah Johor). This command came from 
Zulkifli after being instructed by Hambali.
784
   
  
The second group headed by Zulkifli Khir and accompanied by Murad Halimudin, 
Faizul Anisham, Md. Lotfi Arifin and two more K3M members went to Ambon at the 
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end of the year 2000.
785
 Aside from Ambon, they also participated in various attacks 
and a series of bloody clashes between Muslims and Christians in Poso, Sulawesi, 
Indonesia. These group members were reported to have returned to Malaysia after 
spending two months in Poso for another operation in Malaysia as directed by 
Hambali.
786
 Only married KMM members were directed to go back to Malaysia while 
single members had to continue their Jihad journey to Jakarta and later meet with the 
now late Dr. Azhari.
787
 This is why we can see most of the attacks carried out by 
Taufik Abdul Halim aka Dani and Zid Sharani as well as Rafi Udin were coordinated 
by Dr. Azhari. KMM members and Dr. Azhari came from the same country and spoke 
a similar dialect, which made communication and relationships stronger among them 
especially with regards to completing „operations‟.788   
 
With the soul of Jihad and shared sympathy to help the Muslim brotherhood in 
Ambon and Maluku, these two groups were united and carried out an armed robbery 
in Guar Chempedak Police Station in February and a bank robbery in May 2001 to get 
enough weapons and money to be channelled into the „medan Jihad‟.789  
 
After the bank robbery was botched and all their activities as well as their members 
were tracked down by authorities, the third group, known as the „exile group‟ of K3M 
fled to Indonesia. Rafi Udin, Zid Sharani and Nurmiswari aka Nurdin arrived in 
Indonesia via Batam Island with help from JI.
790
 This „migration‟ was arranged by 
Imam Samudera
791 and this „exile group‟ was protected by the Banten and Sunda 
separatist movements before it silently travelled to Sulawesi to take part in the Poso 
incident.
792
  
 
 After the Atrium building blew up in August 2001, some of the K3M members were 
detained by the Indonesian Police and handed over to Malaysian Police in November 
the same year. Zid Shaarani, one of the detainees, was extradited to Malaysia and later 
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charged and imprisoned under the ISA for two years.
793
 Meanwhile Rafi Udin and 
Nurmiswari were detained on April 23, 2003 at Palu, Sulawesi with 17 JI members 
including Nasir Abas and Abu Rushdan.
794
  
 
The man [Taufik Abd. Halim], who studied housing, building and planning at ITM, 
graduated last year but travelled with 10 other Malaysians to Ambon to attack 
Christians…..,Malaysian police, who confirmed the arrest, are investigating if the 
man had links with the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), whose members 
were arrested under the ISA because they were deemed to be a threat to national 
security.
795
  
 
At this stage, we can see how Hambali and Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir manipulated KMM 
especially K3M to achieve their political goals. Extreme Indonesian preachers 
influenced K3M members to become JI‟s new proxies in Malaysia especially through 
Zulkifli Khir and Adnan Daud. They also successfully persuaded K3M members to 
act violently through robbery, murder and bombing. All of these operations were 
crucial to obtaining KMM‟s main objective which was to stir social stability and 
ethnic relationships in Malaysia.     
 
 
4.6 The Involvement of the KMM in a Series of Attacks    
In the name of Jihad and believing there was no other way to establish Islam except 
by performing Jihad, K3M members were persuaded by JI‟s leaders (Hambali and 
Ba‟asyir) to launch several attacks between 1998 and 2001. During that time, KMM 
burned four churches and one Hindu temple, robbed two banks, attempted to steal 
arms from a police station, murdered one of the Kedah State‟s assemblymen, 
attempted to kill two „infidels‟, attempted three attacks on the US Navy convoy and 
committed at least one bombing in a public area.
796
 They had the capacity to launch a 
massive attack on this country and were always well aware of every step taken. 
Documents seized by the police in June 2001 revealed the KMM‟s forty week training 
schedule covering ideology, guerrilla warfare tactics, weapon training, and the 
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collection of intelligence on police depots and laboratories at tertiary institutions 
around the country.
797
  
 
This is strong evidence showing KMM‟s intelligence, operating in Malaysia with 
support from Indonesian clerics and mixing science and religious prodigy students, 
making this group „exciting‟. The writer will explain some of the attacks done by 
KMM but not all the cases can be shown here because of a lack of evidence or to 
protect respondents' identities and this writer.   
 
There was a report about ten politicians who were on the list of KMM‟s „prospective 
victims‟ including the former President of Indonesia, Megawati Sukarno Putri and the 
leaders of Malaysia and the Philippines.
798
 KMM is believed to have wanted to 
replace Megawati with someone „more favourable‟ to them in order to install an 
Islamic state in this region.
799
 The Malay Mail (5 October, 2002) reported “They were 
not targeting Megawati alone. The same group plotted to kill other top leaders in the 
Philippines and Malaysia who had openly criticized the JI operative.
800
 
 
KMM was accused of working hand in hand with their JI counterparts in Singapore 
and the Philippines to carry out these assassination plots
801
 through bombings in 
Indonesia, however this accusation was questionable. Rohan Gunaratna said one of 
the assassins who wanted to kill Megawati lost his leg when the bomb blew up 
prematurely at Atrium Mall in Jakarta. But Taufik aka Dani who lost his leg in the 
incident said he just wanted to kill Christian followers who were holding a conference 
in that building rather than kill Megawati.
802
 The truth was that Megawati was not in 
the Atrium building on the day the bombing occurred.
803
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Picture 7: The rationale for the Atrium bombing was retaliation for the attacks on 
Muslims in Ambon, since a congregation that was reputed to be funding the Christian 
side met for services on the second floor of the mall. The bomb went off prematurely, 
and Taufik lost part of his leg.
804
 
 
Furthermore, incidents such as a mini-market robbery at Shah Alam in 2001,
805
 the 
Dataran Seni Park bombing in Kelang, brothel and gambling centre attacks
806
 and 
many more incidents may not be revealed in detail here. As stated before, there was a 
lack of evidence and some of the cases were closed by the police. Respondents also 
refused to talk more regarding this issue, but were not denying their role in the 
incidents. 
 
 
4.6.1 The Attempt to Bomb Places of Worship 
A Christian community center in Malaysia set ablaze by suspected Muslim extremists 
was reported in July 2001
807
 and it was later reported that KMM carried out the 
attack.
808
 The Marthoma Christian Community Center was primarily used for 
community gatherings and Christian services. A fire gutted the Marthoma Christian 
Community Center in Sungai Petani, a city located about 190 miles northwest of 
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Kuala Lumpur in the Kedah state on the Malaysian peninsular. Damage to the center 
was estimated at RM300, 000.
809
  
The church caretaker filed police reports on July 19 and 20 after noticing two 
windows had been broken and homemade petrol bombs were found near the 
premises.
810
 A similar modus operandi on attacking churches was implemented by 
KMM members in Indonesia such as Taufik Abdul Halim, who had lived in exile 
since June 2000. Taufik was alleged to have been involved in the bombing of two 
churches in Semarang and central Java as well as the Atrium Shopping Mall in the 
Indonesian capital in 2003.
811
  
Taufik Abdul Halim was arrested in Jakarta after a bomb he was carrying prematurely 
exploded in a shopping mall.  It exploded in a phone booth in a car park outside the 
Atrium Mall.
812
 The bomb seriously injured four people and blew off one of Taufik's 
legs. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment at Cipinang Prison Centre in East 
Jakarta. Taufik admitted  he carried out the attack because of the „hatred‟ he felt 
towards the Christians and to seek revenge for every Muslim killed by the US military 
since the declaration of the „war on terrorism‟ by Bush in October 2001. 813 
Respondent B9 said during the interview "Our motivation…was revenge… In Eastern 
Indonesia, many Christians are involved in slaughtering the Muslim population”.814   
The second attack was on October 13, 2001, where chairs and other church equipment 
was burnt and destroyed in the Christ the King Church, also in Sungai Petani, 
Kedah.
815
 The attack only succeeded in burning some furniture near the windows. 
Collective work and effective strategies on gathering information especially from the 
„secret agent‟ led by respondent J and his unit made KMM successful in planning 
such attacks.
816
 Since the assassination of state assembly representative Dr Joe 
Fernandez on November 4, 2000, KMM actively operated in the Kedah state with 
commands coming from the K3M leader, Zulkifli Khir. Some of the attackers 
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travelled from Kuala Lumpur to Kedah, collected the necessary information, carried 
out the operation and later went back to Kuala Lumpur.  
 
The third attack involved Molotov cocktails being thrown at St Philip‟s Church in 
Segamat, Johor. The door was burned, but not the tabernacle, where another Molotov 
cocktail failed to explode.
817
 The fourth or the last attack occurred at the Christ 
Community Centre church in Subang Jaya, which was completely destroyed by a fire. 
At first place, police had been called out to the building in the early hours after the 
burglar alarm went off. However, finding nothing suspicious they left. Three hours 
later the building was engulfed in flames.
818
  
 
On October 25, 2000, one attack on a Hindu temple was recorded in Kuala Lumpur. 
The Sri Ganesha temple at Jalan Pudu Lama, near Pudu Raya Kuala Lumpur Bus 
Station, exploded from a home-made bomb. It was planted by Zainuri Kamarudin and 
Rasid Ismail on the Deepavali Festival
819
 day. In that incident, the premise was 
rocked by an explosion which damaged some parts of the building with smoke and 
left burn marks.
820
 The blast also damaged its side grilled gate, an electric switchbox, 
part of an overhead canopy and two communal bins outside. Elina Noor (2007) wrote 
“What is particularly interesting is that like al-Maunah, KMM planned to spark strife 
between Muslims and non-Muslims as a prelude to an all out religious conflict within 
Malaysia and beyond”.821 
 
As reported by Morais, Raja & Eds. (2001c), “two men on a motorcycle placed a 
package near the bins just before the blast which sent minor tremors to the 
surrounding area as devotees were getting ready to usher in the Deepavali 
festivals”.822 A passer-by suffered slight injuries after being hit by flying debris.823 A 
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bomb disposal unit was dispatched to the temple later, but failed to locate any wiring 
device to identify the type of explosive used. Police later summoned experts from the 
Chemistry Department to investigate.
824
 The outcome revealed that two unidentified 
men were seen walking to the scene of the blast several minutes before the explosion 
took place.  It was later surmised that the attack was carried out by KMM members.
825
       
 
Abu Omar aka Imam Samudera, the members of JI, were  responsible for helping 
Zainuri Kamarudin and Zulkifli Khir in getting the materials for making the bomb. In 
October 2000, for instance, Imam Samudera smuggled 10 detonators, two timers and 
TNT explosive materials through Batam Island to Layang-layang Island before 
landing at Johor Bahru.
826
 The materials were later protected by JI members before 
being handed out to K3M leaders. Zid Sharani, who police considered an expert in 
home made bombs, helped create the bomb used by Zainuri and Zulkifli in that 
bombing.
827
          
 
 
4.6.2 Bank Robberies 
Hong Leong Bank in Petaling Jaya, Selangor was the first bank to be robbed by KMM 
members.
828
 On December 14, 2000, five members of KMM, including Zainuri 
Kamarudin, Adnan Daud, Zainan Harith, Abdul Rasid Ismail and Rafi Udin, broke 
into the bank, justifying it is a legitimate target because the bank was not an Islamic 
institution.
829
 They are reported to have taken about RM98, 000 to fund Jihad 
activities around the region. Some of the money was sent to Mindanao to support 
Jihad between MILF and the government of the Philippines.
830
 They used part of the 
money to buy weapons and home-made bomb materials. Some of the money was also 
spent on Eid Adha (Islamic second biggest festival) and for Moro humanitarian 
purposes.
831
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Picture 4: Adnan Mohd Daud being taken to hospital after a security guard shot him 
during a robbery at Southern Bank in Jalan Gasing, Petaling Jaya. He was paralyzed 
and later died at University Malaya Hospital.
832
   
 
Inspired by the success of the first robbery, KMM desperately broke into the Southern 
Bank in Jalan Gasing, Petaling Jaya on May 18, 2001.
833
  As stated previously, the 
robbery was botched when a security guard shot one of the robbers dead, injured two 
others and later police launched Ops Southern, arresting nine of the KMM members. 
During the incident, Faizul Anisham (who was pronounced dead upon arrival at 
University Malaya Medical Centre-UMMC), Adnan Daud (dead on June 25, 2001 at 
UMMC) and Zainan Harith ended up being shot by the guard who quietly retrieved 
his pump-gun while they were busy with their loot.
834
 The drama unfolded when the 
two security guards were closing the shutters. Faizul Anisham and Adnan Daud 
armed with a Colt 9mm Semi-automatic pistol rushed in, while another, also armed, 
stood guard outside.
835
 The robbers pushed the two guards inside and went to the 
counter demanding money from the cashier. One of them used a hammer to break the 
glass partition beside the counter.
836
 They forced a bank officer to open a vault. Two 
accomplices got the bank teller to place all the cash collected at the counter into a bag. 
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While they were preoccupied, Abdullah (the security guard) stealthily made his way 
to his counter for the pump gun.
837
      
 
Abdul Rashid Ismail, who was able to escape but was arrested a few days later in his 
mother‟s house in Felda Kampung Awah in Temerloh, Pahang, was waiting outside 
the entrance, and, on hearing gun fire, rushed in to find his accomplices lying in pools 
of blood.
838
 Grabbing another security guard as a human shield, Rashid, who was also 
armed with a pistol, opened fire at the armed guard but missed and hit a wall.  He then 
shoved his 64-year-old „human shield‟ aside and escaped on one of two motorcycles 
parked outside the bank.
839
  After making the arrests, police seized a semi-automatic 
pistol which was believed to have been used to shoot at the security guard.
840
  
 
 
Picture 8: Police investigate the Yamaha RXZ, one of the motorcycles parked and 
abandoned by Abdul Rashid outside the Southern Bank. Police also found a Colt 
pistol and a motorcycle believed to have been stolen.
841
  
 
 
The deceased, who was identified as Faizul Anisham Abdullah, had recently (two 
months before the robbery) returned to the country after studying in Pakistan for four 
years and another year in Turkey.
842
 Adnan Daud had graduated from al-Azhar 
University in Egypt, while Zainan and Abdul Rashid had only received a local 
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intermediate-Islamic education.
843
 They were believed to have been influenced by the 
concept of al-Fai, where all assets belonging to non-Muslims can be considered as al-
Fai and therefore could be confiscated.
844
 Al-Fai must however be used in the general 
interests of Muslims and not for personal gain. For this reason, money successfully 
gained from the first robbery was channelled to the Mindanao people and used to fund 
the Jihad war against the US and Manila administration.
845
      
 
Besides KMM, another militant group, JI, had also done the same thing when they 
robbed the Central Bank of Asia, Jakarta in 1999 and the perpetrators of the Bali 
bombing reportedly committed a robbery at the Elita Gold Shop in Serang, West 
Java
846 
for the same reasons – justifying the behaviour by referring to the concept of 
al-Fai. Their understanding or rather misunderstanding of the idea of al-Fai is a 
typical illustration of the misrepresentations and alterations of Islamic lessons that 
some Jihadist choose to use in the pursuit of what they view as Jihad.
847
 In relation to 
KMM‟s robberies, they believed the banks were operating within a secular-capitalism 
system and could be robbed because they paid Riba‟ (interest).   
 
There is no validation in Islamic jurisprudence (or fiqh) for robbing any banks or 
institutions which are run by non-Muslims or on non-Islamic principles. On the 
contrary, since prophet Muhammad and his companions recognised non-Muslims in 
Islamic countries as being protected people or Zimmis who not only had property and 
commercial rights but also the autonomy to live out their religion provided that they 
paid a tax.
848
  The bank robberies carried out by KMM in 2000 and 2001 violated the 
rights of non-Muslims to practise their way of life, even though Malaysia, as a multi-
ethnic country allowed non-Muslims to operate outside of Islam. 
 
4.6.3 The Armed Robbery at Guar Chempedak Police Station 
KMM also aimed to have more weapons for future-planned operations and with this 
objective they attacked Guar Chempedak Police Station on February 4, 2001. KMM 
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already knew that most of the police stations in Malaysia had their own armoury or 
weapon depot. KMM hoped to emulate the success of al-Maunah's raid on July 2, 
2000
849 
where, in a pre-dawn weapon heist on a Malaysian Army Reserve camp in 
Grik, Perak, al-Maunah not only confiscated the contents of four trucks loaded with 
weapons, but also murdered a policeman, an army commando and one civilian.
850
   
 
After witnessing an operation simulation shown by Adnan Daud, KMM believed that 
this was the best and easiest way to get weapons.
851
 This operation was illustrated 
easily through simulations done in Puchong. KMM desperately needed weapons, 
especially after being frustrated with the lack of success of previous arms trades.
852
 
The Puchong cell put significant effort into buying pistols, rifles, hand-grenades, 
bullets and many more from Thailand but always ended up frustrated. Zainuri 
Kamarudin, Zainan Harith and Adnan Daud from K3M's Puchong cell, travelled to 
Perak to pick up Muhammad Azian prior to that incident.
853
 They were believed to 
have stayed and discussed the operation at Murad Halimudin bin Hassan‟s house in 
Pengkalan Batu Hampar, Pendang, Kedah. Guar Chempedak Police Station was 
located only 30 kilometres from Murad Halimudin‟s house (both in Pendang 
district).
854
 
 
In that incident, four masked men (Adnan Daud, Abdul Rashid Ismail Ismail, 
Muhammad Azian and Zainuri Kamarudin) entered the premises.
855
 One was armed 
with a pistol and two others with a crowbar and cutter.
856
 In this pre-dawn (4.15am) 
incident, they shot Lance Corporal Ahmad Tarmizi Mat Changgong and Lance 
Corporal Nik Aziz Nik Kobu.
857
  The attackers walked into the police station through 
a gap in the perimeter fencing behind the police station, entered the reception area and 
attacked the two policemen seated there.
858
 One of them fired two shots at Lance 
Corporal Ahmad Tarmizi Mat Changgong while another hit Lance Corporal Nik Aziz 
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Nik Kob with a crowbar to the head.
859
 Ahmad Tarmizi, however, managed to pull 
out his revolver and return fire.
860
 Although the shots did not kill or injure the four 
attackers, it successfully hastened their actions. Zainuri, Adnan, Rashid and Azian 
were startled by the shot, and ran outside in a panic to escape the situation.  
 
The simulation shown by Adnan Daud prior to the operation had differed significantly 
from what actually occurred. They were especially affected by the reality of the head 
wound they inflicted on Lance Corporal Ahmad Tarmizi: 
 
The main objective is to gain weapons not to kill innocent people especially 
police, when that happened, they panicked and ran away from the scene, what 
was discussed and illustrated by Adnan was really different from what really 
happened.
861
    
 
The two policemen, Ahmad Tarmizi and Nik Aziz, chased the attackers but they 
managed to escape through the back door of the station.
862
 Using a white Proton 
Iswara Aero-back parked outside the station, they made their get-away from the 
scene.
863
 Police investigations revealed the attack‟s motive was to steal weapons 
including M-16 assault riffles, pump-action guns and revolvers stored at the armoury 
but the quick response by Lance Corporal Ahmad Tarmizi and Lance Corporal Nik 
Aziz changed the situation.
864
 
 
We really wanted to get lots of weapon as what al-Maunah had before, if we 
were successful in the raid (Guar Chempedak Police Station weapon heist) we 
may have carried out more operations and projects as we had previously 
planned r.
865
  
 
 
4.6.4 The Murder of Kedah State’s Assemblyman  
Dr. Joe Fernandez, who turned 54 in 2000, was the deputy chief of the Kedah 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). He was shot dead by KMM members at the Jalan 
Maju-Jalan Harapan junction in Bukit Mertajam, Penang.
866
 Adnan Daud rode a 
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motorcycle with other KMM members and shot Dr. Joe Fernandez with a .38 colt 
pistol while he was driving home to Taman Bukit on November 4, 2000.
867
    
     
 
 
Picture 9: The body of Dr. Joe Fernandez was taken out from the emergency room of 
a specialist hospital and was sent to the Bukit Mertajam Hospital, Pulau Pinang for a 
post-mortem.
868
 
 
For a while the case seemed destined to become an unsolved murder. Finally, the 
unsuccessful Southern Bank robbery on May 18, 2001, gave clues to police that 
helped them to track down Dr. Fernandez's killers after a seven-month manhunt. Nine 
suspects, including Adnan Daud who was said to have fired the shots, were arrested 
after several raids in Kelang Valley.
869
 During interrogation of the suspects, police 
obtained information that linked KMM to the killing of the former state assemblyman. 
Through media releases, police explained the motive behind the killing as „ideological 
differences‟ involving an extremist sect.  
 
...Police have detained nine members of a self-styled religious militant group 
responsible for a spate of headline-making crimes, including the murder of 
politician Dr Joe Fernandez last November……the gang was also responsible 
for another robbery at a Hong Leong Bank branch, an attack on a police 
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station at Guar Chempedak in Kedah in February and separate bomb attacks 
at a temple, church and video centre.
870
  
 
Two months after the murder, Penang police and a special task force set up at the 
Bukit Aman Police Headquarters to investigate the case, but had still not made any 
headway.
871
 In relation to this incident, the MIC Subang Jaya Town Centre branch 
had put up a reward of RM100,000 on behalf of a group of Dr. Fernandez‟s friends 
who wanted those responsible brought to justice.
872
 Utusan Malaysia (2000) reported 
“Dr Fernandez had stopped his four-wheel-drive vehicle at the junction when two 
men on a motorcycle went close to the driver's side window and fired three shots. 
Two shots hit his head and the third his body.”873 
 
The nation was shocked by this high-profile murder. Dr. Fernandez was a Lunas state 
assemblyman and was well-respected by the public. However from the KMM's 
perspective, he was considered corrupt and to have converted a number of Muslims to 
Christianity.
874
 He was also accused of being responsible for convincing his patients, 
especially women and factory workers who worked at his clinic, to leave Islam or 
became murtad (apostate).
875
 For these reasons, KMM members made him a primary 
target to be killed along with some other apostates, as shown through incidents that 
occurred before and after this incident.  
 
4.6.5 The Attempt to Kill ‘Infidels’  
At least two attempts to kill apostates were carried out by KMM between 1998 and 
2001. As explained previously, KMM strongly opposed any Muslims who turned 
apostate. Furthermore, KMM was willing to kill any person who tried to persuade 
other Muslims to be non-Muslim (as Dr. Fernandez had done). In Malaysia, Ustaz 
Harussani Zakaria, a Perak state mufti (or Muslim legal adviser/expert) once 
announced that more than 250,000 people were committing apostasy with 100,000 of 
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them still in the process of gaining declaration from the Shari`ah Court.
876
  This 
statement had a significant impact on the radicals and was treated seriously by KMM 
members. Apostates among Malays were also discussed broadly in KMM's Usrah 
especially in the „Puchong group‟ coordinated by Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir, Hambali and 
Abu Jibril and Zulkifli Khir.   
 
The first attack on an „apostate‟ was recorded in January 1998, after several KMM 
members including Respondent A and J monitored the movements of Hartina 
Kamarudin.
877
 The case of Hartina binti Kamarudin, who had converted to Hindu and 
changed her name to Nivashini Jeyaraman, shocked Malaysian Muslims in 1997. 
Kamarudin (Hartina's father), a satay seller in Kampar, Perak, was detained by the 
police because of an assault he committed on his daughter.
878
 Hartina was accused by 
her father of being rude in front of him when he asked her to return to Islam, he then 
hit her, resulting in his arrest.  
 
...other cases believed to have links with this militant group (KMM) which is 
robbery at a Hong Leong Bank branch on the 14
th
 of December last year, 
bomb at Hindu Temple in Jalan Pudu on the 26
th 
of October last year, bomb at 
Dataran Seni Public Park on the 20
th
 of July last year, bomb at the church 
located in northern Malaysia, robbery at Shah Alam‟s mini-market and 
attempts to kill an Indian couple in Brickfields...
879
   
 
 
The statement extracted from Utusan Malaysia newspaper above clearly shows that 
KMM took part in an attempt to kill a Hindu couple (one of whom was Hartina binti 
Kamarudin) who had converted from Islam to Hindu. They were attacked by KMM 
when they were caught in a traffic-jam near the busy road at Brickfields in Kuala 
Lumpur. KMM members were riding a motorcycle and shot Hartina's boyfriend while 
he was seated in the front of their car but only caused a minor injury.
880
 Luckily 
several shots pointed at him missed because of the road conditions and the fact that 
the traffic light turned green just after the attack.
881
 This case was not publicly 
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highlighted by the media and was hidden by the authorities in order to ensure ethnic 
stability in Malaysia.  
 
A second attempt to kill an „infidel‟ took place in 1999. Noraishah binti Bokhari, later 
known as Noraishah Felicia Bokhari (Aishah), converted from Islam in 1998. This 
controversial case was covered by most Malaysian mainstream newspapers at that 
time. It was regarded almost as seriously as the Maria Hertogh incident in 1950.
882
 
This incident occurred when Noraishah declared she had already converted to 
Catholicism and planned to get married to Joseph Arnold Lee.
883
 Joseph worked at the 
same place as Aishah at Citibank Kuala Lumpur.
884
 Police accused him of eloping and 
caging his „girlfriend‟ at Seremban and a few places nationwide from December 30, 
1998.
885
 
 
After successfully running away from her house, Aishah made a writ of habeas corpus 
by a statutory declaration claiming that she was detained involuntarily by her own 
family members for the purposes of converting her to Islam before marrying her 
Roman Catholic boyfriend.
886
 She subsequently escaped and has since left the 
country. She is believed to have been living in Melbourne since 1999.
887
 
 
KMM was attracted to the Aishah issue after it was covered by mainstream media. A 
mass gathering and „solat hajat‟ (special prayer) held at Jamek Mosque in Kuala 
Lumpur catalyzed this sensitive issue around the country.
888
 Several KMM members, 
including Adnan Daud, had planned an attack on Aishah and Joseph while they 
travelled back from Melbourne.
889
 They targeted Aishah‟s entourage when they 
travelled from Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) to Joseph‟s home at 
Seremban. However, the attack was abandoned after the KMM‟s „peeping‟ unit gave 
the wrong information and they became confused with the target.
890
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4.6.6 The Attempt to Attack the US Navy 
The U.S and Malaysia share a diverse and expanding partnership. The US is also the 
largest foreign provider of training courses at various departments in Malaysia such as 
Royal Malaysia Police (RMP), Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism 
(SEARCCT) and Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS).
891
 The U.S 
and Malaysia share a strong military-to-military relationship with numerous 
exchanges, training, annual joint exercises and visits.
892
 
 
However, such a close relationship between these two governments was regarded as  
not Islamic and a kind of „betrayal‟ to the Muslim community in the eyes of KMM.893 
They believed any supporters of the relationship, whether Malaysian or American, 
should be punished with some kind of attack. This attack would make both countries 
realize that their collaborations were unsatisfactory to some groups and some people 
in Malaysia. In order to achieve this, KMM carried out at least three spy missions on 
the groups of US Marine and Navy who were anchored at Kelang and Lumut Port 
between 1999 and 2001.
894
   
 
The first attempted attack was planned in 1999 when the US Navy were spending 
their day off at the Bukit Bintang shopping area in the heart of the Kuala Lumpur city 
centre.
895
 The U.S Navy, on their way to Singapore from the US stopped at Kelang 
Port and had special joint training with the Malaysian Navy.
896
 The spare time on 
their trip was used to enjoy themselves in Kuala Lumpur and almost ended in tragedy. 
KMM members led by Adnan Daud and armed with pistols monitored their 
movement but finally abandoned their target.
897
 One of the main reasons was to avoid 
killing innocent people as the U.S Navy personnel were walking and mingling in a 
public space.
898
 Besides this, the U.S Navy also moved in big groups consisting of at 
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least three people.
899
 This movement made it hard for KMM to attack, as they had 
only planned to attack personnel who were alone or in pairs.   
 
A second attempt occurred in 2001 when a battalion of the US Navy landed in Kelang 
Port again.
900
 KMM monitored all the US Navy‟s movements including where they 
went and with whom they met. But they still did not dare to attack the US Navy ship 
anchored in Kelang Port because of a lack of weapons and the high numbers of the 
US Navy. Led by Adnan Daud, KMM established the „peeps unit‟ to gather as much 
information as possible on US Navy activities while they were in Malaysia.
901
 
 
Some of the KMM members followed US Navy buses that were used to transport 
them from Kelang Port to Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC) in April 2001.
902
 The 
movement through KESAS Highway was considered a good point to attack because 
fewer vehicles used the highway and there were a lot of exits to villages and palm oil 
plantations on both sides of the highway.
903
 However, KMM decided to abandon their 
attack because of the numbers and weapons capacity.
904
 Four KMM members who  
were involved in the attempt were thinking of attacking four buses containing at least 
120 US Navy personnel. In addition, KMM had a very limited weapons capacity with 
only one .38 Colt pistol and one M-16 as well as half a dozen home-made bomb 
pipes.
905
 They realized the U.S Navy could have more sophisticated and a greater 
number of weapons compared with what they had.
906
  
 
The third attempt to attack the U.S Navy was to occur somewhere at Lumut Port in 
1999.
907
 According to the news aired nationwide, the Malaysian government had 
allowed the U.S to build their base at Lumut Port.  KMM remarked that this kind of 
action was an attack on the country‟s sovereignty and the U.S was trying to demolish 
the Muslim movement in the region. A few KMM members travelled from Puchong 
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to Lumut to monitor U.S Navy movements, but they did not receive much 
information.
908
 The attempted attack on the U.S Navy was fully planned, but man-
power and numbers of weapons remained the main constraint. Once more, KMM 
abandoned their attack in Lumut.
909
      
 
At this stage, we can see how radical KMM‟s thinking was about attacks and acts of 
sabotage, regardless of the identity and number of victims. They were still willing to 
do that kind of attack. But when it came to reality, they kept logistics in mind and 
clearly were not willing to become syaheed (martyrs). It is easy to imagine the bad 
reputation the Malaysian government would have gained if that kind of attack had 
taken place. Furthermore, it would have had big implications on the security and 
diplomatic relationship between Malaysia and the US.
910
 But KMM were confident 
that the abandonment of the attack did not mean they were cowards or not willing to 
be a syaheed.  They decided to do more preparation for other, more significant, 
operations in the future.
911
      
 
 
4.7 The Demise of the KMM 
What differentiated the KMM from other militant organisations uncovered in 
Malaysia was the alleged regional scope of its networking and activities. KMM was 
established in Malaysia, but enjoyed close links with JI in Indonesia. The botched 
robbery on May 18, 2001 was a crucial clue for police to uncover the most Islamic-
related militant group in Malaysia since the Tentera Sabilullah group emerged in 
1967. Police connected the attempted robbery to the well-planned web of international 
terrorism that had caused murder and mayhem since 1999 and 2001. Concomitantly, 
the Malaysian security forces launched a nationwide operation to capture remaining 
KMM members after the unsuccessful bank robbery. Eighty-nine KMM and JI 
members were detained without trial under the ISA for allegedly trying to overthrow 
the government through violent means in the name of Jihad.
912
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Furthermore, an investigation into the group has exposed alleged links to Mujahidin 
and militants in Ambon. They had been indoctrinated and recruited into the 
Afghanistan-based Mujahidin whilst studying at universities in Pakistan, Egypt and 
India, as explained previously. The Malaysian government also revealed that the 
KMM was led by Zainon Ismail, who was believed to be the first Malay to go to 
Afghanistan to be a Mujahidin. The leadership of KMM was handed to Nik Adli Nik 
Abdul Aziz in 1996.
913
 More than that, the influence from Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir and 
Hambali had a significant impact on the ideology and the activities done by KMM 
previously.
914
 The charisma of the Indonesian clerics helped them to successfully 
attract people, especially the ex-Mujahidin, to join the group and later implement the 
radical ideas the group imposed.
915
  
 
Although the KMM no longer exists in Malaysia, the emergence and existence of 
KMM a decade ago provides strong evidence that radical ideology may emerge again 
in this multi-racial society. Experienced and qualified leaders may influence and turn 
good Muslims into radicals and later into potential terrorists. This could happen whilst 
they are on their search to find pure Islam. Efforts put in by the government to 
eliminate physical radical groups such as KMM are welcomed, but efforts to counter 
militarist and radical ideology are more crucial. As reported by The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy (2009), “Even as a military success against al-Qaeda 
grows, the ideological challenge, unless confronted, will continue to metasize”. To 
some extent, we can congratulate the Malaysian police for the victory they gained 
against this home-grown militant group, but this does not mean that Malaysia will 
remain free from threat.
916
  
 
KMM was completely paralyzed because the continuation of monitoring and 
rehabilitation programmes by police in collaboration with the Department of Islamic 
Understanding and Development of Malaysia (JAKIM).
917
 KMM and JI look like they 
have no ability to regroup again, but their capability to re-brand or re-name should not 
be underestimated. It is not impossible for KMM and JI to combine and form a new 
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group as they have similar ideologies and activities. Not only Malaysia, but all 
Southeast Asian countries will be in big trouble if KMM and JI work together to 
organize violence and attacks on societies and property.        
It is also unfair to generalize that all of the JI members knew every movement of their 
leaders. Most of them didn't know exactly what happened at the top level. JI‟s 
ordinary members only obeyed the leader of their Fiah.  Most of the Fiah leaders did 
not know the exact decisions made by Kirdas, and Kirdas only followed the direction 
of the Wakalah leaders.
918
 The concept of Tanzimul Sirri (secrecy) was paramount. 
Wakalah leaders would not talk in detail to their members either at Kirdas or Fiah 
stages.
919
 This is why, after JI was uncovered through raids and interrogations 
between 2001 and 2004, most of the links and networks came out through those in 
leadership positions and not via lower level followers.  
 
JI‟s violent activities must be seen to have been carried out by the members in top 
positions; they made the decisions and planned the targets. Most of the followers in 
lower ranks were innocent and did not know exactly what was happening. However 
Malaysian, Singaporean and Indonesian authorities detained all of the JI‟s related 
members regardless of rank or how much they contributed, or did not contribute, to 
attacks. Some of them were given the same level of punishment as those with more 
responsibility. In Malaysia and Singapore, the detention law ISA was widely used to 
arrest, punish and rehabilitate innocent followers along with the real instigators. 
Indonesian authorities were more transparent with an open trial in every case.  
 
A big issue when dealing with militancy and extremism is evidence, or lack thereof. It 
is hard to find evidence of terrorist „projects‟ or attacks as they are always carried out 
in secret. Little communication between attackers took place either before or after the 
attacks. In some cases, they did not know the details of the whole project; they only 
did as directed by their leaders. For example, Respondent B7, carried a box containing 
a Smith and Wilson pistol and bullets from Kelantan to Johor by an Express Bus.
920
 
Respondent B7 didn't know what the box contained and he never asked. Azmi, a 
member of the JI Kelantan cell, gave Respondent B7 the box wrapped in newspaper 
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and a plastic bag.
921
 Respondent B7 then showed the box to Wan Min Wan Mat, the JI 
Wakalah Johor leader. Instructed by Wan Min, he smuggled the box to the Batam 
Island through Sungai Layang, Johor and Teluk Mata Ikan before handing it over to 
Imam Samudra.
922
 This gun was used for the Christmas Eve bombing carried out by 
Imam Samudra as directed by Hambali.
923
  
 
At this stage, it is hard to prove Respondent B7 should suffer the death penalty under 
the Firearms Act (increased) 1971. Even though Respondent B7 goes through an 
open trial, there will be an issue between committing crime or „only obeying orders‟. 
If convicted, he deserves less punishment because of he was only doing his job. Many 
cases may end up without a fair trial if brought up in an open court because of the lack 
of evidence.  
 
In Indonesia, many JI-related cases were concluded with only a light punishment, 
such as a few months in prison, or release with bail. If there was no strong evidence of 
violence, the accused might have only been charged with breaches of immigration or 
other related laws. Nasir Abas, who was known as the JI Mantiqi Tsalis leader and 
trained large numbers of NII and JI members during his period at Camp Sadda and 
Towrkhan, only spent nine months in prison charged with breaching Indonesian 
immigration law.
924
 There was no clear evidence to connect Nasir Abas with the act 
of terrorism. Furthermore, two of Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir‟s accusations were dropped due 
to a lack of evidence. This highlights the weaknesses of open trials, in that it is hard to 
prove and punish without clear evidence. 
 
Does this mean that the ISA is the best answer? The ISA can be one part of the 
answer but it is not a complete solution in itself. To some extent, the ISA is a good 
remedy to counter radicalism in cases where there is no strong evidence to be proven. 
JI and KMM were a good example of how ISA was used to demolish the most 
dangerous radical groups in Malaysia. To generalize that all KMM and JI members 
are dangerous and threaten the country‟s security is unfair. Some of them, specially 
those at the top and the followers of the KMM Selangor cell were clearly involved in 
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violence, but not all of them. There should be different methods of punishment 
concordant with members‟ involvement as some of them were barely followers and 
only obeying orders.      
 
The deadliest terrorist networks in Southeast Asia have suffered significant setbacks 
in the past six years. These radical networks weakened by aggressive strategies, 
improved intelligence, enhanced military operations and an erosion of public support, 
government officials and counterterrorism. Two years after the region's most 
dangerous man, the late Dr. Azhari Hussin and his entourage were killed in the Batu 
Malang incident, American and Asian intelligence analysts said financial and 
logistical support from Al Qaeda to other groups in the region had long dried up, and 
the most lethal were scrambling for survival.  
 Since 2005 in Indonesia, authorities have arrested more than 200 members of Jemaah 
Islamiyah. In the Philippines, an American-backed military campaign has the Abu 
Sayyaf Group, an Islamic extremist organization with links to Jemaah Islamiyah, 
clinging to footholds in the jungles of a handful of southern islands. In Malaysia, at 
least 19 KMM and 68 JI members were detained under the ISA.
925
 Networking, 
financial and logistical capabilities of these two groups were dismantled by the 
Malaysian authorities. Massive raids and effective strategies by various departments 
in Malaysia were crucial in tackling the threat.   
In the Malaysian context, KMM was totally paralyzed and no longer posed a threat to 
the Malaysian government.
926
 Since the leaders, Zainon Ismail and Nik Adli were in 
prison for four years, no violent activities have been recorded. The thorough 
surveillance by the Malaysian police weakened KMM and made them ineffective. 
Moreover, KMM members also fled to neighbouring countries such as Indonesia and 
the Philippines. The very significant KMM members such as Taufik Abdul Halim and 
Ibrahim Ngah have been in an Indonesian prison since 2003. Zulkifli Khir, the alleged 
leader of K3M and the middle man between the KMM Selangor cell with JI are still at 
large. Hambali, the indirect spiritual leader of KMM has been at Guantanamo Bay 
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since 2003. Meanwhile, Abu Jibril, the most influential KMM Ustaz was back in 
Indonesia after spending six years in a Malaysian detention camp.  
JI had suffered greatly as a result of the crackdown by governments in the region and 
beyond. The series of arrests to its operatives and key leaders greatly disrupted its 
activities. JI was considered illegitimate in Malaysia since the breakdown in 2001 and 
2002. But there was a different story concerning JI in Indonesia. It was still operating 
and was recognized as a legal organization in the country with the world‟s biggest 
Muslim population. Indonesia still manages to control the threat of Islamic radicals 
especially after the murder of Dr. Azhari and the death penalty to the Bali bombers.    
However, there are many reasons to believe the threat of KMM and JI in Malaysia 
still exists. Even with the arrest of Hambali (in US custody), Yazid Sufaat, Zainon 
Ismail, Nik Adli and many more, the JI and KMM has proven to be flexible and 
strong. There are a number of KMM and JI operatives who are still active in the 
region. Zulkifli Khir, the leader of K3M, Nordin Md. Top, a bomb expert and the late 
Dr. Azhari‟s close aid, Amran aka Henry, are still at large in Indonesia and many 
more KMM and JI members who fled the  country just before being raided by police. 
All of them are believed to be living in scattered places in Indonesia and in the 
Southern Philippines with MILF and ASG.
927
      
Although their operational base in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia has been 
dismantled, there are still training camps run by MILF and ASG indirectly in theb 
Southern Philippines. KMM and JI members still in exile are believed to contribute to 
strengthening the camps, which could be a new factory for terrorists‟ operatives. It 
was learned that Zulkifli Khir, Nordin Md. Top and Umar Patek were staying in the 
remote area of Mindanao with MILF and ASG members to avoid arrest by the 
authorities. Not only were ex-Mujahidin from Asia, but also the Arabian Mujahidin, 
believed to be in Mindanao and involved in training and planning for future attacks. 
Arabian Mujahidin shifted their „medan Jihad‟ from Afghanistan and Pakistan to the 
Southern Philippines after their bases were closed down by the US and the Pakistani 
military for the war on terrorism.
928
 Kyodo (2008) wrote: „We are not sure whether 
we have crippled them, but the fact is that they are on the run and the fact that we 
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have uncovered various terrorist cells in the past few years means that they are within 
our reach‟.929  
4.8 Conclusion 
The government is acutely aware that social political grievances need to be adequately 
addressed to prevent exploitation by extremists. It also needs to allow political parties 
to have their say without worrying about diluting its own power.  The latest general 
election result showed that increasing price of goods as well as religious and race 
tensions have contributed significantly to turmoil for the incumbent Barisan Nasional 
party and have resulted in its worsening performance for the 50 years it has been 
ruling Malaysia.
930
 It is clear the ruling government faces significant challenges in 
maintaining its political power and ensuring national stability in the future. 
 
A strong connection between KMM and JI with MILF in the Southern Philippines has 
been recorded since the Afghan-Russian war ended in late 1980s. The Philippines 
were the first place chosen by al-Qaeda for overseas operations after the Afghan-
Russia War ended in 1989. Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (KSM), the brother-in-law of 
Osama bin Laden was appointed as the key operations person for al-Qaeda‟s 
Southeast Asia regional hub based in Mindanao. Besides planning militant attacks in 
the Southeast Asia region, Mindanao was also used as a new „medan Jihad‟ for Arab 
Mujahidins after Afghanistan.
931
 To realize this objective, al-Qaeda established a 
network with the local JI militant operative.  
 
Later, JI established Mantiqi Tsalis (3
rd
 section) to conduct joint training and 
operations with MILF in Mindanao.
932
 JI also managed the transport of JI members 
for training and participating in Jihad against the Manila government. Tawau and 
Sandakan in Sabah was used to transfer JI members to and from Mindanao from 1993 
until the crackdown in 2002.
933
 Mindanao was one of the areas that was to be included 
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in the wider Islamic caliphate planned by JI. The Southern Philippines also played a 
crucial role in helping to circulate Jihad funds. Money from Osama bin Laden, 
sadakah (donations) or Fa‟i (robbery) was used by MILF and JI to pay for Jihad and 
the costs involved in operating camps.
934
  
 
KMM used a similar method and the same route to transport their members for 
military training and Jihad experience. Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz at one stage was in 
the Southern Philippines to negotiate military training facilities with MILF, but this 
project was abandoned due to lack of money and a logistics issues.
935
 However, 
KMM did manage to have some of its followers undertake Jihad in Mindanao.
936
 
KMM and MILF representatives also took part in Rabitatul Mujahidin meetings in 
three places in Malaysia between 1999 and 2000.
937
      
 
Another goal was to have more opportunities for Islamic activists to channel their 
desires and thoughts about political Islam. At a regional level, KMM and JI‟s aim was 
more about gaining political mileage. It cannot be denied that KMM had strong 
connections with PAS; however, JI‟s affiliation with the NII struggle dated back to 
the 1940s. PAS was the earliest political party founded in Malaysia and tried to obtain 
power through democratic means.
938
  
 
Children of PAS's first generation members were sent to India and Pakistan to gain a 
better understanding of Islam.
939
 These children were also needed to be the new 
generation to sustain the struggle of PAS. However, extra time during their studies 
was occupied with Jihadi experiences in Afghanistan. This generation regrouped in 
Malaysia and was named Halaqah-Pakindo, later known as KMM. The main 
objective behind the foundation of this group was to achieve the political aims of 
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PAS.
940
 Despite believing in democracy, KMM was also willing to undertake war 
against the Malaysian government if their political objectives were denied.
941
     
 
To avoid expansion of radical thinking, the Malaysian government should give proper 
opportunity to PAS members or any Islamic political party to express their own 
perspective. Denying this will result in rebellion and vendettas. Their political needs 
should be channelled in a proper way and addressed as much as possible. If not, these 
highly motivated political members will only be able to express their agenda using 
extreme and radical methods. Then, what began simply as radical thinking may turn 
into radical action, as has occurred before.   
 
In contrast to PAS and KMM, JI‟s struggle is more related to political objectives 
formulated by DI for the establishment of NII. The Afghan-Russian war and the rise 
of al-Qaeda in this region had a significant impact on JI‟s struggle. Apart from just 
Indonesia, the concept of a Negara Islam (Islamic State) was widened to consist of 
almost all countries in the region. JI's role in Malaysia was more to prepare funds for 
all of JI‟s operations. Their political objective was for a future Islamic caliphate and 
not to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia. 
 
Another issue that should be highlighted by Malaysian government is detention 
without trial or ISA. The Malaysian government should not generalize by saying all 
KMM members were committed to violence and criminal activities. Fair and open 
trials should be implemented for those who had either direct or indirect contact with 
KMM. In fact, only KMM Selangor and Kuala Lumpur branches or known as K3M 
were involved in militancy, other branches had only normal sermons, Usrah, and 
meetings. However, K3M has always been in contact with other branches for logistics 
and surveillance. Most ordinary followers, however, were not involved in any violent 
activities despite following radical ideologies. 
 
Despite these facts, all KMM members were detained in Malaysia under the ISA for 
between three to seven years without trial. Regardless of the degree of violence and 
crime they were involved in, only one type of punishment was ordered – that of being 
                                                 
940
 Ibid. 
941
 Ibid. 
 158 
 
placed in a detention camp. There was no differentiation between individuals, as long 
as they were connected to KMM; they were detained under the ISA.
942
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Chapter V- 
KUMPULAN MILITAN MALAYSIA (KMM) AND 
JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (JI) IN MALAYSIA 
 
 
There is a close link between the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Kumpulan Militan 
Malaysia (KMM). They share the aspiration of setting up an Islamic state in 
Malaysia through violence and by overthrowing a democratically-elected 
government. One person who was able to forge that link, was Hambali, the 
operations director of Osama bin Laden‟s movement.
943
  
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir and Abdullah Sungkar founded Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in 
Malaysia in 1993 during their 1987 – 1998 exile. JI was in turmoil in 1993 after the 
ideological clash between Abdullah Sungkar and Masduki which resulted in 
Sungkar‟s split over from DI. Moreover, after the death of Sungkar in 1998,944 the top 
position was taken over by Ba‟asyir.945   
 
JI‟s main objective was to bring back the pristine notion of Islamic values and norms. 
In order to establish Islamic states, JI struggled to establish Shari`ah as the highest 
law for each nation in the region.
946
 Islamic states were also called Daulah Islamiyah, 
incorporating Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Southern Thailand and Mindanao. 
These countries were supposed to implement Shari`ah law throughout their 
administration, encompassing legislation, education and social aspects. Ba‟asyir 
publicly expressed his radical ideology after returning from Malaysia, just after the 
Suharto regime‟s downfall in 1998.947 JI also had transnational links with the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) regionally, 
and al-Qaeda internationally.
948
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JI grew out of the DI movement in Indonesia in 1947. DI was founded by Sekarmadji 
Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (Kartosuwirjo) after he was influenced by the ideology of 
Sufism from Middle Eastern countries.
949
 DI's goal was to establish an Islamic state in 
Indonesia to be known as Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). Kartosuwirjo was alleged to 
have been an Islamic reformist because of his initiatives against Sukarno‟s nationalist 
concepts and Dutch colonization. During this era, Sungkar and Ba‟asyir were 
members of NII. They were angered by the execution of Kartosuwirjo by the Suharto 
regime in 1962.
950
 
 
The prominent Indonesian clerics who established JI were Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir and 
Abdullah Sungkar. These men claimed to be descendents of the NII or DI ideology as 
put forward by Kartosuwirjo. They managed to establish a private radio station that 
advocated the imposition of Shari`ah in Solo in the 1960s.  They were also the 
founders of the Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Young Indonesian Islamic 
Movement) at the Pondok Al-Mukmin Ngruki in Solo in 1972.
951
   
  
Sungkar and Ba‟asyir continued to expand their radical ideology under the shadow of 
Pondok Ngruki. Pondok al-Amin, also known as Ngruki in Poso, Central Java, who 
was devoted to teaching Salafism and very conservative interpretations of Islamic 
principles. Sungkar and Ba‟asyir were arrested on November 19, 1978 by the Suharto 
regime because of the sedition taught in their school. The salafi wahhabism ideology 
was implemented by both of them along with lecturers who had come back from the 
Middle East. The radical approach was confessed by Ali Imron in Ngruki as written 
by Sarlito Sarwono (2006) in his book “In 1988, Ali Imron managed to pass 
Madrasah Tsanawiyah…Ali Imron permitted to study in Ngruki, the teachers taught 
extreme idealism, such as anti government, anti Pancasila and Jihad which is OK with 
Ali Imron”.952  
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However, Sungkar and Ba‟asyir were galvanized by the suppression during the 
Suharto regime (1965-1998). As a result, they fled to Malaysia to avoid being 
captured by the Indonesian authorities in 1985.
953
 Sungkar was detained briefly in 
1977 by Indonesian authorities for urging the people not to vote in the national 
election. He was then arrested with Ba‟asyir in 1978 on subversion charges for 
alleged involvement in Kommando Jihad and Darul Islam.
954
 At this stage, Sungkar 
and Ba‟asyir found Malaysia to be a safe place and more tolerant with regards to the 
preaching of Islam. They took the opportunity to teach Jihad and radicalism through 
the narrow interpretation of Islam.
955
  
 
They continually expanded NII activities through Usrah and religious classes in the 
Klang valley and Kuala Pilah, Negeri Sembilan. Ustaz Hashim Ghani, who was 
responsible for establishing Maahad Ittiba‟us Sunah in Kuala Pilah, invited both of 
them to teach in his Maahad.
956
 Ustaz Ghani knew Sungkar and Ba‟asyir before they 
had migrated to Malaysia, mainly through Javanese-blood connections. Both of them 
had contributed to establishing the Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School (LHIS) in Ulu 
Tiram, Johor, together with the Ustaz Ghani and Ustaz Latif in 1991.
957
   
 
One question was raised as to why the Malaysian authorities did not monitor the 
movements of Sungkar and Ba‟asyir at this early stage, and why both of them easily 
moved freely in Malaysia to deliver their radical and militant ideology. The answer 
was that so many things were happening politically, socially and economically in 
Malaysia during 1985 and they created a distraction. At least five major incidents 
occurred in Malaysia in that year alone. First, there was the „Memali incident‟ where 
clashes between police and the Ibrahim Libya‟s followers in Kampung Memali, 
Mukim Siong, Kedah claimed 18 lives. Second, there was the suspension of tin trade 
on the London Metal Exchange (LME). This suspension paralyzed the Malaysian 
economy which was strongly dependent on tin trading in the 1980s. Third, there was a 
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three day closure of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) as a result of the 
Singapore-based Pan Electric Industries going into receivership. Fourth was the 
occurrence of the Bumiputra Malaysia Finance (BMF) scandals
958
 and fifth was the 
upsetting victory of Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) in the Sabah snap polls, which meant 
the Sabah state was to be led by a party that was not a member of the Barisan 
Nasional (National Alliance -BN) coalition parties.
959
    
 
Back to Sungkar and Ba‟asyir, another question is why Ustaz Hashim and the society 
in Kuala Pilah easily accepted these clerics and their teaching approach. There were a 
few things that geared them towards accepting this kind of approach.  Firstly, Ustaz 
Hashim was attracted to the struggle and ideology of NII. Ustaz Hashim also 
indirectly supported the idea of establishing an Islamic state in the region. This idea 
appeared to be more compatible with the Malays who gradually sought Islam as a way 
of life. The Islamization policy by the Malaysian government encouraged Malays to 
be more „Islamic‟ in daily life.   
 
Second, Malays were regarded as a society that was very accommodating and 
respectful towards its visitors. Malays always welcomed their guests regardless of 
who they were or where they came from.
960
 Alongside that, sharing the same religion 
with their visitors also made the interaction more effective and convenient. Islamic 
teaching favoured honouring and welcoming guests and respecting their rights, thus 
with the Malays‟ already accommodative characteristics, Ba‟asyir and Sungkar were 
accepted without reservation from the society in Kuala Pilah. Ba‟asyir and Sungkar‟s 
oratory skills and teaching techniques were attractive and followed by the Malays 
without hesitation.
961
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Sungkar and Ba‟asyir's approach was accepted by locals and expanded to the Kelang 
valley in the late 1980s. Both were given Malaysian Permanent Residence (PR) status 
in 1987 through the support of local and Kelang valley students. On top of this, 
Ba‟asyir and Sungkar also received approval from the Majlis Agama Islam Negeri 
Sembilan (Negeri Sembilan‟s Islam Religious Council) to deliver Islamic teaching. 
This approval not only allowed Ba‟asyir and Sungkar to deliver Islamic sermons in 
that state but also in any state in Malaysia as long they did not go against Sunni 
teaching. This kind of „privilege‟ gave them huge opportunities to expand Wahhabism 
ideology in Malaysia.
962
   
 
Their radical ideology expanded in Malaysia and was popular with students who had 
returned from study in Afghanistan. K3M in Selangor was influenced by their 
ideology because they shared similar understandings of the Salafus-soleh approach 
and the concept of an Islamic state. Sungkar also drew attention to his regional vision 
when he spoke of “the obligation of Jihad within the framework of an Islamic state in 
Southeast Asia” with the development of Quwwatul Musollaha or military strength 
being essential. At this stage, it appeared that Malaysia could play a major task in 
realizing Daulah Islamiah Raya with Indonesia as the axis of the Islamic Caliphate.
963
        
 
 
5.2 The Emergence of JI in Malaysia  
JI was called the Jemaah or ikhwan (brotherhood) movement when it first began in 
Malaysia in 1985 and this continued until 1993, when it was officially named JI. 
Sungkar was called „Abah‟ (father) by his students as a sign of respect of his age and 
knowledge. Meanwhile, Ba‟asyir was called „Ustaz Abu‟ during his exile in Malaysia. 
JI Malaysia or KMM members and the general public knew him only as Ustaz Abu. 
They recognized him as Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir after the Bali Bombing in 2002 when 
Ba‟asyir was wanted by the Indonesian and Malaysian governments as well as the 
U.S.
964
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Ustaz Hashim Abdul Ghani (Ustaz Ghani), a mudir (headmaster) at Maahad Ittiba‟us 
Sunnah, hosted the emigration of 50 Wahhabism Indonesian clerics including Sungkar 
and Ba‟asyir. Pak Adung (arrested in June 2004 by POLRI in Jakarta, and involved in 
hiding Nordin M. Top), Abu Jibril (detained under ISA until 2004, returned to 
Indonesia and detained by POLRI), Pak Solihin, Ustaz Afif (teacher at Pondok al-
Mukmin, Ngruki), Pak Agung Biyadi (arrested in Selangor on  April 17, 2002 and 
detained under ISA until June 2006), Ferial Muchlis Abdul Halim (arrested April 17, 
2002, detained under the ISA until June 13, 2004, extended two more years) and Pak 
Ristan (died).  These men were among the Indonesian „emigration‟ that sheltered in 
Maahad Ittiba‟us Sunnah in 1985.   
 
The group was involved in teaching at various places nationwide to gain money to 
over their own expenses. Some of them worked at palm plantations or did farming 
jobs in the vicinity of Kuala Pilah, but their most common work was as book sellers, 
particularly selling books about Islam, ideology and the Islamic movement including 
Hassan al Banna‟s Ikhwanul Muslimin book. 965  Just a year before Hambali was 
granted Malaysian permanent residency in November 1989, Darul Islam‟s ideology 
expanded outside Kuala Pilah, Negeri Sembilan.  
 
Hambali, who was already making regular trips to Kuala Pilah to attend the Ba‟asyir‟s 
sermons, was welcomed as a host for the expansion of DI ideology in the Kelang 
valley. Hambali spent two years in Maktab Al Kidamah (MAK) in Jaji, Afghanistan. 
He also trained at the Camp of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, leader of Ittihad-I-Islami, the 
Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, one of the seven Mujahidin forces 
fighting the Soviets. He was taught bomb-making and guerrilla warfare and spent less 
than two years in Afghanistan, but had a great impact on the Mujahidin and Jihad 
movement.
966
 Hambali became a key figure in the Indonesian Mujahidin camp. He 
was responsible for bringing in new Jihadis from Southeast Asia and also for 
managing Mujahidin‟s logistics. This kind of opportunity led him to have direct 
contact with Osama bin Laden.
967
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Sungkar and Ba‟asyir not only expanded their Wahhabism ideology and Jihadi 
teaching in Malaysia, they also managed to send batches of JI‟s next generation to 
„medan Jihad‟. JI organized at least 10 groups of JI‟s protégé to Sadda Camp in 
Afghanistan for training. The Sadda Camp operated until 1992, and then all training 
was transferred to Towrkham Camp in Peshawar. These two camps were organized 
by JI members. At least 15 people were involved in these camps either as instructors 
or Ustazs.
968
 Malaysia could be considered as a meeting and selection point for JI‟s 
future fighters before they were sent to Afghanistan.  
 
Through Maahad Ittiba‟us Sunnah Kuala Pilah, Baasyir and Sungkar sent batches of 
Malaysian and Indonesian students to fight against the Russia occupation of 
Afghanistan.
969
 Near the end of 1985, the Indonesian clerics in Malaysia readied an 
initial contingent for travel to Pakistan. Showing foresight, the idea was for this group 
to be trained as instructors for later waves. This meant that candidates would need to 
be of a sufficiently high intellectual and physical calibre in order to be effective 
understudies.  
 
Later, JI built the Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School (LHIS) based in the Johor state, 
as a feeder for this movement.
970
 LHIS was important for planting the seeds of 
Wahhabism and DI in the younger generation. This generation would play a big role 
in this form of struggle; JI should be driven by new young people and not remain on 
the shoulders of the members of the older generation such as Ba‟asyir and Sungkar. 
Ali Ghufron, an Islamic preacher and close affiliate of Baasyir and Sungkar, became 
the master of the LHIS, where several of the Bali Bombers were trained.
971
 LHIS was 
an important transit station for just returned JI members before they were channelled 
to the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore or Malaysia.  
 
However doomsday for JI came after KMM was uncovered in May 2001. Through 
massive raids and interrogations between June 2001 and March 2002, at least 68 JI 
members were detained. The Malaysian government was considered successful in 
managing and halting JI from growing further. The return of JI‟s „key player‟, 
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Ba‟asyir, and the arrest of Hambali aided the abatement of JI in Malaysia. 
Nevertheless the threat of JI to the country‟s security still exists, and the radical 
ideology could easily be spread again. Malaysian authorities take ongoing precautions 
because JI still exists at its crucial base in Indonesia. As Respondent B8 pointed out, 
JI can be detained physically but not mentally. 
 
Ba‟asyir and Sungkar, who had returned to Indonesia after the fall of the Suharto 
regime in 1998, maintained ties with like-minded groups in Malaysia and the 
Philippines. JI Malaysia played a direct role in establishing contact and activities 
throughout Hambali.
972
  JI members saw Ba‟asyir as a reluctant leader. Ba‟asyir was 
recognized as being more suitable undertaking spiritual rather than operational 
leadership. Hambali and Imam Samudra as well as Mukhlas and Amrozi were keen to 
have more effective operations rather than just attending sermons.  
 
 
5.3 JI in Malaysia: Hambali the Connector   
Hambali was born in 1964 into a family of 13 children in the village of Sukamanah, 
West Java to parents who were respected religious teachers. In 1985, when Hambali 
was 21, he decided to move to Malaysia to continue his studies but failed to secure a 
scholarship. He settled in Kampung Batu 3 ¼ in Banting, Selangor. He took several 
odd jobs, including slaughtering chickens at the Kelang market and selling kebabs, 
religious books, books and carpets.
973
 With some of the money he made, Hambali 
managed to attend Sungkar‟s sermons at least once a month in Kuala Pilah, Negeri 
Sembilan.  
 
Hambali was directed by Sungkar to expand DI‟s ideology in Selangor in 1988. 
Hambali, helped by Muhammad Iqbal Abdul Rahman (also called Abu Jibril), 
managed to set up a JI base in Surau al-Huda, Sungai Manggis, Banting, Selangor. 
Later, it was moved to Surau Jabatan Bekalan Air Selangor (Selangor Water 
Department-SWD). This was the first step of the expansion of DI‟s ideology on the 
Malaysian government staff before the JI Johor cell took its beliefs to the lecturers at 
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Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (Malaysia Technology University-UTM). Al Bakry 
Mohamad Alias was an engineer with SWD and was responsible for bringing DI‟s 
ideology into his department.
974
  
 
Meanwhile, Hambali was building a good rapport with Sungkar through his monthly 
visits. Hambali‟s sacrifice (money and time) was not considered as Jihad in the eyes 
of Sungkar, for him true Jihad is to take part in the battle in order to establish an 
Islamic caliphate.
975
 Hambali‟s commitment was rewarded by Sungkar after he 
appointed Hambali to do missionary work at Tawi-Tawi Island in the Southern 
Philippines. He spent eight months on this small island with a stipend from Sungkar 
and lived with a Muslim family there. He offered sermons and taught the Quran to 
people as had been done with Afghan veterans before.
976
 Hambali took this 
opportunity to travel to Mindanao to establish contact with MILF.
977
 
 
After coming back from Tawi-Tawi, Hambali continued to build his connections 
through regular contact with Sungkar and Ba‟asyir in Kuala Pilah. Hambali managed 
to visit his Indonesian DI‟s exiled members in Sabah sometime in 1991. This group 
was later called Darul Islam Sabah (DIS) by the Malaysian government. DIS appears 
to have played a logistical support role for JI.
978
    
 
The role of Darul Islam Sabah was to help Indonesian militants transit to the 
southern Philippines, smuggle weapons from the southern Philippines to 
Indonesia and obtain military training in the southern Philippines…with their 
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arrests, the police have crushed the underground network of militant group 
Darul Islam Sabah who had collaborated with Indonesian militants.
979
   
  
Darul Islam Sabah (DIS) was made public after the arrest of 12 militants (most of 
whom were Indonesian nationals) on May 29, 2006 at Sabah, Malaysia.
980
 The 
militants were arrested on suspicion of planning attacks on neighbouring countries 
and claimed to be members of a group known as DI. This group may potentially pose 
a greater threat than ASG as a result of their superior training and resources and their 
willingness to deploy terrorism against civilians, demonstrated in the movement‟s 
connection with the bombings in Bali in 2002.
981
 A source in the Malaysian 
intelligence forces has commented; 
 
The regional intelligence agencies had been keeping tabs on the group, particularly 
with its links to Abu Sayyaf, a small violent group operating in the Southern 
Philippines. Several of its leaders had reportedly fought in Afghanistan during the 
Soviet war and were students and proponents of radical Islamic teaching.
982
  
  
Hambali's was not a normal visit but actually ended with his marriage to a Chinese 
convert, Noralwizah Lee binti Abdullah. Noralwizah was 21 years old at the time; she 
had just come back from LHIS after spending a few years studying there.
983
 Later, 
Hambali come back to Selangor with his wife and resettled in a simple semi-detached 
house in Sungai Manggis, Banting Selangor. Hambali also managed to get Ba‟asyir 
settled down beside his house sometime in 1997. Ba‟asyir's presence in Banting was 
crucial to the management of Usrah and religious classes for locals.  Later, this 
migration (from Kuala Pilah to Kelang) was followed by Dadang Surahman 
Zainuddin, Abu Jibril and Solihin Ahyamanullah, Abu Yusuf and Abu Omar. 
Sungkar, who already had a base at Kuala Pilah, visited Ba‟asyir and visited 
Hambali‟s place from time to time upon invitation or during special occasions.984  
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In 1988, Hambali managed to set up a base in Surau al-Huda, Sungai Manggis, 
Banting Selangor. He taught Sungai Manggis‟s community through weekly classes in 
the Surau, situated just a few kilometres from his house. One of Hambali and 
Ba‟asyir's students was an engineer who worked with SWD. All Bakry Mohamad 
Alias from Selangor arranged for Wahhabism ideology to be spread in his 
workplace.
985
 The classes were run by the two clerics, with the support of Abu Jibril 
and Dadang Surahman when needed. Hambali also conducted religious talks and 
Usrah at the Kampung Baru flat in Kuala Lumpur.  
 
At the same time, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa established a new Mujahidin base in the 
Southern Philippines after the Russia-Afghanistan war ended in 1989. Bin Laden, 
who formed al-Qaeda from its original MAK, started to show heightened interest in 
different parts of the world, especially Southeast Asia. Before Jamal Khalifa and al-
Qaeda's plans were continued, they looked to establish a commercial front and 
networking in this region. In need of local faces, they turned to the Afghan Jihadi 
network. This immediately led them to Sungkar who vetted hundreds of Southeast 
East Asians who had passed through Sadda and Towrkhan camp during the previous 
decade and Jamal requested Sungkar to be a local partner to help open a business as a 
cover to give them the means to shift funds around the region.  
 
In 1999, Hambali was asked by Sungkar to establish a joint business venture with a 
Middle Eastern man. On June 2, 1994, Hambali and Nor Alwizah went to the newly 
opened office of the import and export company, Konsojaya Enterprise.
986
 Konsojaya 
was registered as an import and export company in palm oil as well as construction 
materials. Hambali was on the board of directors, along with Wali Khan and 
Noralwizah Lee. Most of the funds came to the Southern Philippines via Konsojaya, 
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especially those used for (later foiled) the Bojinka operation in 1995.  Konsojaya 
provided the perfect cover for planned violent activities and also provided a legal 
platform for the transfer of funds throughout Southeast Asia.  
 
Together with Kuwaiti terrorist, Wali Khan Amin Shah, now serving jail sentence in 
the US for his role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York, 
Hambali set up Konsojaya as a front company for al-Qaeda. It was supposed to 
import and export palm oil to Afghanistan but checks by intelligence sources found 
that a telephone call was made to the company by Mohd Jamal Khalifa, a brother-in-
law of Osama bin Laden.
987
  
 
Due to the conflict between Sungkar and Masduki in January 1993, an urgent meeting 
was held at Kumpung Serting Ulu, Jempol Negeri. It was held at Ba‟asyir's house and 
concluded with the affirmation that they would continue the DI‟s struggle. In the 
middle of 1993, Sungkar began to systematically organize JI. Sungkar split his 
followers into Mantiqi or regional clusters. Mantiqi 1 (Mantiqi Ula) covered 
Singapore and Malaysia. Mantiqi 2 (Mantiqi Tsani) covered Indonesia. Mantiqi 3 
(Mantiqi Tsalis) covered the Philippines, Brunei, eastern Malaysia (Sabah and 
Sarawak), Kalimantan and Sulawesi in Indonesia. A final cluster, Mantiqi 4 (Mantiqi 
Uhro), was developed to establish cells in Australia and Papua (Irian Jaya). Each 
Mantiqi controlled up to four sub regional branches (Wakalah). Each Wakalah 
controlled one or more compartmentalized cells (Fiah).
988
  
 
Subsequently, a guidebook called Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jemaah Al-
Islamiyah (General Guidelines for the Struggle of Al-Jemaah Al-Islamiyah), known 
as the PUPJI, was issued. The PUPJI outlined the role of clandestine cells (tanzim 
sirr) and described the struggle using the language of guerrilla warfare.
989
 PUPJI was 
also known as „Pedoman Dharma Bakti‟ (Dharma Bakti Guide) and „Qanun Asasi‟ 
(Basic Law) as explained by Ba‟asyir and Pak Harits through their visit to the  
Towrkhan camp (Negara Islam Indonesia camp) sometime in 1992.
990
 
 
JI had a formal structure with Sungkar serving as the amir or spiritual leader who had 
full authority over JI‟s operations. Ba‟asyir, who was already in Malaysia, was 
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responsible as the leader of Mantiqi Ula. In the second half of 1997, Hambali was 
appointed to head Mantiqi Ula after Ba‟asyir was elevated to deputy amir. At this 
stage, Hambali showed his mettle as a strong and charismatic leader in operations as 
he had done when managing the Southeast Asian Mujahidin in Sadda Camp a decade 
previously. Hambali not only managed JI in Malaysia, he also established local 
networks with KMM and regional networks with MILF and the Rohingyan Solidarity 
Organization (RSO).   
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Malaysia‟s Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) administration, training, communication, 
information and education structure.
991
 
 
Hambali travelled to the Southern Philippines in 1997 and spent a month at Camp Abu 
Bakar - the camp that was established by his partner Nasir Abas who was ranked as 
the leader of Mantiqi Tsalis. Hambali also visited Mindanao and West Java several 
times between 1997 and 1999. As well as this, he managed to visit Cox‟s Bazar in 
Bangladesh with Nasir Abas in 1998 under orders from Sungkar. They had gone there 
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to meet leaders of RSO in order to establish networks to find new training fields. This 
visit was established to discuss the possibility of RSO‟s inclusion under the JI 
umbrella for an Islamic Caliphate. But the project was cancelled because of the 
danger in the area and a series of attacks by Myanmar soldiers against Arakanese 
rebels.  The lack of suitable areas for training purposes was also among the factors 
contributing to the cancellation.
992
     
 
Hambali began preaching the need for Jihad to rise against the U.S and Israel. He also 
worked as a mediator between JI and al-Qaeda through KSM from 1998 until the JW 
Marriott Jakarta bombing in August 2003. Hambali played an important role in 
connecting Khalid al Mihdar and Muhammad Atef (the 9/11 hijackers) with Yazid 
Sufaat and many more. Abuza (2003) also wrote “Hambali, operationally more 
important than Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir”.993  
 
After JI and KMM were unearthed in Malaysia, Hambali fled to Thailand for safety. 
Using Ayutthia, small towns in northern Thailand, Hambali moved in and out to 
Cambodia. Hambali also planned to use Cambodia as a base for launching attacks in 
the region.
994
 Between September 2002 and March 2003, Hambali stayed in Phnom 
Penh before his arrest. Hambali had spent much of his time in Phnom Penh living in 
backpacker‟s accommodation at Boeng Kok Lake.995 He travelled between Phnom 
Penh and Bangkok under the false name „Mizi‟ and „Ibrahim‟.996 Hambali probably 
targeted Western properties in Phnom Penh for future violent attacks. A small cell 
was built in Cambodia and probably in Vietnam to establish an Islamic Caliphate in 
this region. Cambodia is one of the most attractive “countries of convenience” 
because of the lack of administration. Cambodia is a leading centre of money 
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laundering, especially from drug proceeds from Myanmar and Laos, and is well 
known as a centre for illegal arms trading, particularly from the former Khmer Rouge 
regime, and corrupt bureaucracy.
997
      
 
During Hambali‟s exile in Bangkok and Phnom Penh, the main player who protected 
information was Noralwizah Lee, Hambali‟s wife. Noralwizah knew everything about 
Hambali as they lived together for 17 months during exile. Noralwizah knew every 
person met by Hambali, movement between Ayutthaya and Phnom Penh and also the 
series of attacks planned by Hambali and his network. 
 
At one juncture when he (Hambali) left Thailand to go into hiding in Cambodia, she 
stayed back in Bangkok and waited for him to return. The source said Hambali and 
his wife moved to at least five different places in Bangkok, staying in different 
houses to evade detection. She knew whom he had been dealing with, talked to and 
met during her stint there and it is more than just a pillow talk.
998
    
 
 
Hambali was captured in August 2003 along with Farik Amir Zubair aka Lily and 
Nazir Lat in the Ayutthaya city, about 40 miles north of Bangkok.
999
 After two weeks 
of surveillance, Thai police burst in on Hambali‟s one bedroom apartment and found 
Noralwizah (his wife, later deported to be detained in Malaysia) and a large amount of 
money, allegedly supplied by al-Qaeda for violent activities in this region. When 
arrested, Hambali was wearing a pair of jeans, a T-shirt, a baseball cap and 
sunglasses. Hambali had also undergone plastic surgery and was clean shaven. Thai 
police also seized firearms and explosives from the apartment.
1000
    
 
Lily and Nazir were believed to be KMM turned al-Qaeda members assisting Hambali 
during his exile in Thailand.
1001
 Lily was accused of channelling at least RM190, 000 
(USD50, 000) for the J.W. Marriott bombing in Jakarta in 2003.
1002
 Nazir and Lily 
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were believed to have planned for the Library Tower bombing in the U.S in 2003.
1003
 
This was stated in the transcripts of the court proceedings dated March 13 and 17, 
2007 by the US legislator at Guantanamo Bay.  
 
 
5.4 Rabitatul Mujahidin – The Vital Faction for Southeast Asia Militant 
Groups 
Hambali was responsible for establishing the meeting of the Rabitatul Mujahidin 
(Mujahidin League) in December 1999 at Kuala Lumpur. After Ba‟asyir succeeded as 
JI‟s amir, he initiated a Rabitatul Mujahidin meeting. Hambali as the leader of 
Mantiqi Ula, was appointed as the organiser for that meeting. Rabitatul Mujahidin 
was conceived as a discreet platform for Southeast Asian Jihadists. Hambali directed 
Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana (Faiz) to host the first Rabitatul Mujahidin meeting at Faiz‟s 
house in Gombak, Selangor.  
 
Attendees came from various groups of the region. From Indonesia came Ba‟asyir as 
JI‟s amir and Hambali. Abu Jihad represented the Acheh separatist movement, 
Lamkaruna Putra the Republik Islam Acheh (RIA), Agus Dwikarna the South 
Sulawesi movement, Abu Hurairah the Southern Philippines (MILF), Abdul Fatah the 
Southern Thailand, Salimullah the Burma‟s Muslims Rohingyas (RSO), Pattani 
United Liberation Organization (PULO) and Laskar Jundullah (LJ). Some sources say 
more than 15 people were present at the meeting. At the Rabitatul Mujahidin meeting, 
JI hoped its alliance groups could cooperate and share resources for training, the 
procurement of weapons, and financial assistance along with the needs of Jihad.
1004
   
 
Soon after the first meeting, the Ambon tragedy occurred in Maluku. The seed of the 
conflict was discussed at the first Rabitatul Mujahidin meeting, but no action was 
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taken. JI saw Mantiqi Tsalis as having the ability to handle this situation however in 
the end, Hambali took action by collecting money to help the Ambonese Muslims 
through the Pertubuhan al-Ehasan (PAE) and the NGO he founded and operated 
openly at a shop-lot in Teluk Panglima Garang, Banting Selangor. PAE carried out 
welfare projects to conceal its motives but it was generally to co-ordinate activities of 
JI members who were sent for arms training in the Southern Philippines for Jihad in 
Ambon.  
 
Within two weeks Hambali gathered around RM68, 000 to be channelled to Ambon 
Mujahidin. Hambali was a clever leader. He collected money from JI members to 
fund their operation, but when the Ambon issue come, he managed to get funds from 
the Malaysian society in general, and not just JI followers.
1005
 Wai and Charles wrote 
in The Star newspaper (1 January 2003) “In the name of humanitarian missions, the 
PAE was also linked with another international NGO, with 70 affiliates worldwide, to 
help refugees in Afghanistan”.1006 
 
Hambali was also responsible for organizing two more Rabitatul Mujahidin meetings 
in Malaysia.  In June 2000, Hambali organized a second meeting at a Park Avenue 
apartment - a luxury house owned by Yazid Sufaat in Ampang, on the outskirts of 
Kuala Lumpur.  This meeting was attended by the same participants as the first 
meeting except for Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, the new Malaysian JI representative. It is 
believed that it was just an informal meeting, but even so the possible creation of an 
Islamic Caliphate in the near future was discussed.
1007
 If Rabitatul Mujahidin was 
successful, this group would have an active member base of more than 400 million 
people including 75 million men who were ready for military service. The greater 
group would also have access to the shipping lanes in the South China Sea, virtually 
guaranteeing unlimited access from Asia through the Indian Ocean to India, Africa 
and Oceania.
1008
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The third Rabitatul Mujahidin meeting was held in November the same year at a 
resort in Sungkai, Perak. Zulkifli Marzuki aka Ibrahim, a Malaysian accountant and a 
JI secretary, rented a villa at this resort for the meeting. Zulkifli took on the 
responsibility of getting the meeting started. All who were involved in the first two 
meetings was present, but there were few new faces from Indonesia and Malaysia. 
The main points discussed at this meeting were cooperation and joint training as well 
as logistic aids.
1009
  
 
 
Picture 10: A Rabitatul Mujahidin Logo was found on Fathi Abu Bakar Bafana‟s [a 
brother of Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana] computer disk. Hambali handed over a hand-
drawn Rabitatul Mujahidin logo for him to re-design. Fathi drew the logo on his 
computer and handed it over to Mas Salamat Kastari as directed by Faiz.
1010
   
 
This meeting was recorded as the last Rabitatul Mujahidin meeting held in Malaysia. 
After that, JI was more involved in operations including a Christmas Eve bombing 
that successfully took place a month after the meeting. A Philippines intelligence 
officer claimed the Bali bombings, an attempted assassination of the former 
Indonesian president, Megawati Sukarno Putri, and the spate of bomb blasts in Manila 
and Jakarta were planned at a secret Rabitatul Mujahidin meeting in Perak. Nasir 
Abas claimed the Rabitatul Mujahidin meetings were more about establishing an 
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Islamic Caliphate than planning violent actions. But all the bombings were discussed 
by a few select JI members who were led by Hambali secretly out of the meeting.
1011
     
 
Contact with Muslim groups in Rabitatul Mujahidin was established by Hambali as 
approved by JI‟s top position. Hambali created contact through his Afghan-alumnus 
network and at some stage through his personal contacts. This arrangement was 
carried out by Hambali and the top leaders as requested by Tanzim Sirri (secret 
movement). Not all of the JI members knew about the Rabitatul Mujahidin meetings. 
Most of them were not informed about nor invited to the meeting. As ordinary 
members, they had to obey all commands from leaders without question.
1012
  
 
 
5.5 JI and al-Qaeda in Thailand 
From this research, the writer never found strong ties between al-Qaeda and Southern 
separatists. However, a few incidents had happened which were related to 
international terrorist organizations. The failure of the bombing operation of the 
Israeli Embassy in Bangkok on March 2004 has proven links with al-Qaeda.
1013
 
General Surayud Chulanont
1014
 of the Thailand army, admitted military intelligence 
was monitoring a „small number‟ of Bin Laden operatives operating in Thailand.1015 It 
is known that al-Qaeda has shifted its training base and financial operations from the 
Middle East to Southeast Asia following 9/11.
1016
  
 
Several Thai Muslims have been detained because of their links either to al-Qaeda or 
JI.
1017
 For example, on May 28, 2003, two Thai nationals, who were affiliated with 
the al-Qaeda front Om al-Qura Foundation, were arrested in Cambodia. On June 10, 
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2003 Ariffin bin Ali (John Wong Ah Hung) was arrested in Bangkok.
1018
 Ariffin ran 
the JI Singapore operative at Bangkok and had plans to attack Western embassies and 
tourist venues in Pattaya and Phuket Island. In 2002, Dr. Ismail Lutfi rector of Yala 
Islamic College was detained because of his radical ideas.
1019
 In March 2002, 25 
Middle Eastern men were arrested in Bangkok, suspected of involvement in money 
laundering of al-Qaeda funds.
1020
 
 
Hambali also suggested bombing a tourist centre in Phuket Island, Thailand, in early 
2000. Hambali appointed Yazid Sufaat (a leader of the Selangor & Kuala Lumpur 
cell) to go to Phuket for surveillance. Hambali asked Fatah (who had attended the 
Rabitatul Mujahidin meeting a year before) to provide assistance for this project. 
Hambali wanted Thai national assistance for Sufaat. Abu Hisham, an Afghan-alumnus 
was chosen for this two-week assignment. Later, a three-page surveillance report was 
forwarded by Hambali to KSM, but this operation was abandoned after disagreement 
with Fatah. Fatah and his Afghan-alumnus were reluctant to get involved, fearing it 
would have a negative impact on his own Islamic network in Southern Thailand.
1021
 
 
At this stage, JI had no direct contact with Southern Thai insurgents. The contact 
mostly came from Afghan-alumnus such as Abdul Fatah and others. To generalize 
that most of the Southern Thai separatists had connections with JI is misguided. The 
leaders of the separatist movement in Southern Thailand were locals, only a few of 
them were ex-Afghans. JI only established networks with their Afghan members and 
not with the local leaders. However, JI tried hard to develop close contacts with 
separatists and were also willing to channel some funds for violent activities. But, 
Abdul Fatah, the JI mediator, was reluctant to make this initiative a reality. Fatah also 
worried that his close contact with local separatists would land him in trouble if he 
tried to stir up the situation there. Bringing in JI as a new faction and thus allowing for 
the possibility of new attacks would have worsened Southern Thailand‟s situation.1022 
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Why did southern Thailand movements have no connection with JI? Was it because JI 
was not eager to influence the separatists or did the separatists not want to work 
together with them? The answer is that incidents in Southern Thailand did not have 
any relation to militants or terrorism. Incidents in Southern Thailand were related to 
insurgencies rather than terrorist activities. Fighting over unfair treatment and double 
standards practiced by the Bangkok administration had taken place for decades.
1023
 
They wanted equal treatment in education, administration, the economy and society. 
Southern Thailand separatists also wanted to re-establish the Malay-Pattani Sultanate, 
which was dismantled in the early 20
th
 century by the Siam administration.
1024
  
 
This kind of movement was clearly different from the one in the Southern Philippines 
and Ambon as well as Rohingyans. The Southern Philippines and Ambon were more 
about a religious clash between Islam and Christianity; Rohingyans involved the 
conflict caused by ethnic and religious cleansing by the Burmese junta.
1025
 The 
situation in the Philippines, Ambon and Myanmar was considered paramount for 
Muslims to perform Jihad against infidels. This is why JI wanted to get involved in 
Myanmar and the Southern Philippines - because the „Jihad door‟ was open. The 
Southern Thailand situation was more related to a nationalist movement rather than 
Jihad against the Bangkok administration.      
 
Two groups in Thailand, Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani (GMIP) and Wae Ka Raeh 
(WKR), reputedly a veteran of the Afghan war, were alleged to have ties with JI and 
al-Qaeda. When JI suspects from elsewhere in the region fled to Southern Thailand in 
the aftermath of the arrests by Singapore and Malaysian police in December 2001, 
they were given a safe haven by Thai Muslims. In June 2003, Thai authorities picked 
up three Muslim community leaders on suspicion of planning major bomb attacks 
against foreign embassies and tourist spots as part of JI plots. They were religious 
teacher Maisuri Haji Abdullah, Mayahi Haji Doloh and Wae Mahdi Wae-dao; all 
prominent community leaders in Southern Thailand. Until his arrest on August 11, 
2003, Hambali was able to get shelter from the Thai Muslim community especially 
from the Afghan-alumnus networking in Thailand.  
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U.S officials, in particular FBI officials, were incensed that Hambali, the Jamaah 
Islamiyah leader, was able to hold a major policy meeting in Bangkok in which the 
Bali attack was planned .
1026
    
 
In March 2002, Thailand and the U.S uncovered an important document related to an 
al-Qaeda operation in Bangkok. Later, 13 people were arrested for alleged 
involvement in al-Qaeda activities in Thailand. Following this, Thailand began the 
investigation of three firms that had suspected links to al-Qaeda in 2002. Ties between 
Thailand and ASEAN countries, particularly Singapore were established. A follow-up 
joint operation between Thailand and Singaporean officials with the help from CIA 
and FBI officials led to the arrest of three JI members in Southern Thailand on June 
10, 2002.
1027
 On the 16
th
 of May, 2003, Arifin bin Ali, a senior JI leader form 
Singapore was detained in Bangkok. Arifin was extradited to Singapore immediately 
after the arrest.  
 
 
5.6 Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School as The Transit Centre 
Sungkar also made contact with a few Ustazs and people who were committed to the 
Salafi teaching in Johor including Ustaz Latif (Ustaz Abu Suhut), Ustaz Harun 
Embong, Pak Abas,
1028
 Pak Borhan and Ustaz Hafif.
1029
 Most of these Ustazs had 
close contact with Ustaz Hashim Ghani, a mudir of Maahad Ittiba‟us Sunah and also 
shared similar Wahhabism ideology.
1030
 Sungkar and Ba‟asyir had expanded their DI 
ideology indirectly to Johor from 1988 with their regular visits. In return, sometimes 
Johor followers went to Kuala Pilah to meet their spiritual leader.  
 
Close ties between Kuala Pilah and Ulu Tiram made the idea of establishing 
Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School (LHIS) a reality in 1991.
1031
  Starting out under the 
title of the “ikhwan movement” in 1988, Sungkar, Ba‟asyir and Abu Jibril visited their 
new brotherhood in Ulu Tiram. The visits and Usrah led them to come up with an 
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idea for establishing a school to achieve their long term agenda. Jaafar Anuwarul and 
Mukhlas, both of them previous Afghani Jihadist fighters, were willing to pioneer a 
specific centre to expand their teaching.
1032
     
 
First, with no apparent end to their Malaysian exile, Sungkar and Ba‟asyir 
established a modest Malaysia-based Ngruki clone, the Luqmanul Hakiem 
pesantren, in Johor state. In this way they could continue turning out 
impressionable, hard line adherents for as long as Ngruki was operating under less 
than optimal conditions.
1033
 
 
The idea to have an appropriate school for JI members came from several meetings 
held in Ulu Tiram and Kuala Pilah. Regular meetings at Ustaz Harun Embong, Ustaz 
Latiff and Ustaz Abu Suhut's house in Sungai Redan, Ulu Tiram between 1988 and 
1990 were catalysed by the existence of LHIS.
1034
 In 1990, Sungkar and Mukhlas 
decided to build a school with support from ikhwan. The idea was discussed seriously 
in Usrah and every ikhwan meeting.
1035
 Jaafar Anuwarul, who owned a one-hectare 
section, along with Jalan Rabbani, Kampung Sungai Tiram, Ulu Tiram Johor agreed 
to waqaf (religiously endow) his land to build the school.
1036
 This land was at times 
alleged to be under the names of Pak Borhan and Ustaz Latiff instead of Jaafar 
Anuwarul. LHIS was successfully built by the ikhwan with some help from locals in 
1991.
1037
 
 
LHIS was built on two main objectives, the first one being to create a true Islamic 
generation which would practice Islam in every aspect of life. This alternative school 
was also important to help protect ikhwan children from any maksiat (sinful acts) and 
secular influences implemented in the modern Malaysian school system as organized 
by the Ministry of Education (MOE). Respondent L1 said: “Students in the Luqmanul 
Hakiem School (LHIS) came from all over the country...also lots of students from 
Sabah, there were JI children and foreigners who wanted their children to be educated 
in the Islamic way and become a good human being”.1038  
                                                 
1032
 Respondent B1 (2007). Interview on 01 of November 2007 at Cipinang, South Jakarta. Jakarta. 
And Nurhasim, A. (2009). Senyum Terakhir Sang Mujahid. Jakarta Selatan: Ar Rahmah Media. p. 118. 
1033
  Op. Cit., Conboy, K. (2006), p. 66.  
1034
  Op. Cit., Abas, N. (2007b).  
1035
  Op. Cit., Mughirah. (2007). 
1036
   See Appendix 22 and 23 at page 282, Appendix 24 and 25 at page 283 and Appendix 26 and 27 at 
page 284.    
1037
  Op. Cit., Mughirah. (2007). 
1038
  Op. Cit., Respondent L1. (2007). 
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LHIS's second objective was to provide a substitute educational system to ikhwan 
members in Malaysia and Singapore.
1039
 Children who would grow up under the 
Jemaah observation and follow a proper ikhwan-suit syllabus were to sustain JI's 
future movement.
1040
  
 
However, there are questions about who attended the school.  Most of the students 
who studied in LHIS were the children of illegal Indonesian immigrants in Malaysia. 
There were also students from Singapore and Sabah as well as children of ikhwan 
members from all around the country. Some sources said that Muslim students from 
Southeast Asia also attended LHIS in the name of ikhwan
1041
 but there is no clear 
evidence of this.  This writer, during fieldwork research at LHIS in December 2007, 
found documents stating students from only Sabah and Singapore attended the school.  
 
The Darul Islam Sabah (DIS) was the main issue related to the higher number of 
students coming from Sabah. When Sungkar and Ba‟asyir migrated to Kuala Pilah in 
the heart of peninsular Malaysia, their colleagues from the DI movement moved to 
Sabah, a big state in east Malaysia. Sabah was located on a porous border between 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Illegal immigrants either from Indonesia or the 
Philippines moved freely in and out of Sabah. This advantage was used by DI 
members to settle in Sabah and expand their ideology. Most of them married locals 
and sent their children to LHIS to study. LHIS's application of ikhwan was welcomed 
by DI members and thus it was regarded as the place to educate and enhance DI‟s 
struggle for the new generations.  
 
LHIS provided a radical approach to teaching and also acted as a feeder for the DI 
struggle. JI children were indoctrinated with radical ideology to make sure the 
struggle of DI was maintained. This “cadrerization” was considered a crucial tool in 
the ikhwan movement as discussed widely in Usrah, with the first batch of LHIS 
graduates reporting to Pakistan and later Afghanistan for Jihad training. In September 
2003, 13 students were arrested in Karachi while studying at Abu Bakar Islamic 
                                                 
1039
  Ibid. 
1040
  Op. Cit., Mughirah. (2007). 
1041
  McEver, K. (2005). The Terrorist's wife: What is Paridah's role in Jemaah Islamiyyah. Retrieved 
05 August, 2008, from http://www.slate.com/id/2128835/  
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University in Pakistan. Among them were Abi Dzar Jaafar, 18, from Johor, Eddy 
Erman Shahime, 19, from Kelantan, Mohd Radzi Abdul Razak, 19, from Selangor, 
Mohd Ikhwan Abdullah, 19, from Johor and Mohd Akil Abdul Raof, 21, from Perak.  
 
The five were believed to have joined a secret group known as the Al-Ghuraba that 
was linked to JI.
1042
 All of them were arrested for illegally continuing to stay in 
Pakistan after the expiry of their visa. They were detained for involvement in 
activities seen as prejudicial to the interests of Pakistan. Two Indonesians, identified 
as Gungun Rusman Gunawan from West Java (allegedly younger brother of Hambali) 
and Muhammad Saifudin from Central Java, were detained along with these 
students.
1043
 They had been sent to Pakistan by Hambali through LHIS. They also 
attended sermons by Osama bin Laden while in Afghanistan on a „school holiday‟ 
visit.
1044
   
Evidence presented during the hearing showed that Hambali had been the operations chief 
of Jemaah Islamiyah and served as its main contact for al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, He 
also helped recruit members for al-Ghuraba, the foreign student organization that helped 
develop Jemaah Islamiyah organization in Pakistan.
1045
  
Four of the 13 students turned out to be the sons of JI members who were detained by 
Malaysian authorities under the ISA. Among them were Mohamad Radzi, a son of 
former school headmaster Abdul Razak Baharuddin, Tarmizi, a son of production 
executive Nordin Ahmad, and Muas, a son of All Bakry Mohamed Alias, an engineer 
attached to SWD. The name of the son of UTM lecturer, Abdullah Daud, one of the 
few alleged JI members to have admitted that the group exists, was not available. 
Besides the 13 Malaysians, Pakistani authorities also arrested six Indonesian students, 
including the head of al-Ghuraba, Gungun Rusman Gunawan.
1046
 
With regards to the school, LHIS was built with two sections to differentiate puteri 
(girls) and putera (boys). Mughirah, as a LHIS warden, was responsible for the boys 
                                                 
1042
  Benjamin, N. (2005, 22 March). Six Held Under ISA Freed after Two-year Detention The Star. 
1043
 Op. Cit., Jones, S. (2007). 
1044
  All five scored in Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (Malaysia Education Certificate) examinations in 2005, 
four of the former students obtained between 6As and 8As while the fifth got through his STPM 
examinations. From Op. Cit., Pitchay, A. K. M. (2007). 
1045
 Gleason, C. L. (2007). Detainees Denies Participation in Singapore, Indonesia Bombings.   
Retrieved 15 Jun, 2008, from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=32793  
1046
  Respondent B5. (2007). Interview on 01 November at Kepolisian Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta 
(Polda), Jakartaraya. Jakarta. 
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and any contingencies needed. His house was located at the front of LHIS and played 
an important role as a meeting point.
1047
 The car park beside the house was a 
playground for infants who were enrolled in the connected kindergarten.
1048
 His wife 
was a chef and also responsible to the food for both puteri and putera. There was a 
Surau as a centre for every activity especially Usrah, sermon, prayer, motivational 
speeches and many more. The Surau also played a crucial role as a meeting point in 
case of emergency.
1049
   
 
 
Chart 3: A drawing of the Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School (LHIS) built on the 
land owned by Jaafar Anuwarul located at Lot 1288, Jalan Rabbani, Kg. Sungai 
Tiram, Ulu Tiram Johor.
1050
 
 
The male section was monitored by Mukhlas and his wife, Parida binti Abas, who 
lived at the office building. It was important for Mukhlas to look after every aspect of 
LHIS because he was appointed as the first mudir of LHIS by Jemaah.
1051
 His house 
was located on the second floor of the main building and was surrounded by offices. 
                                                 
1047
 See Appendix 28 at page 285.   
1048
  The kindergarten was the first building established before LHIS was built. It was established for 
ikhwan‟s children and Indonesian immigrants.  From Op. Cit., Abas, N. (2007c). 
1049
 See Appendix 29 at page 285.    
1050
  This drawing was gained by this writer through a site visit guided by JI members. Most of the 
information was freely given to this writer through interview sessions on the 24
th
 and 25
th
 of December, 
2007.     
1051
 Op. Cit., Nurhasim, A. (2009). p. 111.  
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A guest house was also located in the same building to accommodate visiting Ustaz or 
outside delegations and Jemaah leaders (Sungkar)
 
.
1052
 A bookstore was located in 
this building
1053
 to provide students with books that were suitable and met the 
requirements set by the Jabatan Agama Islam Johor (Johor Islamic Department).
1054
 
LHIS had many Arabic books that were donated by sheikhs from the Middle East who 
sympathised with Jemaah.
1055
 One koperasi
1056
 operated in this building to provide 
students with all their daily needs such as stationery and toiletries at reasonable prices.         
An interesting aspect of the LHIS was its training fields, which were provided for 
both males and females, each having their own stages.
1057
  LHIS students were 
exposed to martial art training as well as occasional spiritual and mental training.
1058
 
Once, they were trained by a Chinese Muslim who was a master in martial arts. 
Putera students were provided with „Minyak Chu‟ (Chu Oil-imported from China) as 
a warm-up before training started.
1059
 Female students were involved in theatre and 
drama presentations guided by the wives of Ustazs. Only female spectators could 
observe these activities.
1060
 Both putera and puteri used their training fields 
effectively.   
 
There was a playground in the female section complete with slides and swings.
1061
 It 
was used by LHIS kindergarten children as well as Puteri students.
1062
 Most of the 
equipment in the playground was donated by ikhwan members from Singapore. The 
playground was completed sometime in 1995 to provide an exercise area for students. 
Most of the funds for this came though the JI Singapore cell. The expansion of the 
ikhwan movement in Singapore was important both politically and economically. 
Singaporeans were known to have good and stable incomes and this was important in 
helping to fund ikhwan‟s activities, like the playground. 
                                                 
1052
 See Appendix 30 at page 286.    
1053
 See Appendix 31 at page 286.    
1054
  Op. Cit., Respondent L1. (2007). 
1055
 See Appendix 32 at page 287.    
1056
  Koperasi is from „co-operative‟ in English and means people from various backgrounds integrating 
into one company. Basically this koperasi operated as a low profit company with its main focus being 
to work together through group synergy to achieve social and economic goals.  
1057
 See Appendix 33 at page 287.   
1058
  Op. Cit., Respondent L1. (2007). 
1059
  Op. Cit., Mughirah. (2007).  
1060
  One of the principles in Islam is not to see the opposite sex in order to avoid being sinful. It is 
because when females or males do any activities, they will expose a part of their body to the opposite 
sex which is prohibited from seeing it.     
1061
 See Appendix 34 at page 288.   
1062
 See Appendix 35 at page 288.    
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Classrooms separated into Putera and Puteri areas. Male students were only allowed 
to move in their sections and learn in the classes located in their section:
1063
 the same 
applied to female students.
1064
 Only Ustaz o Ustazah were allowed to move between 
sections for teaching purposes or in cases of emergency. Putera and Puteri had their 
own living quarters located on the second floor, on the top of the classrooms.
1065
 A 
unique aspect of the female site was a Bengkel Kratangan (craft workshop). This 
workshop was organized and monitored by Mughirah‟s wife. She was responsible for 
sewing, knitting, and cooking classes provided for Puteris.
1066
 Besides that, the 
female section also had its own Musolla (prayer hall) for female related activities.
1067
  
 
LHIS started with a roll of less than 30 students that gradually increased to more than 
500. In 1995, it was felt that LHIS needed to filter students who were interested in 
studying at this school so at a board meeting in 1995, Nordin was forced to establish a 
standard operational procedure to filter students. Since then, a series of interviews for 
prospective students have been held every December, a month before school formally 
starts. Knowledge about basic Islamic teaching and reading of the Quran, as well as 
jawi writing are tested in order to make sure candidates achieve the minimum 
requirement needed by the board.
1068
  LHIS provided the Surat Berhenti Sekolah 
(Declaration of Completion of Study) to students who made the decision not to 
continue their study at this school.
1069
 
 
LHIS was organized by Mukhlas and Jaafar Anuwarul at the beginning with the help 
of two families who lived in the school area. Pak Rusdi and Pak Latiff, both Johorean 
and followers of Sungkar‟s ideology, were responsible for LHIS at the first stage. At 
one time, the number of Ustazs or staff who were organizing and teaching at LHIS 
reached 40. Jemaah decided to build housing lots inside LHIS for the Ustazs in order 
to encourage them to contribute and concentrate more on building LHIS. A few Ustaz 
                                                 
1063
 See Appendix 36 at page 289.    
1064
 See Appendix 37 at page 289.    
1065
  Op. Cit., Respondent L1. (2007).  
1066
 See Appendix 38 at page 290.    
1067
 See Appendix 39 at page 290.    
1068
  The original copies are in my possession and are printed in Appendix 6 in page 262. 
1069
  The original copies are in my possession and are printed in Appendix 7 in page 263. 
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houses were built in the back area of LHIS to cater for Ustazs and their families. 
LHIS was surrounded by a simple fence made of wood and wire.  
 
Electricity was connected to LHIS under the name of Jaafar Anuwarul for the male 
sections and Rafiee aka Fiee bin Hassan for the female sections. Jaafar Anuwarul had 
registered his name with Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB), the national electric 
provider for the Lot 1288T JR47/14/7 with TNB account number 00055480.
1070
 
Rafiee Hassan was registered for Lot 1288Z4 R47/14/3 on the TNB account number 
00055465.
1071
 Meanwhile, Wan Min Wan Mat
1072
 was responsible for connecting 
water to LHIS under his name with Syarikat Air Johor (Johor Water Company) 
account number 62815207J2792847.
1073
  
 
Zulkarnain bin Alladent, who worked for LHIS as an Ustaz, was responsible for the 
LHIS phone bill. At least one mobile phone was purchased by Zulkarnain and was 
registered in his name. It was registered with Celcom (M) Sdn. Bhd. under account 
number 62444718 with the last outstanding bill being RM210.38. A land line phone 
was registered under Zulkarnain‟s name for the number 07-8630188. This line was 
connected by Telekom Malaysia on account number A91025-654-0210 for LHIS at 
Lot 1288, Jalan Rabbani, Kampung Sungai Tiram, Batu 19, 81800 Ulu Tiram, 
Johor.
1074
      
 
Wan Min Wan Mat and Abas bin Yusoff
1075
 were responsible for the LHIS bank 
account. Both of them opened Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) current account 
in Kota Tinggi, Johor. It was registered as account number 1-040-003357-28 at the 
address Lot 1288, Jalan Rabbani, Kampung Sungai Tiram, Johor. Transactions 
between the BIMB Kuala Pilah branch and BIMB Ulu Tiram were recorded between 
                                                 
1070
  The original copies are in my possession and are printed in Appendix 8 in page 264. 
1071
  The original copies are in my possession and are printed in Appendix 9 in page 265. 
1072
   Wan Min Wan Mat was also known as Abu Hafis, Wan Halim and Abu Hidayah. A former 
lecturer at University Technology Malaysia, born on the 23
rd
 of September 1960 in Kelantan and was 
arrested on the 27
th
 of September 2002 in Kelantan. He was given a two year detention order under the 
ISA and was released in March 2005. Respondent I (2007). Interview on 31 December at Colonial Cup 
Cafe, Bangunan Mahkamah Persekutuan. Kuala Lumpur. 
1073
  The original copies are in my possession and are printed in Appendix 10 in page 266.  
1074
  The original copies are in my possession and are printed in Appendix 11 and 12 in page 267 and 
268. 
1075
  Abas bin Yusoff was put under house arrest by Malaysian police for his involvement in JI dating 
back to the group‟s founding in the 1980s. From Omar, I. (2007). 
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1991 and 2001. Both Wan Min Wan Mat and Abas bin Yusoff could use the accounts 
separately, except when making withdrawals – where both signatures were 
required.
1076
  
 
This account is still active and contains more than RM110, 000. No-one intends to use 
this money now, because it was for LHIS operations and for Jemaah, not for other 
purposes.
1077
 LHIS was abandoned by JI members following massive raids by police 
in 2001 and 2002, so it no longer operates or requires funds. Some of the building 
sections were broken down by Respondent G because he did not want police to keep 
monitoring the school. Furthermore he wanted to avoid the allegation that he and his 
family intended to revive LHIS again.
1078
 No registration was made under the names 
of Sungkar or Ba‟asyir (founders) or Mukhlas (the first headmaster) because of their 
citizenship status. 
 
The biggest mistake made in LHIS's operation was not getting support from locals. 
LHIS received students from all over the country, including international students 
who came from Singapore, but no single student was from Ulu Tiram. JI members 
refused to mingle with locals; they felt satisfied with the connections and networks in 
their Jemaah. Activities were only organised between JI members and their family 
and not outsiders. No Ustazs or other staff of the LHIS met with locals. Students were 
discouraged from freely meeting with locals as they had to understand that their 
vision in LHIS was to study, not interact with others. This was agreed by Respondent 
L1 as he said: “The paramount mistake for us was not to visit locals and that‟s why 
we got no support from locals, we were supposed to ziarah (visits for sake) locals to 
gain support, but we did not do that”.1079 
 
Mukhlas was appointed as the first LHIS mudir (headmaster) with the major task of 
laying the foundation and managing the operation of the school. Mukhlas was chosen 
                                                 
1076
  The original copies are in my possession and are printed in Appendix 17 on page 274. 
1077
 A copy of the LHIS account at Bank Islam, Kota Tinggi Johor branch are in my possession and are 
printed in Appendix 18 on page 275. 
1078
  Respondent G and his family stayed beside LHIS. He said police still monitor his movements and 
often accuse him of trying to revive LHIS. He felt uncomfortable and decided to break down some of 
the LHIS roof and ceiling and organized an excavator to pull down part of the building to show to the 
police and locals that LHIS was over. From  Respondent G (2007). Interview on 24 November at 
Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School, Jalan Rabbani, Ulu Tiram, Johor Baru. Johor.  
1079
  Op. Cit., Respondent L1. (2007). 
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because of his vast experience in Islamic teachings and the practical training he 
gained while in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1990s.
1080
 Mukhlas graduated from 
Pondok al-Mukmin, Ngruki in Indonesia and was in the Sadda Camp in Afghanistan 
between 1986 and 1989.  
 
Among the reasons why Mukhlas was appointed as LHIS mudir was the fact he 
stayed with Abas, his father-in-law in Ulu Tiram and was actively involved in JI 
Usrah in Johor. Mukhlas was seriously involved in a series of discussions on 
establishing LHIS from 1990 until the school formally opened in 1991. Paridah was 
committed to teaching at a Malaysian kindergarten while her husband raised money to 
open LHIS despite his tight schedule of preaching Islam at various Surau and masjid 
(mosque). After the main building was completed in 1991, Mukhlas and Paridah 
moved to LHIS and lived beside the Headmaster's Office. Paridah decided to leave 
the kindergarten and work at LHIS, where she taught maths, English and the Quran.     
 
The top 20 JI tier, who were responsible for attacks in this region, was connected with 
LHIS. Under Mukhlas's administration, he managed LHIS as a „transit centre‟ for JI 
members. Every Mujahidin who came back from Afghanistan, especially Indonesians, 
were placed in LHIS. This was important to ensure these Mujahidins were connected 
in Jemaah and exposed to the regional situation after spending a few years at war. 
Mujahidins were forced to contribute their knowledge and experience in Pakistan, 
India and Afghanistan for this „duplicate Ngruki‟ in the name of JI. It was crucial for 
them to help Jemaah in establishing their feeder school. Moreover, all of the JI 
leaders stayed in Malaysia at that time. They were asked to see their leaders when 
they finished their study and before they went anywhere.  
 
Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir, Abdullah Sungkar, Mukhlas and Nordin Mohd Top all taught at 
LHIS. JI bomb maker Azahari Hussin served on the board of directors. Nordin Mohd 
Top was promoted to director when a Malaysian law was adjusted. However, 
Mukhlas continued to operate as leader by proxy. Nordin Mohd Top took over LHIS 
as director on paper because of a new rule relating to private institutions implemented 
by the Malaysian government: “All private institutions including schools should be 
                                                 
1080
 Op. Cit., Nurhasim, A. (2009), p. 110-111. 
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registered with Jabatan Pendidikan Swasta (Department of Private Education) under 
Ministry of Education Malaysia”. On that basis, Nordin Mohd Top was appointed as 
board director and Wan Min Wan Mat as chair of board.  
 
Wan Min Wan Mat submitted an application to establish LHIS as a private Islamic 
school, with the support of Johor State Education Department (JSED), on December 
15, 1997.
1081
 This application was labelled as „pending‟ by the Jabatan Pendidikan 
Swasta (JPS) with correspondence dating January 17th and 19th, 1998. The main 
reason was that Nordin had not put together all the required documents including 
board members' curriculum vitae and the certificates of the teachers.
1082
 Finally, LHIS 
was granted approval by JPS in 1999 with the reference number SRJ832. JSED 
granted RM100, 000 as support for LHIS to develop an appropriate Islamic school.
1083
    
 
Nordin Mohd Top, LHIS director, graduated from the University Technology 
Malaysia (UTM). Unlike other JI operatives, he did not receive training in al-Qaeda 
camps. Like many JI members, he married within the ikhwan family; he wed Rahmah 
Rusdi, a sister of Rais Rusdi, another JI member. Nordin‟s house was located in front 
of LHIS, which allowed him to conveniently live near and operate the school.
1084
  
 
Nordin organised fundraising and donations to enhance infrastructure in LHIS, for 
example, requests for playground and computer donations.
1085
  Nordin also set up an 
agreement with Tele Dynamics ATEC Sdn. Bhd. for maintenance of the photocopier 
that was rented from a Toshiba dealer in Johor Bahru.
1086
 At this stage, Mukhlas 
concentrated more on teaching and organizing the Ustazs and classes, whereas Nordin 
and Wan Min concentrated on administration and documentation. Nordin Mat Top did 
an excellent job of administering LHIS.  He is still at large. Wan Min Wan Mat was 
responsible for the LHIS bank account and was accused of funnelling money from 
Hambali for the Bali bombing. Indonesian authorities allege that Indonesian 3million 
                                                 
1081
  Original copies are in my possession and are printed in Appendix 13 in page 269. 
1082
  Original copies are in my possession and are printed in Appendix 14 in page 270 and 271. 
1083
   Respondent G (2007). Interview on 24 November at Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School, Jalan 
Rabbani, Ulu Tiram, Johor Baru. Johor. 
1084
  Morais, L., & Abas, M. (2002, October, 17). New KMM Leaders on the Way. The Malay Mail, p. 
3. 
1085
  Original copies are in my possession and are printed in Appendix 15 in page 272. 
1086
  The original copies are in my possession and are printed in Appendix 16 in page 273. 
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Rupiah seized from a Parida Abas account had originally come from Wan Min Wan 
Mat.
1087
    
 
One of the most wanted terrorists, Dr. Azhari Hussin, also spent time working at 
LHIS.  Dr. Azhari was a technical expert who had learned how to build bombs in 
Afghanistan. Dr. Azhari taught science and maths subjects to LHIS students.  
 
Mukhlas led the school until October 2001 before handing it over to Nordin Mohd 
Top. There was conflict during the power transition period between Mukhlas, Nordin 
and some JI members. Some of them did not really agree with the violent „operations‟ 
discussed, which were scheduled to take place between 1999 and 2001. A conflict of 
interest between LHIS staff and Nordin‟s administration went on for some months 
before the school was raided by police. Later, Mukhlas managed to enter Indonesia 
with his family on July 7, 2002 through Tanjung Balai Karimun, Riau. This legal 
journey was made from Kukup Port in Pontian, Johor - three months prior to the Bali 
bombing.
1088
      
  
 
5.7 The Crucial Role of the JI Malaysian Cell 
Malaysia was a crucial element in the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the 
region.  It had strong support from locals, and was to be an important place for 
organising JI attacks with violent means. At least 200 members were recorded in 
Malaysia and it was perhaps the second largest individual JI cell in the region.
1089
 
Malaysians who also worked as the JI‟s „key players‟ were Yazid Sufaat, Wan Min 
Wan Mat, Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, Dr. Azhari Hussin, Amran and many more.  
 
The JI Malaysian cell also successfully recruited educated Malays as members. 
Twelve of these recruits who were arrested had university degrees. At least seven 
senior JI members were lecturers at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (Technology 
University of Malaysian-UTM) including Dr. Abdullah Daud, Roshelmy Md. Sharif, 
                                                 
1087
  Rosyid, I. (2003b). Polisi Sita Uang Milik Isteri Tersangka Bom Bali.   Retrieved 06 August, 2002, 
from http://www.tempointeraktif.com/  
1088
  Rosyid, I. (2003a). Tersangka Muchlas Kembali ke Indonesia sebagai Wisatawan. Retrieved 06 
August, 2008, from http://www.tempointeraktif.com/  
1089
  Op. Cit., Abuza, Z. (2003).  
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Dr. Azhari Hussin, Wan Min Wan Mat, Nordin Mohd Top, Shamsul Bahri Hussein 
and Idris Salim. At least eight had graduated from higher institutions in the US, the 
UK and Indonesia. 
 
Abdullah Daud had a local degree and held a Masters of Science from the University 
of Newcastle, in the geo-information science field. Dr. Azhari Hussin was an engineer 
with a Ph.D. in property valuation from the University of Reading, UK. Wan Min 
Wan Mat was a former UTM lecturer with a Masters of Science in construction from 
the University of Manchester. Shamsul Bahri was an engineering Professor who had 
graduated from Dundee University, Scotland. Roshelmy Md. Sharif and Idris Salim 
were also local graduates.     
 
The JI Malaysian cell also secured indoctrinated professional Malays as assets. 
Besides lecturers, at least two accountants, two engineers who worked in local 
authority departments, two private company managers, and one bank officer (a UK 
graduate), wealthy businessmen, graduated teachers and many more were involved in 
JI.  
 
Undeniably the JI Malaysian cell played a crucial role in laying down the foundation 
of the most dangerous terrorist group in the region. Malaysia was a transformational 
place from NII to JI in the early 1990s. Malaysia was a base for educating most of the 
regional bombers as well as a transit and planning centre for terrorist attacks including 
9/11.
1090
 From research and interviews, at least six main functions of the JI Malaysian 
cell were recorded.  
 
First, the Malaysian cell was the primary conduit between JI and Osama bin Laden 
through the al-Qaeda network and the Malaysian cell was the logistical hub for 
dispatching JI operatives to Afghanistan for training. At first, JI members were sent to 
                                                 
1090
 In January 2000, a key meeting for the 9/11 attack took place in Hazel Evergreen Park Apartment 
in Ampang, Selangor. This meeting was attended to by Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaf  al-Hazmi, Tawfiq 
bin Attash, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed (KSM), Hambali aka Riduan Isamuddin, Yazid Sufaat, Fahad al-
Quso and Rahim alNashiri. Other attendees were Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Ahmad Himat Shakir, Salem 
alHazmi, Abu Bara al-Taizi and unnamed members of the Egyptian-based Islamic Jihad. The CIA 
leaned of the meeting beforehand and had it monitored by the Malaysian Special Branch, but it did not 
realise the significance of the meeting until just before the attacks. From Zegart, A. B. (2007). "CNN 
with Secrets": 9/11, the CIA, and the Organizational Roots of Failure. International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 20(1) 26. 
 193 
 
Afghanistan for two objectives, one for training and the second to get involved in the 
Jihad war via the Mujahidin during the school holidays. More than 100 JI followers 
from Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia were sent to Afghanistan for training in the 
Sadda and Towrkhan Camps between 1985 and 1995. Starting with a few JI pioneer 
operatives sent to Afghanistan in 1984, JI ended with their own instructors and camps 
in Afghanistan.
1091
        
 
Hambali established networks with MAK through KSM in the early 1990s. Later, at 
least ten Jihadist batches were sent to Afghanistan, consisting of JI members from the 
region.  JI‟s regional network including KMM, MILF and RSO members was sent by 
JI through Pakistan from Malaysia. Hambali secured visas for JI members from the 
Pakistani Embassy in Kuala Lumpur with some help from internal officers. After 
2000, most of the JI members went to Afghanistan through Pakistan via tourist visas, 
which only allowed them to spend three months there. For example, Yazid Sufaat 
spent three months in Afghanistan and was later granted three more months extension 
through the Karachi Immigration office. Most ordinary JI and K3M members were 
sent to the Southern Philippines to be trained by JI operative Camps Hudaibiyah and 
Abu Bakar.      
 
The JI and KMM members were encouraged to take up arms training in Afghanistan 
where forged documents were made to help them pass immigration checkpoints. 
Hambali was the key person, using his Kampung Sungai Manggis house as a meeting 
point for those travelling to Ambon, Afghanistan, and the Southern Philippines. 
Airline tickets, visas and forged documents were handled by Hambali with help from 
Farihin aka Yasir and many more JI senior members.
1092
  Because of this, Thailand 
was used as a safe place for transit and obtaining false documents.   
 
Second, the Malaysian cell was responsible for recruitment and education. Most of the 
recruiting was done through the LHIS in Ulu Tiram, Johor. LHIS also played a crucial 
role in educating and recruiting JI members and leaders as well as prospecting 
instructors. LHIS may not have been similar to the system that was developed at 
Pondok al-Mukmin, Nguki, but it was a good foundation base for JI outside of 
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Indonesia. LHIS was developed by blending Indonesia‟s madrasa and Malaysia‟s 
sekolah rakyat systems. The mixed education system from these two countries 
secured a good momentum for LHIS in its 10 years of operation. This has been 
proven by the number of students, which increased by fewer than 20 at the beginning 
to more than 500 before being raided by the Malaysian police at the end of 2001.
1093
  
 
Funding for the school and most of its bills were paid by JI managers through the 
money from Infaq Fisabilillah (contributions in the name of Allah). JI members 
usually contributed ten percent from their income for Jemaah, and that which came 
from Singapore and Malaysia was regarded as being a stable and good income. Ten 
percent of the Infaq also came from JI faction companies operating in Malaysia such 
as Konsojaya Sdn. Bhd, al-Mawasi Trading, Angsana Trading and many more. It is 
believed that no money from the fund was used for attacks and bombing. But most of 
JI‟s operation fund came directly from Hambali, KSM or Osama bin Laden through 
al-Qaeda.
1094
  
 
Third, JI strategically made alliances with locals in order to secure the movement‟s 
objectives. It may be coincidental, but JI clearly worked with KMM from the mid 
1990s in the Kelang valley cells. Not all of the KMM members were involved in JI, 
but some of them were, especially through the KMM Selangor cell (also known as 
K3M).  
 
JI influenced KMM through its spiritual leaders. Indonesian clerics such as Hambali, 
Abu Jibril and Ba‟asyir were accepted by KMM without prejudice. Starting with 
ordinary Islamic classes at the KMM leader‟s house, JI ended up sharing similar 
Islamic Caliphate objectives and carrying out joint operations. KMM members, who 
fled to Indonesia after massive raids by the Malaysian police, were sheltered by JI 
members in many places.
1095
 JI members such as Respondent B7 were involved in 
smuggling KMM members from Malaysia to Indonesia in 2001.
1096
 Rafi bin Udin, 
who was involved in a botched bank robbery in May 2001, was helped by Respondent 
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B7 to enter Indonesia via the Batam Island. After this, other JI members helped Rafi 
Udin get safe shelter in Indonesia until he was arrested on April 22, 2003.
1097
   
 
Rafi bin Udin and Ibrahim Ngah are believed to have been sent to Ambon by JI after 
arrangements with Zulkifli Khir in Puchong, Selangor. JI also worked hand in hand 
with KMM in the training and military education at JI operated Hudaibiyah and Abu 
Bakar camps with MILF in Mindanao. Hence, at least two KMM members were 
arrested in connection with the Indonesian bombing. Taufik Abd Halim aka Dani, a 
KMM member was convicted of the Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta on August 2001 
and Respondent B8 was convicted in connection with the Kuningan bombing that 
took place in Jakarta on September 9, 2004.
1098
  
 
Fourth, the Malaysian cell was responsible for establishing a regional network, the so 
called “Rabitatul Mujahidin”. Headed by Hambali as the leader of Mantiqi 1, a 
meeting for establishing a regional network took place in Malaysia. At least three 
meetings are reported to have been held in Malaysia, starting with the first meeting in 
Ampang, Kuala Lumpur at the end of 1999 and followed by one in June 2000 at Kuala 
Lumpur and the last one at Sungkai, Perak in November 2000. Malaysia was a place 
for regional Jihadist meetings, with the main focus being to gather around all the 
leaders from various Islamic movements to be in one faction, JI. 
 
JI tended to be a champion in Southeast Asia when directing all groups to establish an 
Islamic Caliphate. Hambali used his Afghan-alumnus network to get participants from 
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Aceh, Sulawesi, Singapore and 
Myanmar to come to Malaysia for Rabitatul meetings.  
 
Hambali is believed to have used the last Rabitatul Mujahidin meeting in Perak to 
plan a series of bomb attacks in Indonesia. Altogether, 45 bombs were detonated on 
the December 24th and 25th, 2000 in 11 cities across Indonesia. The bombings took 
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place less than a month after the matter was discussed at last Rabitatul Mujahidin 
meetings. Al-Qaeda, by contrast, often took years to launch their attacks.    
 
But Hambali had bigger ambitions. Together with JI leader Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir, 
he arranged a meeting of senior terrorist groups at a house near the International 
Islamic University...the two meetings were also held to discuss plans to set up an 
Islamic state as well as bombing activities in the region.
1099
  
 
Fifth, the Malaysian cell could be considered as an administration center for JI. All 
the „key players‟ such as Hambali, Sungkar, Ba‟asyir, Abu Jibril and many more had 
lived in Malaysia since 1985. After Sungkar and Ba‟asyir fled Malaysia in 1998, 
Hambali managed JI from Kampung Sungai Manggis in Banting, Selangor. Not only 
did he manage to give direction to Malaysia, Hambali was also able to bring JI‟s amir, 
Ba‟asyir to Malaysia for Rabitatul Mujahidin meetings in 1999 and 2000.   
 
The Malaysia cell also played a paramount role in establishing JI from the beginning 
until it was regarded as the second most dangerous terrorist group in the world. 
Malaysia, geographically situated at the heart of Southeast Asia, was ideally located 
for managing JI effectively. The locations of Singapore and Indonesia in the south, 
Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar in the north, the Philippines, Sabah and Borneo in 
the east and Sumatra in the West, made Malaysia a crucial hub for connection from 
every direction. Lenient immigration policies for Muslims from other countries also 
made Malaysia important for JI‟s movement.  
 
In 1985, Sungkar and Ba‟asyir fled to Malaysia to avoid being sent to prison by the 
Suharto regime. They found Malaysia to be tolerant of their preaching of violent 
Jihad as the best path for achieving an Islamic state. They also were in good 
location to facilitate the travels of Indonesians and Malaysians to Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.
1100
  
 
Furthermore, Mahathir‟s anti-Western statements also make him famous especially to 
the radical Muslims. It was what Mahathir intended and was perhaps sometimes 
misunderstood by both Muslims and the West. His negative rhetoric about the West 
made him appear as more of a radical Muslim than what he probably intended.  
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Finally, the Malaysian cell was a financial centre for al-Qaeda and JI. The Malaysian 
cell was responsible for establishing several front companies that were used to 
channel al-Qaeda money for their operations. Malaysia also played a crucial role as a 
centre for allocation of money to every single al-Qaeda project in the region. Most of 
the money was believed to have been used to buy weapons and material for bomb-
making such as ammonium nitrate and devices.  
 
At least four companies were run by JI's Malaysian cell: Konsojaya Sdn. Bhd., Secure 
Valley Sdn. Bhd., Infocus Technology Sdn. Bhd and Green Laboratory Medicine Sdn. 
Bhd. Konsojaya Sdn. Bhd. Konsojaya was registered under the names of Hambali and 
his wife, Noralwizah Lee, along with Wali Khan on June 1994. It was established as a 
company doing palm oil trading between Malaysia and Afghanistan, but its real 
purpose was the channelling of al-Qaeda money around the region.  
 
Yazid Sufaat, a former captain in the Malaysian army and a US trained biochemist, 
set up Green Laboratory Medicine, a medical testing facility on October 6, 1993 in 
Kuala Lumpur. Yazid was chosen to establish this company because of his expertise 
and previous experience as an army captain.  
 
In 2000, Yazid, through his laboratory, was believed to have procured four out of 21 
tonnes of ammonium nitrate that he was instructed to purchase. This main ingredient 
in bomb-making was hidden in Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana's house in Muar, Johor.
1101
 JI 
members tried to get 17 more tonnes of ammonium nitrate for a truck bombing in 
Singapore, but this plan was halted after 15 JI Singapore cell members were detained 
by the police.
1102
    
 
Yazid also set up Infocus Technology Company Sdn. Bhd. in July 1995 focusing on 
the information technology industry. This company was registered under his and his 
wife‟s name, Sejarahtul Dursina aka Chomel's. Yazid was alleged to have signed a 
letter on the stationery of the computer company naming Massaoui as the firm's sales 
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representative, so he would have an excuse to do business in the United States. The 
federal indictment against Massaoui alleges in October 2000, he was named 
marketing consultant for Infocus Tech, and was to be paid $2,500 a month for 
working in the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe.
1103
 During 
interrogation by Malaysian police, Yazid denied any contact with Massaoui and 
claimed that he never paid him any money and that the letter was a forgery.
1104
  
 
Another example of a JI-run company was Ar-Risalah Trading. This company was 
registered under the name of Mohd Sha Sarijan, a JI member who was detained under 
the ISA on February 22, 2002. This company's registration number was 001040582-
X.
1105
 Ar-Risalah Trading was granted a Class-E contractor‟s licence from January 
16, 1996. Among the tenders that were awarded to Ar-Risalah Trading was one to 
supply stationery to a school in Banting, Selangor. Abdul Razak Baharudin, a 
headmaster at one of the schools in Banting helped Ar-Risalah to gain this contract.  
 
The real manager behind the scenes was Feri Muchlis bin Abdul Halim, the son-in-
law of Abdullah Sungkar. Feri Muchlis, a welder with Malaysian PR, did not have the 
credentials to establish a company in Malaysia. Hambali asked Mohd Sha Sharijan to 
register the company under his name and gave him RM25, 000 as start-up capital. Ar-
Risalah also secured a contract to install water pipes in Selangor. This contract was 
obtained with the help of a senior SWD engineer. All Bakry Mohammed Alias, the 
engineer who worked with SWD, was detained under the ISA on January 12, 2002. 
The company was also awarded contracts to build two Bestari (smart) schools in 
Selangor.  
 
It is believed that Hambali in turn helped other JI members from the profits he made 
through his business ventures. All JI-run businesses had to contribute ten percent of 
their total earnings to the group. This money was to be channelled to the special fund, 
either to support Jihad or to help Muslims who were suffering. Hambali, as the 
Mantiqi Ula leader, also controlled the Infaq Fisabilillah money and channelled it to 
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various operations. He collected more than RM800, 000 from many unsuspecting 
Malaysians, Singaporeans and JI-run companies. They thought the money was being 
used by NGOs to help needy Muslims, but the fund was actually used to finance 
Hambali's extremist plans. Wai and Charles (2003) reported in The Star newspaper: 
“Malaysian police, who have painstakingly tracked Hambali‟s movements and traced 
his financial backing, found that up till December 2001, the RM800, 000 was used to 
buy arms and send JI members for training in Afghanistan”.1106  
 
Hambali also managed to get outsider money, which came directly from the al-Qaeda 
organization. Records show RM95, 000 was awarded to Hambali by KSM to establish 
a radical network and carry out „deadly‟ operations in the region as mentioned by Wai 
and Charles (2003) „he collected money from unsuspecting people, not only in 
Malaysia but all over the world‟.1107 
   
The other JI-linked company was Excelsetia, directed by Abdul Manaf Kasmuri, a 
former Malaysian army colonel. Kasmuri also headed a UN peace-keeping operation 
in Bosnia in the mid 1990s. Excelsetia was a privately-owned general trading 
company that was run out of the offshore haven of Labuan. Two of the other four 
directors/shareholders were JI members, Zulkifli Marzuki and Faiz Abu Bakar 
Bafana. Zulkifli, an accountant, was the auditor for most of the JI-related companies 
including Infocus Technology and Green Laboratories Medicine. Meanwhile, Faiz 
Abu Bakar Bafana was a wealthy businessman based in Kuala Lumpur and 
Singapore. Faiz was arrested in Singapore before being handed over to Malaysian 
authorities in 2001.    
 
In June 2003, the US Department of the Treasury designated 18 individuals and nine 
Malaysian companies as terrorist funders. All of these firms were controlled by JI 
members and they had donated ten percent of their profits into the Infaq Fisabilillah. 
These firms included Angsana Agencies,
1108
 Excelsetia, Marebina, Twin Two Trading 
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Co., Gulf Shores, Shafate Niaga, Min Hwa Envelope and Mawasi Corporation.
1109
 
Some of the zakat money (giving alms) from these companies was channelled to JI, 
but most of the zakat was given directly to the state's Islamic department or to needy 
Muslims. However, JI members and its allies such as MILF, KMM and ASG became 
increasingly dependent on donations, including zakat, to finance bombings because 
the governments had tightened bank controls and monitored every suspicious 
financial transaction.
1110
 
 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
JI successfully operated in Malaysia under the clever management of Sungkar and his 
close colleague, Ba‟asyir. JI did not emerge as part of the NII struggle in the 
beginning, but was a means to achieving NII objectives. JI absorbed all of the NII 
strategies but was enhanced with the support of some Afghan „key players‟ such as 
Zulkarnaen, Hambali, Abu Jibril and many more. 
 
The decision to send NII members from Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and 
Thailand to participate in military training in Afghanistan was a paramount step in 
radicalizing NII. JI‟s establishment in 1993 gave a new face to NII's struggle. Starting 
with sending NII fighters to Afghanistan, JI ended up establishing their own camp in 
Towrkhan. In addition to learning military and guerrilla warfare at the camp, NII and 
JI members also experienced Jihadist fighting in the Afghan-Russian war. 
 
The end of the war in Afghanistan was a crucial catalyst for spreading radical 
ideology throughout the world. Jihad fighters came from all over the world to find 
martyrs including NII and JI members. Southeast Asian Jihadists who had all the 
fundamental knowledge about guerrilla warfare and bomb-making were seen as the 
new „medan Jihad‟ to continue their Jihad. The war between Moro and Manila 
military in Mindanao was a good opportunity for these „war-hungry‟ Afghan veterans. 
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Later, in addition to Mindanao fighting, JI members were involved with the series of 
bomb attacks in Indonesia and planned more bomb attacks in Singapore and 
Malaysia. The main reason was to create chaos on the basis of conflict between 
religions.   
 
Meanwhile, JI in Malaysia also established LHIS as their alternative training center 
after Ngruki. Sungkar and Ba‟asyir set up LHIS in 1991 with strong support from 
local NII sympathizers. LHIS was a clone of Al-Mukmin Pasantren, known as Pondok 
Ngruki, back in Solo.
1111
 Ba‟asyir confessed he established the „Ahli Sunnah Wal 
Jamaah‟ community in Malaysia with the foundation laid in Kuala Pilah and Johor. 
Through these efforts, Sungkar and Ba‟asyir were successful in expanding the Usrah 
network outward from Indonesia, and for soughing roots into Malaysia and 
Singapore.          
 
LHIS was build on two main objectives, first, to create a true Islamic generation 
which would practice Islam in every aspect of life, and second to provide a substitute 
educational system to JI‟s children in this region.1112 Except students from Sabah 
(predominantly children of DIS), most of the students were the children of illegal 
Indonesian immigrants in Malaysia. LHIS also provided a radical approach to 
teaching and also acted as a feeder for the DI struggle. JI children were indoctrinated 
with radical ideology to make sure the struggle of DI was maintained. Later, LHIS 
created „al-Ghuraba‟; a secret group to train future „Jihadi fighters‟ with military 
training in Afghanistan and Pakistan. LHIS also acted as a „transit centre‟ for JI 
members after returning from Afghanistan, then they were instructed to take part in 
militant operations in this region.      
 
JI made a regional radical network with the Philippines through MILF, Singapore 
through the JI Singapore cell, Thailand through GMIP and WKR, Malaysia through 
KMM, Indonesia through GAM and Sulawesi Muslims Organization, and Myanmar 
through RSO. All these groups' representatives were present at the three Rabitatul 
Mujahidin meetings that took place in Kuala Lumpur and Perak in 1999 and 2000. 
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However, these meetings did not include discussions about violence and attacks but 
were more about establishing an Islamic Caliphate throughout the region.  
 
Malaysia played a crucial role in establishing JI and also strengthened the 
organization during the 1990s. Its geography location and the amicable policy by the 
Malaysian government to any Muslims were important to the expansion of JI in 
Malaysia. JI also had close contact with the local Malaysian radical group, KMM. 
This group was founded in April 1996 by Zainon Ismail under the name Halaqoh-
Pakindo. Later, KMM divided into two paradigms with different leaders and different 
objectives. The north and east cells followed the instructions of Zainon and Nik Adli, 
but the Kuala Lumpur and Selangor cells followed the instructions of JI leaders such 
as Hambali and Abu Jibril. The K3M group, led by Zulkifli Khir, was influenced by JI 
and shared the same NII ideology. Later, K3M had a joint venture in JI operations. 
KMM also received advice from JI experts for their operations as stated by Elina 
Noor (2007) “Ties between KMM and JI are also well forged that KMM members on 
the run are believed to be sheltering with or finding support from JI members in the 
region, particularly in Indonesia”.1113  
 
When KMM was uncovered in mid-2001, most of the members fled to Indonesia and 
received help from JI members. The members helped to ferry out KMM members 
through the Indonesian islands and hid them in various places in Indonesia. Later, 
KMM and Malaysian JI members worked hand-in-hand in carrying out, planning and 
bombing operations in Indonesia. Respondent B8 and the Kuningan bombing give 
clear evidence that KMM and JI were involved in the cases of Taufik Abdul Halim 
and the Atrium Mall bombing.   
 
However, all of the attacks planned by JI and KMM were abandoned after the crack-
down by the Malaysian government in 2001 and 2002.  Apart from the Manila 
bombing (2000), the Christmas Eve bombing (2000) and the Bali bombing (2002), a 
number of other attacks were planned by JI from the base in Malaysia. At least three 
more planned bombings, including Tambak Johor, the water link between Malaysia 
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and Singapore, and bombings in several embassies in Singapore and Indonesia were 
abandoned after JI and KMM were uncovered in 2001 and 2002.
1114
    
 
This unsuccessful agenda started after KMM was accidentally discovered by the 
Malaysian police following the botched bank robbery on May 18, 2001. For JI, most 
operations in Malaysia were foiled after this crackdown. At least 80 people related to 
JI were detained all over the country in a series of police operations. However, other 
countries such as Indonesia and Singapore never learnt from this police initiative. 
Indonesia ignored the presence of JI operations in its territory until the Bali bombing 
in October of 2002. JI‟s operations were only taken seriously by the Singaporean 
government after details about Yishun MRT's bombing plans were found on the 
confiscated laptop of Abu Atef, one of the al-Qaeda suspects arrested in Karachi in 
late 2001. Following this, 13 JI members from the Singapore cell were arrested by 
Singaporean authorities in January, 2002.        
 
Questions also arose about the possibility of KMM and JI regrouping again in 
Malaysia. The last Molotov cocktail attacks carried out in 2001 were instigated by 
KMM in Sungai Petani and Johor. After seven years, it has happened again. Teresa 
Kok, an outspoken MP (Member of Parliament) from the DAP party, has received 
death threats after raising discussions about Islam as an official religion in Malaysia. 
Her parents' house was also attacked by unidentified assailants with Molotov 
cocktails. Dr. Ambiga Sreenivasan, President of the Malaysian Bar Council, was 
similarly attacked. One thing is clear: there are some individuals or groups who do not 
agree with what is happening. Moreover, these people might do something radical 
such as carry out further violent attacks, bombings or killings.   
In addition, the series of arrests by the Malaysian, Indonesian, Singaporean, and the 
Philippine police might have weakened these groups, but their ability to rise again is 
undeniable. In addition to a lack of key operative leaders, the remnants of JI members 
are believed to have regrouped; its primary infrastructure remains intact (as the nature 
of clandestine).
1115
 The executions of three Bali bombers on November 9, 2008 might 
be encouraging nominal followers to follow the „holy pathway‟ and become syuhada 
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(martyr) or to take revenge. Those who are at large might be re-communicating and 
preparing for new attacks in this region if the situation is in their favour.   
Radical ideology might be re-branded and benefit from the political turmoil currently 
happening in Malaysia. Radical followers will take advantage of domestic political 
instability to promote the idea of Islamic khilafah. The Malaysian government should 
be replaced with the khilafah system, which is more suitable for Muslims either in 
Malaysia or the greater region. The „true‟ democracy that has just been implemented 
in Malaysia will come at a high price. Instead of demands and claims made by certain 
groups, radicals will take the opportunity to further their own political motives. 
 
At least 3000 JI followers are believed to still be active in the region.
1116
 They might 
strike if the situation is in their favour. Tight security and constant surveillance by 
ASEAN countries paralyzed KMM and JI, but their capacity for violence still exists. 
Those who are still at large, such as Nordin Mohd Top, Umar Patek, Dulmatin and 
Zulkifli Khir, may regroup and plan future attacks. When there is a chance, they 
might come back to work together for the sake, they believe, of Islam and Muslims.  
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Chapter VI- 
COUNTERING RADICAL ISLAM: THE MALAYSIAN OPTION 
 
 
Malaysia can claim to know how to deal with terrorists, be they Muslims or non-
Muslims. We have been successful so far and we believe we can successfully 
handle future problems.
1117
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
It is important to analyze the Kumpulan Militant Malaysia and the Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI) movements before discussing how the Malaysian government has sought to 
counter its influence of Muslim radicalism. The de-radicalization syllabus in detention 
camps, the dialogue between citizens and the influence of ASEAN are all instruments 
used by the Malaysian government in its de-radicalization programme. In this chapter, 
the use of these tools will be discussed.  
 
 
6.2 De-radicalizing the Militant  
Most Southeast Asian countries exposed to militant and radical threats know it is in 
their interests to fight al-Qaeda.
1118
 Terrorism is not merely a danger to citizens and 
property; it is a threat to the economic prosperity of the region. Terrorist incidents 
affect the tourism industry and undermine investors‟ confidence, as occurred in Bali 
after the 2002 bombing.
1119
 JI and KMM were also a threat to the existing state of 
power due to their long-term goal of setting up an Islamic caliphate in the region.   
 
The radicalization of Islam in Southeast Asia is not a recent phenomenon, but an 
evolution of political, social and educational practices across the region.
1120
 
Progressive and inclusive states like Singapore and Malaysia are not immune to Jl‟s 
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insidious presence; they can only hope to reduce the ongoing terrorist threat through 
robust security measures and effective public policies which incorporate education 
and dialogue with Muslim leaders and the wider Islamic community. 
 
Simon Sheldon‟s (2002) perspective of terrorism in Southeast Asia is that it is home-
grown with concerns largely confined within national borders. Although he 
acknowledges there are some ties with al-Qaeda, Sheldon holds that the level of 
cooperation and coordination among terrorist groups is nowhere near that of groups 
outside the region. Furthermore, Abuza says: 
 
Southeast Asia has become a major centre of operation of al-Qaeda operatives for 
three primary reasons: the Afghan connection to Middle Eastern extremists, the 
growth of Islamic grievances within southeast Asian states since 1970s for 
socioeconomic and political reasons and most important, that southeast Asian states 
are countries of convenience for international terrorists.
1121
   
 
Political violence and terrorism are not new in Southeast Asia, although Islamic 
radicalism with its now global dimensions is a relatively new phenomenon. The 
biggest security threat encountered by Malaysia and Southeast Asian countries in an 
earlier era came from communist insurgency and subversion.
1122
 The main purpose of 
communism at that time was as an alternative contender for state power.  
 
Southeast Asian countries should be well aware that the current threat from radicals is 
important, and is one type of political warfare that requires not only security action 
but also a comprehensive counter-strategy. No single country in Southeast Asia 
should feel complacent about what they have done so far.
1123
 The threat from radicals, 
and especially Muslim militants, will continue unless stern actions are taken. None of 
these groups were institutionally linked to any political party; they operated with their 
own methods and ideologies as well as implementing a “terror approach” in their 
movement. Aggrieved by local politics and frustrated with the electoral systems, 
inability to establish an administration well-matched with their radical perspective of 
Islam is among the reasons contributing to the existence of these groups. This 
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initiative may take a long time to succeed, but it is absolutely essential that it is 
carried out.  
 
The war on terrorism in Southeast Asia will be long and arduous. Governments in this 
region must work together if they are to have any chance of eliminating the JI threat. 
The JI spectre is still with us and it is essential to exorcise it before more innocent 
lives are lost.
1124
  
 
 A few months before September 11, the Malaysian government took significant 
actions and made a series of arrests of suspected militants.
1125
 Its use of a competent 
strategy to uncover the KMM and JI threats was a huge success for the Malaysian 
government, especially as it took place before the September 11 tragedy. Moreover, 
the Special Branch (SB) of the Malaysian police department also supplied important 
data about the militants' movements and the secret meeting in Malaysia between  
Muhammad Atta, Zachariah Massaoui and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad along with 
other 9/11 suspects.
1126
 However, the U.S government and CIA did not take this 
information seriously and missed the opportunity to prevent a tragedy.
1127
       
 
The militant threat in Malaysia was further reduced when the Inspector General of 
Police (IGP), Norian Mai, revealed on January 5, 2002, that 13 more KMM members 
had been arrested.
1128
 Less than two weeks later, 10 more militants were arrested and 
claimed by police to be the second and most dangerous wing of KMM. On June 19, 
14 more militants in Malaysia were detained - one of them was Sejahratul Dursina aka 
Chomel, the wife of Yazid Sufaat.
1129
  
 
All of those arrested in 2002 were at first believed to be members of KMM, but the 
Malaysian government later found they were JI Malaysian cell members.
1130
 On April 
23 2003, three more Malaysian militants were arrested in Indonesia, two of them 
(Nasir Abas and Nurmiswari) were JI members and one, Rafi bin Udin, who had fled 
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to Indonesia in 2001, was from KMM.
1131
 Malaysian police strongly believed that 
many more KMM and JI members were dispersed and in hiding in the region, 
particularly in Indonesia and the Southern Philippines.
1132
    
 
After the September 11 incident, the Malaysian government was emboldened to take 
stern measures to maintain the „moderate Islam‟ implemented in Malaysia. Various 
actions have been taken, such as strictly enforcing the constitutional provision for 
Islam as the official religion. This initiative was implemented by the Mahathir 
government in order to prove that Malaysia is an „Islamic state‟ and that there was no 
need for the radicals' more extreme interpretation of what that should mean. For 
radicals, they have their own interpretation of an Islamic state. For them, Malaysia is 
not an Islamic country because it uses colonial law and a secular (Western) political 
system.  
 
Malaysia was also identified as a fragile multi-ethnic country.
1133
 The situation had 
always been somewhat unstable and it was hard for the government to take any action 
without affecting people's rights.
1134
 However, without any choice, the government 
used the ISA to deal with all types of extremists. Racial, ideological, language, 
cultural and political means were used by some extremists to destroy inter-ethnic 
harmony, social stability and national unity.
1135
  
 
Countering terrorist strategies in Malaysia involves using certain domestic measures 
to build Islamic religious education and to eliminate the causes of militancy. The 
Mahathir administration has once again made a significant decision to monitor the 
curriculum content of religious institutions, either run by the state, privately or by the 
opposition party. Most of the private schools known as Sekolah Agama Rakyat (SAR) 
are owned by Partai Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and are located around the country.
1136
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The Malaysian Strategic and Research Centre (MSRC), an independent Malaysian 
think-tank suggested that privately-run religious institutions are a fundamental 
breeding ground for potential Muslim terrorists and should be overhauled and placed 
under stern government control.
1137
 The failure of the government to monitor these 
schools could result in bigger problems similar to those that occurred in Indonesia. 
There are more than 500 SARs with at least 126,000 students operating in 
Malaysia.
1138
  
 
Abuza (2003) wrote, “On October 15, 2001, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad 
announced all private and state schools run by PAS (Partai Islam Semalaysia), from 
kindergarten to college would “be under closer scrutiny”.1139 Mahathir also expressed 
concern about the extreme PAS ideologies being taught at over two thirds of the 2160 
religious schools in Malaysia.
1140
 Mahathir condemned all PAS-linked institutions as 
un-Islamic and deviant, and said they required constant monitoring.
1141
 Deputy Prime 
Minister at the time, Abdullah Badawi, said that “the majority of these schools 
contribute nothing to the educational stock”.1142        
 
The government strongly believes these schools are the sources of anti-government 
sentiment and Islamic based militancy.
1143
 Lack of surveillance and monitoring 
accessibility by state and federal education departments were among the factors 
allowing the growth of radical ideology in these schools. Most of the Ustazs came 
from the Middle East and have been influenced by radical ideologies, with some of 
them introduced into Afghanistan for short military training.
1144
  
 
Later, the Malaysian government cut SAR funding in order to weaken the 
management of these schools. This initiative was successful when some SARs 
decided to close their premises because of the cost burden. The government then gave 
schools the choice to either carry on with their operations without support from the 
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education department or become part of the state or federal school system with the 
condition that they embrace secular subjects.
1145
 
 
Moreover, teachers without qualifications from the Islamic department or a teaching 
certificate from the education department were forced to take weekend courses or 
Kursus Jangka Pendek (short-term courses) at Maktab Perguruan (Education 
College). This brilliant step was initiated by the Mahathir administration.  In addition 
to forcing teachers to get a proper education, it provides a chance to de-radicalize 
them.
1146
 Ustazs were asked to learn „secular‟ subjects such as pedagogy, psychology, 
management, history, civilization and many more instead of needing to pass 
examinations at the end of the courses.
1147
 Apart from the certificate, these teachers 
were assured a better salary and the opportunity to serve in their home town if a 
position was available.
1148
  
 
Initiatives taken by Mahathir‟s administration in regulating Islamic education as tools 
for de-radicalization had successful outcomes. It may not work in some countries and 
normally ends-up with resistance from extremists, but this has not happened in 
Malaysia. Majority Malay Muslims in Malaysia support any de-radicalization means 
taken by the Malaysian government and give no sympathy to militants. All 
government agencies especially Ministry of Education, States Education Department, 
States Religious Department, Police and others, work hand-in-hand for the de-
radicalization programme.  
 
  
6.3 Dialogue between Civilizations
1149
   
Islamic civilization was at one time a bridge between East, West, North and South.
1150
 
But now, misconception is a big problem between Islam and the West. 
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Misinterpretation of Islam can pose a variety of threats to Muslims and later will 
create conflict as has occurred before. Furthermore, misconceptions of Islam can also 
transform into foreign policies that have a significant impact on Muslim countries, as 
is now occurring in Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq. Frank Tachau, a Professor of 
Middle Eastern politics has critiqued some of the American misconceptions 
concerning the Arab-Israel conflict and the role Islam plays in it. Tachau also 
expressed that some misconceptions about Islam have influenced American foreign 
policy towards the Middle East, especially in the Israel-Palestine conflict. He 
suggested the American government educate their citizens to create a well-informed 
public who will understand and support every step taken in shaping foreign policies. 
Osman Bakar (1997) wrote: “The West‟s problem with Islam is the Muslims‟ main 
problem with the West”.1151  
 
Another American scholar, John L. Esposito, has said it is necessary to appeal to the 
American public to think beyond stereotypes in their perceptions of Islam.
1152
 
Esposito also said that since the disintegration of the Soviet Empire and the death of 
communism, Western media has tended to publish more about Islam. However the big 
issue is misinterpretation, with many voices stimulating fear of Islam. As well as 
urging the West to be fair to Islam, Esposito has suggested Muslims should also rid 
themselves of their own stereotypes of the West.
1153
   
 
In today's society, both Muslim and Christian or Islamic and Western civilizations 
need to strive for a better understanding and implement dialogue to stop 
misconceptions.  This would help to bridge the East and West. Among the main 
objectives of a dialogue between civilizations is to bring different communities 
together to work for the common good of society as much as they are forced by 
circumstances to live together, side by side, while subscribing to different spiritual 
faiths, religious ways of life and political ideologies. Community leaders seek to lay 
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down principal conditions to be adhered to by all of those involved in the conduct of 
civilized dialogues including inter-religious discussions.    
 
Therefore, to counter terrorism through civilization dialogue is not the issue, but to 
understand and to recognize the wisdom enshrined in such dialogue is crucial. Both 
Muslims and non-Muslims have to develop their interaction within the positive 
context of living together in fellowship and with the aim of mutually helping each 
other. Human beings were created in diversity so they could help each other and gain 
the benefits by these relationships.
1154
    
 
History shows Muslims and non-Muslims have lived together in harmony and peace 
as in Cordova and Jerusalem.
1155
 A similar situation was also recorded in the 
Malaysian region decades ago, when Muslim traders came for business and later 
settled down in areas such as Malacca, Acheh, and Pattani.
1156
 Locals, who had 
already embraced Hindu and „Animism‟, welcomed these traders without 
confrontation. In addition to experiencing positive interactions, the traders also 
assimilated themselves and Islam with local culture and customs. There is clear 
evidence that Muslims and non-Muslims in this region lived together peacefully. 
Their understanding and interactions about local culture and customs as well as 
existing religions showed that dialogue has been in place for centuries.     
 
 
6.4 Religious Perspectives and the Malaysian ‘Strategic’ Approach 
Religion is an important part of human life. However, there is now a more 
pronounced religious element to international terrorism.  Bruce Hoffman in Whittaker 
(2007) has estimated nearly half of today‟s terrorist groups can be classified as 
religious in character and/or motivation
1157
 “by 1994, a third (16) of the 49 
                                                 
1154
 Hassan, M. H. (2005). Response to Jihadis' View of Jihad: A Sample Approach to Counter 
Ideology Work. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International Private Limited, p. 92-93.  
1155
 Coope, J. A. (1993). Religious and Cultural Conversion to Islam in Ninth-Century Umayyad 
Cordoba. Journal of World History, 4(1), p. 47-68. 
1156
 Fealy, G., & Hooker, V. (2006). Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook. 
Singapore: ISEAS (Institute of Southeast Asian studies) Publications, p. 51-53.  
1157
 Whittaker, D. J. (2007). Terrorism: Understanding the Global Threat. Harlow: Pearson Education 
Limited, p. 103. 
 213 
 
identifiable terrorist groups could be classified as religious in character and/or 
motivation”.1158 
 
Past clashes and conflicts have occurred in the name of religious differences. The 
most effective way to counter this is to share the values and teachings of various 
beliefs. We must share all of these values, either academically or through spiritual 
experiences.
1159
 These are powerful instruments for developing mutual understanding 
and respect. The subsequent understanding would make this world a more harmonious 
and prosperous place. As harmony and understanding among different beliefs is 
crucial to followers, we should enforce the development of greater ties between 
religions. Not only at the leadership level, but everyone must understand the 
principles and methods of each religion.  
 
There are a number of methods available for establishing strong ties between religious 
followers and resolving conflict, such as encouraging meetings among scholars from 
different religious backgrounds.  Meetings like this are important for allowing 
discussion of differences and similarities in traditions and also to promote empathy 
and improve knowledge about one another. It is crucial for religious scholars to meet 
and discuss all these matters in the public eye. Their understanding and cooperation 
will be followed by the public.  
 
It is crucial for everyone to understand the differences between religions. There is 
nothing wrong with recognizing differences; what is important is a willingness to 
acknowledge all of the values and beliefs in every religion. We are living in a world 
of differences. It is crucial to maintain the diversity of religious traditions because 
people live in a world of variety and complexity.
1160
   
 
But we should realize that while a diversity of religious traditions is more suited to 
serving the needs of the varied perspectives in humanity, this diversity naturally also 
possesses the potential for conflict and tension. Everybody, whether they are scholars 
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or followers, must work to transcend intolerance and misunderstanding and build a 
stable and strong society throughout the world. In the case of KMM and JI, religion 
was used as an instrument for conflict and tension. Jihad as one of the Islamic 
principles was actively promoted as a religious obligation and become a reason for 
carrying out works of terror.
1161
   
 
KMM and JI have different understandings and interpretations of Islam and Jihad 
compared to the majority of Muslims in the world. They have their own substantiation 
and verification taken from verses of the Quran and Sunnah to support their violent 
and terrorist activities. KMM and JI have misunderstood and misinterpreted certain 
Islamic concepts, resulting in the assertion that they are following the correct path. 
Members have not been concerned about whether their actions would lead to the 
destruction of human lives and public property, causing anarchy and stirring unrest 
between ethnic groups.  
 
One of the Bali bombers who was executed by the Indonesian government on 
November 8, 2008, Imam Samudra,  wrote in his book, entitled Aku Melawan 
Terroris, that killing unbelievers (infidels) was permitted as part of Jihad fi sabilillah 
(waging holy war for Allah)
1162. Imam Samudra‟s book contains his confession and 
justifications for committing the Bali bombing as well as the basis of his actions. 
Imam Samudra also supports his words and legitimates his violence and deadly action 
in Kuta, Bali in October 2002, through verses from the Quran such as: “Then kill the 
Mushrikun wherever you find them, and capture them and besiege them, and prepare 
for them each and every ambush”1163. 
 
However the issue is, Imam Samudra did not look at the verses as a whole, he just 
picked words that matched his own beliefs. In understanding any issue in Islam, one is 
supposed to look at the wider context of the verses; they cannot be addressed in 
isolation. Imam Samudra explained the Bali bombing was an offensive Jihad that had 
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to be done to infidels in any place in the world
1164
. This is a complete misinterpretation 
of the text, in that it only takes account of certain verses while ignoring the historical 
context in which they are written
1165
.  
 
The exact context of that verse is related to Mushrikun (infidels) and the idea is that 
Jihad should only be used defensively.
1166
 This verse should be understood based on 
its origin, and why and to whom it was revealed. It was revealed to Prophet 
Muhammad in Madinah, Saudi Arabia 1400 years ago to explain how to deal with 
those who breached a peace treaty at the time.
1167
 However, people like Imam 
Samudra, Osama bin Laden, and Abdullah Azzam manipulate this verse for their 
political and violent means.
1168
  
 
As the writer illustrated in chapter two (typology of terrorism), the interesting thing 
about militant Muslims is that most of them have very little knowledge of Islam. They 
do not come from an Islamic background, but are extremely eager to discover religion 
when they join the JI, KMM or any radical Muslim-based groups. Lacking religious 
education, they are easily influenced by the teachings of JI, promoted by charismatic 
leaders such as Hambali, Sungkar and Osama bin Laden. They then become confused 
about the definitions of some crucial terms in Islam such as Jihad and Kafir (infidel). 
After their extreme induction, they believe armed Jihad is compulsory for Muslims 
regardless of who they are or where they come from.
1169
      
 
They were thus made confused with other Islamic concepts; for example on the 
promises of eternal lives or akhirat; using violent means to restore the Khilafah 
Islamiah; that military armed Jihad is compulsory for Muslims as Islamic Law is not 
being carried out; the coming of Islam is to execute all non Muslims and therefore it 
is permissible to kill all non-Muslims.
1170
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Jihad is not an act of terrorism. Any act of terrorism targeting innocent civilians 
through aggressive or suicidal means is wrongful and never permissible by Islam.
1171
 
Individuals and organizations do not have the right to launch Jihad in the name of 
Islam or on behalf of Muslims in another country. Jihad is supposed to be decided by 
the head of the country which is involved in the fight.
1172
 No-one can simply wage or 
declare Jihad in the name of Islam or to help their brotherhood.  
 
Therefore, only people in power, which means the leaders of a particular country, are 
in a position to decide whether or not to take part in Jihad.
1173
 However, for countries 
with no government due to invasion, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, anybody 
who has received the mandate of a majority of the people can make a decision. Those 
in power are also bound to declare Jihad when their government has been removed by 
the enemy or to defeat enemies who are invading their country.
1174
  
 
Those in power and participating in Jihad should be aware of who their enemies are 
and who can legitimately be killed.
1175
 It is not permissible to kill anyone other than 
members of armed forces or those who have joined forces against them. This is the 
law in Jihad, which is in line with the Geneva Convention about the protection of 
civilians and prisoners.
1176
 Jihadists are not allowed to kill civilians, prisoners, non-
combatants or anybody who is injured. The Prophet Muhammad said: “Do not kill the 
elderly who are sick, young children or women and do not behave excessively, 
accumulating the spoils of war. Be kind, for Allah loves those who are kind”.1177 
 
Jihad should be conducted only in conflict zones or areas recognized as such under 
international law.
1178
 Attacks cannot simply be carried out anywhere, such as in Bali, 
the Philippines, Singapore or Malaysia. Attacks out of conflict zones are highly 
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questionable and illegitimate in Islam. Although Bali, according to Islam, is a place of 
vice and its economy relies on immoral activities, this does not justify it as an attack 
target; Islam does not condone such approaches to eradicating vices.
1179
  
 
Moreover, the nature of Islam as a religion is of peace. Its followers are required to 
practice peace in every aspect of their life at all times. Islam demands that war should 
be the last resort only after all peaceful possibilities have been exhausted. Islam also 
teaches its followers to respond to bad things with kindness rather than aggression. 
The decision to wage war should only be made if it brings greater benefits or prevents 
greater dangers from occurring. If not, peace and agreement should be developed 
between Islam and its enemies in order to prevent deaths, casualties and the 
destruction of property.
1180
   
 
The issue often mistakenly believed by some Muslims is the various interpretations of 
Jihad in Islam.
1181
 In a battlefield Jihad is only one of many of its forms, as illustrated 
in the Quran and Sunnah.  For example, these can include Jihad against poverty, 
Jihad against illiteracy, Jihad to develop the economy and Jihad to create a better 
community.
1182
 By practicing Islamic principles in daily life, Muslims are already 
committing to versions of Jihad.  
 
The most important Jihad that should be practiced by Muslims is Jihad to acquire 
knowledge.
1183
 Knowledge is considered the most important thing in human life. Only 
with knowledge will people be respected no matter who are they and where they come 
from. For Muslims, knowledge will guide them towards a better understanding of 
Islam and advance their faith. Many social, political and economic problems will be 
created if Muslims have no education or pursue the wrong type of education.
1184
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Hence, Muslims throughout the world should attempt to gain knowledge or upgrade 
their existing understanding for the betterment of world affairs.
1185
           
 
Jihad that addresses economic issues is regarded as being on a par with Jihad for the 
acquisition of knowledge.
1186
 Today, about 70 percent of the 1.3 billion Muslims 
around the world live in poverty.
1187
 Muslims approached 23 percent of the whole 
world population but have suffered under the humanitarian crisis for decades. A lack 
of capability in managing their economy and corrupt leaders as well as a high 
illiteracy rate has led to major obstacles in creating a better life. Because of economic 
difficulties, some Muslims have become involved in criminal and immoral activities. 
Piracy in Somalia, robbery in Nigeria and bribery in Indonesia are among the 
significant effects of poverty. Islam is not only about obtaining life after death, but is 
also related to living in this world.  
 
Nevertheless all this does not mean that the rise of terrorist groups among Islamic 
populations only has to do with poverty and a lack of jobs and hope. This could easily 
be given as the reason, but why then has terrorism failed to develop in many other 
populations characterized by the same problems? Islamic radicalism is very much a 
political movement, targeting the disaffected.
1188
 Feelings of alienation, anger, and a 
sense of powerlessness in the face of overwhelming real or perceived obstacles to the 
realization of both individual and group fulfilment should be taken into account.
1189
 
Militants in Malaysia have shown poverty was not the cause of radicalism; at least 
eight of the detainees were lecturers, two accountants, and two engineers with good 
stable incomes.
1190
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Moral and social Jihad is as important as other Jihad among Muslims. Throughout the 
Muslim world, moral and social decay is prominent. The weight of becoming a good 
person is on every Muslim‟s shoulder, and it is supposed to start with their own 
family.
1191
 Being a good Muslim and guiding the respective family is important and in 
line with what is asked by Islam. Muslims should think and tackle the matters 
surrounding them rather than try to take care of distant problems.
1192
 When internal 
problems are dealt with, only then can Muslims think about crises in other countries.  
 
Since the 1980s Malaysian Muslims in Afghanistan, Ambon and the Southern 
Philippines have been performing Jihad to help their brotherhood. For this reason, 
should Malaysian Muslims taking part in conflict areas such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the 
Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand and Palestine be able to help their oppressed 
brothers? It should not be that way; Malaysian Muslims have their own government 
which is responsible for internal and foreign affairs. The burden to help Muslims in 
other countries is with the Malaysian government, which can support organizations 
such as the Organization of Islamic Association (OIC) and the United Nations (UN) 
in reducing conflicts.
1193
 
 
Individuals should not be involved in conflict in other countries because each Muslim 
is needed to build the strength of their own community. What would happen if 
thousands of Malaysians go to war zones and take part in armed Jihad? The answer is 
productivity and solidarity in their home community would be affected, which is not 
in line with what was conveyed by Prophet Muhammad - that taking care of 
themselves and their family before others is most important.
1194
 Islam asks its 
followers to prioritize their responsibility to their own communities before rendering 
assistance to those who are far away.  
 
Muslims should be extremely careful to take note of the basic Islamic resources of the 
Quran and Sunnah as well as Ulamas' decrees. Doing this will lead them towards a 
better understanding of Islam and avoid misinterpretation. Muslims are also urged to 
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understand the classical Muslim scholars‟ perspectives and their relationship with 
modern thinking. Most of the kitab (books) used by militants today, were written by 
classic scholars who had no knowledge of present times. It does not mean these 
scholars were not well-educated, but their situation was different from what is 
happening today.
1195
  
 
Differences in faiths cannot be used as a reason for creating conflict between religious 
followers, particularly between Muslims and non-Muslims. Having the perception 
that all non-Muslims are anti-Islam and hate Muslims is unacceptable. Such a 
misconception is no different from some non-Muslims' belief that all Muslims are 
terrorists. Muslims always argue with non-Muslims about their stereotypical 
perceptions of Muslims, but at the same time are guilty of stereotyping all non- 
Muslims as bad and constantly prejudice. Both these kinds of thinking are closer to 
extremism than moderation.  
 
 
6.5 The De-radicalization Programme  
It is a challenging task for governments and institutions in this region to help 
extremists understand the true meaning of Islam. Most JI and KMM members have 
had radical perspectives implanted in their minds since they were very young. Radical 
ideologies have been developed over about 10 to 20 years, and it looks like it will be 
impossible to wipe them out in the short-term.
1196
 Consider the following chart:  
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Chart 4: The continuing process of de-radicalization and inputs needed by police 
to encounter threat from militant groups in Malaysia.
1197
     
 
As illustrated above, the process of de-radicalization by the Malaysian government 
went through a few stages. After being arrested, detainees were taken to the RMP 
remand centre at Bukit Aman, Kuala Lumpur for interrogation. From information 
obtained, detainees commanded to be detained under the ISA for two years 
(minimum). At this stage, more arrests may have happened depending on the 
information given by detainees. After being released, detainees were put under 
Restriction Order (RO), but some went on unconditional release. Counter strategies 
were also implemented by the Malaysian government with co-operation between the 
RMP (special Branch Department), the Prime Minister Department, the Department 
of Islamic Development Malaysia and many more.  
 
Internal Security Act (ISA) is a major prevention tool in Malaysia, besides detention's 
aim to weaken their ability to carry out violence; authorities in detention camps are 
trying hard to de-radicalize all detainees.
1198
 Religious counselling conducted by the 
religious department is part of the programme. Sermons and counselling have assisted 
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the KMM and JI detainees to explore their misinterpretations about Islam. Ustazs and 
Ulamas have been invited to give accurate explanations about aspects of the religious 
doctrine and their belief system, where KMM and JI members have gone wrong.
1199
          
 
The main difference between Malaysia's and Indonesia's de-radicalization 
programmes is related to using ex-militants to counsel their comrades.
1200
 Reasons for 
not using this method include the fact that some of the detainees regarded such 
members as traitors. A figure like Nasir Abas is hated by JI members because they 
believe police used Abas as a secret agent and he was also considered a culprit in the 
Jemaah (JI movement).
1201
 Unlike the al-Arqam movement, Jabatan Kemajuan Islam 
Malaysia (Department of Islamic Development Malaysia-JAKIM) and the police use 
former members such as Zabidi Mohammad
1202
 in their rehabilitation programme, but 
a different approach with continuing rehabilitation and monitoring has taken place for 
JI and KMM members.    
 
The advantage of the Malaysian rehabilitation programme is the use of academics 
from universities as counsellors. Malaysia might be the first country in the world that 
has used this approach to rehabilitate militants.
1203
 One of the reasons is that 
academics are not seen as government agents like the police and counsellors from 
JAKIM. Academics are seen as an independent party involved in the capacity of 
knowledge and research,
1204
 as written by Oorjitham (2008): „Malaysia was the first 
to rope in university lecturers to help with the rehabilitation of JI leaders because they 
are knowledgeable and respected‟.1205   
 
                                                 
1199
 Ali, M. (2007). Coping With the Threat of Jemaah Islamiyah. Singapore: Taman Bacaan Pemuda 
Pemudi Melayu Singapore, p. 108-115.  
1200
 Oorjitham, S. (2008, 05 October). Persuading Terrorist to Disengage. The News Straits Times, p. 2.  
1201
Respondent L1 (2007). Interview on 25 November at Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School, Jalan 
Rabbani, Ulu Tiram, Johor Baru. Johor. 
1202
 Zabidi Mohammad was the former legal adviser of al-Arqam. In 1998, he wrote a book titled „Al-
Arqam Tersungkur di Pintu Syurga (Al-Arqam; The Untold Truth and Inside Story). He was the 
fanatical senior leader of al-Arqam for 18 years until he was arrested under the ISA in 1994.  From 
Aziz, S. A. (2008). Interview on 9th January at Kumpulan Karangkraf Sdn. Bhd., Persiaran Kemajuan, 
Seksyen 16  Shah Alam.  
1203
 Op. Cit., Hashim, R. (2007). 
1204
 Op. Cit., Oorjitham, S. (2008, 05 October). 
1205
 Ibid. 
 223 
 
At least one lecture every month has been reserved for academics to carry out a series 
of presentations. Every lecture lasts three hours from 9.30am until 12.30pm with 
participation from most JI and KMM members. Participation in the lecture and any 
programme run by the detention authorities or police will be taken as merit for their 
release.  Later they will be either withdrawn from the detention camp or put under a 
„Restriction Order‟ (RO).  
 
Rehabilitation is considered the most important tool in countering radicalism, 
especially in Malaysia and its neighbouring countries. A religious approach in 
countering radicalism and terrorism is crucial. This is because, unlike ordinary 
methods, the religious approach of the rehabilitation programme hits at the foundation 
of the problem, which is the militant ideology of JI and KMM members. At the end of 
the programme, the radical ideology based on salafi-wahhabism thinking will have 
been replaced by more accurate Islamic teachings. It does not mean the programme 
was created to wipe out the idea of Jihad from JI and KMM members' minds, but it 
was developed as an important guide to the real meaning of holy war as illustrated in 
the Quran and Sunnah.        
 
To all Mujahidin (Jihadi fighters) and ikhwan (Muslim brothers) in this world, re-
think what we have done as extremely important, if what we have done is right why 
have we faced these difficulties, why does Allah (God) not help us? Why were some of 
our members killed or will be executed, arrested or fled abroad?  We still have time to 
make a change.
1206
  
 
The rehabilitation program implemented in Malaysia has similarities to the religious 
counselling implemented in Singapore. JAKIM conducted rehabilitation programs for 
three main clusters of detained KMM and JI members, who were placed under the RO 
along with their families.
1207
 In attempting to correct JI and KMM misconstrued 
ideology, JAKIM and police have categorized them into two groups. The first 
includes those who make up the hardcore. That is, they are still extreme and militant 
in their thinking and continue to believe what they did was right. The second group is 
made up of members who have shown regret and remorse for their actions.
1208
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Various departments such as the Special Branch of RMP, together with senior Ustazs 
from JAKIM, the National Mosque and Jabatan Agama Islam Negeri (State Religious 
Department) work hand in hand to provide a clear understanding of the main religious 
concepts, particularly about Jihad.
1209
  
 
The government cannot deal with the terrorist ideology by changing the mind of the 
detainees who have [been] poisoned. This has to be done by the religious teachers 
and scholars themselves; that‟s why the religious rehabilitation group[s] have played 
a very important role in helping the government provide rehabilitation to the 
detainees. And this should be the case because they are the experts.
1210
  
 
Regular and special courses were created from time to time by the government in co-
operation with the police and JAKIM at state level. Focal groups targeted in this 
program were released detainees. Continuity and consistency in the running of the 
programme has denied JI and KMM ability to re-group again.
1211
 These programmes 
are also important for helping such terrorists avoid returning to radicalism because of 
the influence of other members or factors.  Those who are detained under the RO, 
have to report on a weekly basis to the nearest police station.
1212
 On top of this, they 
are required to attend any courses organized by the police or religious department at 
the district or state level. However, sometimes they have Kursus Perdana 
(prime/major courses) designed by the Special Branch unit and JAKIM to make sure 
de-radicalization is sustained.
1213
      
 
In countering the radical thinking of JI and KMM members, four different phases of a 
rehabilitation syllabus have been implemented. For those who are on detention order, 
or are under the RO, it is compulsory for them to take part in all four stages of the 
programme. In the first stage, counsellors from JAKIM and the police extricate any 
negative ideology or twisted Islamic perceptions.
1214
  
 
In the second stage, discussions take place with counsellors and the misunderstood 
ideologies are addressed. At this point, a challenging task awaits every counsellor as 
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the militants try to defend their understanding.
1215
 Counsellors must counter this with 
a clear and deep knowledge of Islam, because JI and KMM members will at first 
argue that the counsellors are infidels.
1216
 In the third stage, all twisted Islamic 
concepts and ideologies are replaced with the correct interpretations of the Quran and 
Sunnah. After all of these aspects are completed, more comprehensive education 
about Islam begins.
1217
    
     
For family members, indirect courses are sometimes held in order to break the cycle 
of indoctrination and to prevent KMM and JI regeneration.
1218
 Immediate family 
members, who are usually in shock, need clear explanations about what is happening. 
Besides this, having the right interpretation of Islam is crucial for making sure other 
family members do not become victims of the same deviant understanding of Islam. 
But the most important aspect is that  the family must proactively focus on providing 
future generations with the correct understanding of Islam. 
 
The Malaysian government also uses emotional and kin relations to counter 
radicalism. Using a family approach formula, Malaysian programmes use appeals and 
regular family visits to heal detainees. Anybody from the militant‟s family, who they 
have contact with, will talk to them and try to explain de-radicalism indirectly. 
Cooperative detainees are given more time to have family visits than those who are 
not. This helps detainees build up their confidence about life after release or at least to 
become eager to cooperate for their release.
1219
   
 
Besides this, the Malaysian government also has a special programme for militants' 
families, with the aim of helping them survive without their husband, wife or children. 
Other government agencies such as Jabatan Kebajikan Masyarakat (the Social 
Welfare Department) and Pusat Zakat (the State Alms Centre) are helping these 
families gain financial support for their daily life. Most of the detainees‟ children are 
given help with textbooks and uniforms through their schools to make sure they are 
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not missing out on educational opportunities.
1220
 In some cases, the government also 
helps a detainee's wife to get a job with agencies which are willing to help. One 
example is respondent A‟s wife who was given a job at Dewan Bandaraya Kuala 
Lumpur (Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council-DBKL) while her husband was in a 
detention camp.
1221
 
 
Detainees have difficulties entering the job market with their militant backgrounds, so 
the government helps them find a job or provides them with a suitable workplace. 
Through certain agencies, it also lends money if detainees wish to begin a new 
business. For example, respondent F now works with one of the private Islamic 
institutions in Perak
1222
 and respondent B works as a teacher at Sekolah Pondok (a 
private Islamic boarding school) in Penang.
1223
 Respondent A
1224
 is doing business in 
Kuala Lumpur after renting premises from DBKL by arrangement with the police 
department
1225
 as part of the de-radicalization programme.            
 
The rehabilitation programme initiated by JAKIM and police involves a continuous 
learning process due to its complex nature. This kind of programme is a long-term 
effort and needs to be taken seriously, not only by those two agencies already 
involved, but by many other parties. Malaysia has shown its capability in dealing with 
radicalism through physical and ideology contacts. Zachary Abuza stated in 
Oorjitham (2008): “The Malaysian programme [is] institutionalized, well coordinated 
between various agencies and well resourced”.1226 
 
 
6.6 ASEAN & Regional Initiatives 
Malaysia has cooperated successfully with ASEAN countries on intelligence 
gathering and addressing terrorist threats.
1227
 Malaysia also has strong relationships 
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with the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand and is friendly with other 
powers including the US and Australia. Malaysia has had military and intelligence 
relations with the US for many years, even before the September 11 incident. The 
Special Branch (SB) units under the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) have had a strong 
relationship with the US, which was apparently unaffected by the difficulties in 
bilateral political relations before September 11. Criticism about human rights 
violations and detention without trial (ISA) were among the sensitive issues between 
these two countries.
1228
 Despite some criticism and “verbal confrontations” between 
Kuala Lumpur and Washington, the military and intelligence relationship has 
remained sturdy for some time. Sidney Jones (2008) has remarked; “Since I know 
there is a problem between Mahathir and Bush in the 1990s and early 2000, but the 
cooperation in intelligence and security is so amazing, both countries work together to 
uncover the threat of JI and al-Qaeda in the region”.1229 
 
Among the first government reactions to terrorism was the increase of intelligence 
capabilities, this entailed not only improving surveillance of dissidents and suspected 
extremists at home, but also abroad, particularly at the ASEAN level. Malaysia 
showed its commitment to countering terrorism with the establishment of the 
Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in 2001.
1230
 In 
addition to carrying out close collaborations with the US and the CIA on anti-terrorist 
programmes, SEARCCT also facilitates cooperation and conducts training for 
officials in all relevant government bureaucracies from ASEAN countries.
1231
   
 
The Malaysian-U.S diplomatic relationship has steadily improved since September 
11. Both countries share a similar focus in their wars on terrorism and methods for 
addressing radical threats to social, political and economic stability. The close 
relationship between Malaysia and the U.S was demonstrated in a visit to the White 
House by the former Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad in May, 2002.
1232
 The USA 
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Patriot Act 2001, which allows the detention of terrorist suspects without trial for a 
certain period, appears to be based on Malaysia's ISA detention law.  
 
In correlation with the May 2002 White House visit, a joint declaration to fight 
terrorism was signed by Mahathir and Bush.
1233
 This agreement outlined plans to 
cooperate on intelligence sharing, enhance bilateral teamwork against any kind of 
terrorism, block terrorist funding, freeze terrorist assets, combat money laundering, 
enhance border controls, and work together on transportation and law 
enforcement.
1234
 The CIA's request to interrogate Yazid Sufaat in November 2002 
was accepted by the Malaysian SB as a part of bilateral cooperation on countering 
terrorism.
1235
 However, the CIA refused to allow the Malaysian SB to go to 
Guantanamo Bay to interrogate Hambali and his Malaysian entourage, Nazir and 
Lily.
1236
  
 
In relation to further cooperation between ASEAN countries, not only is there the 
commitment to exchange intelligence information, there is also the commitment to 
physically fight terrorism.
1237
 Terrorism in this region enjoys transnational 
organization, with cells working in various countries in Southeast Asia. JI played a 
role as the main body connecting most of the groups in the region and it helped create 
the main shared objective - that of establishing an Islamic caliphate consisting of all 
of the Southeast Asian countries.  
 
The major response by ASEAN countries to the September 11 incident was the 
condemnation of the attack and subsequent support for the global war on 
terrorism.
1238
 This joint condemnation was expressed through UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 signed on September 21 and 28, 2001.
1239
 ASEAN 
                                                 
1233
 Abdullah, K. (2008). Interview on the 07 January 2008 at The Strategic Studies and International 
Relations Centre, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi. 
Selangor. 
1234
 Op. Cit., Singh, D. (2003).  
1235
 Chua, E. (2002d, 19 November). The Massaoui Link: FBI Quizzes Malaysian Detainees Yazid 
Sufaat. The Malay Mail, p. 5. 
1236
 Op. Cit., Hashim, R. (2007). And  Op. Cit., Gunaratna, R. (2007b). 
1237
 Op. Cit., Jones, S. (2008).  
1238
 Tan, A. T. H. (2003b). Southeast Asia as the "Second Front" in the War Against Terrorism: 
Evaluating the Threat and Response. Terrorism and Political Violence, vol.15.(No. 2.), 129. 
1239
 Ibid. 
 229 
 
countries showed the world their strong response in the first and second weeks 
following the tragedy. ASEAN countries also issued a joint declaration on November 
5, 2001 at The Seventh ASEAN Summit in Brunei.
1240
  The ASEAN Declaration on 
Joint Action to Counter Terrorism (ADJACT) was signed by the ASEAN leaders to 
further condemn the September 11 attacks and extend sympathy and condolences to 
the people and the government of the U.S and the victims.
1241
 Apart from this, 
ASEAN countries have been directly involved in formulating policies and initiating 
activities against transnational crime.  These include the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
on Transnational Crime (AMMTC), ASEAN Chiefs of National Police 
(ASEANAPOL), ASEAN Senior Officials on Drugs Matters (ASOD) and ASEAN 
Finance Ministers Meeting (AFMM).
1242
  
 
An ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) was created as a 
practical platform for ASEAN countries to overcome the threat of terrorism. The 
organisation is headed by ministers of Home Affairs and takes the lead in ASEAN in 
counter terrorism co-operation.
1243
 AMMTC was started in 1997 to adopt effective 
approaches to fighting transnational crime through regional alliances and international 
cooperation.  AMMTC holds meetings every year, and „terrorism‟ was on its agenda 
even before the September 11 tragedy. The ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat 
Transnational Crime was initiated in June 1999, with the main objective of 
establishing a constant mechanism to combat transnational crime from the national 
and bilateral levels to the regional level.
1244
 The AMMTC resolution also urged 
ASEAN countries to strengthen their regional commitment and capacity in countering 
any threat from these kinds of crime.
1245
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In response to the rise of radicalism in this region and September 11, a special 
AMMTC meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur in May 2002.
1246
 At this meeting, 
AMMTC drew up a cohesive regional strategy to fight transnational crime using 
information exchange, law enforcement institutional capacity building, training and 
extra-regional cooperation.
1247
 AMMTC also worked on the criminal activities in 
ASEAN member countries, such as illicit drug trafficking, money laundering, 
terrorism, piracy, arms smuggling and human trafficking.
1248
 Two cohesive initiatives 
were mentioned in this meeting. Firstly, Malaysia agreed to train police personnel in 
relation to intelligence procurement and psychological warfare in relation to 
terrorism. Secondly, with its strong military and intelligence base, Singapore agreed 
to organize training on bomb and explosives detection, post-blast investigation, 
airport security and passport or document security.
1249
  
 
Just two months after the September 11 tragedy, further attention was given to 
intelligence sharing between ASEAN countries. In November 2001, leaders of these 
countries agreed to expand their collaboration with strengthened cooperation between 
their respective security forces to exchange information and increase coordination in 
the fight against terrorism.  A special meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in January 2002 
was attended by military intelligence from Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Brunei. The objective for this „confidential‟ meeting was to discuss the sharing of 
intelligence and security information.
1250
 This gathering, attended by top military 
officials, created a new dimension of multilateral cooperation between ASEAN 
countries that had never been experienced before. 
 
Not long after this, the ASEAN foreign ministers met in Thailand in February 2002 to 
strengthen strategic cooperation against terrorism between regional countries. Then, 
the 22
nd
 Meeting of the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANOPOL) was held 
in Cambodia in May 2002, followed by similar meetings in Chiang Mai in August 
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2004, Bali in May 2005 and Singapore in June 2007.
1251
 All of these meetings focused 
on finding new ways to identify terrorism and to understand its roots as well as to 
understand the transnational crime behind it. ASEANOPOL also agreed to improve 
regional databases to facilitate sharing and analysis of critical intelligence information 
such as wanted and arrested persons, transnational crime, terrorism „modus operandi‟, 
syndicates and maritime offences.
1252
  
 
Furthermore, Indonesia suggested the establishment of the ASEAN Security 
Community (ASC) at the 36
th
 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia in June 2003. ASC initiated an order to establish cooperation between 
countries to address the threat posed by terrorism. ASC was established as a platform 
for ASEAN countries to respond more effectively to a series of transnational threats 
such as terrorism, piracy, immigration and pandemics. At least 70 proposals were put 
forward by ASEAN countries at ASC meetings between 2003 and 2007. Among the 
plans of action proposed by the ASC were the establishment of the ASEAN 
peacekeeping force, the founding of an anti-terrorism centre and the promotion of 
democracy and human rights.
1253
     
 
In addition to internal collaboration within regional countries, an important step has 
been taken by ASEAN in developing external counter-terrorism allies. ASEAN 
countries signed a Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism with the 
U.S on August 1, 2002.
1254
 The outline of this agreement was in line with the U.S 
policy on the „war on terrorism‟, as Southeast Asia is regarded as the second front in 
the war on terrorism.
1255
  The ASEAN-US bilateral relationship was signed in Bandar 
Seri Begawan, with the main objective of improving intelligence sharing and 
collaboration among their law enforcement agencies, to provide assistance on border 
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surveillance, immigration and financial issues and also to comply with the UN 
resolutions on terrorism.
1256
     
  
ASEAN also sought a strategic partnership with China on a broad range of issues. A 
joint declaration with China on non-traditional security issues was signed at the Sixth 
ASEAN-China Summit in November 2002. Furthermore, the first informal ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime plus China (AMMTC+China) 
Consultation meeting took place in November 2005 in Hanoi, Vietnam to boost 
cooperation against transnational crime and terrorism.
1257
  
 
ASEAN also developed an understanding with three East Asian countries to combat 
transnational crime. ASEAN+3, which include China, Japan and Korea, was founded 
in 1997. A special meeting on countering terrorism and establishing cooperation at an 
international level to combat transnational crime took place in Bangkok in January 
2004.
1258
 For outer continent collaboration, the ASEAN-EU ministerial meeting was 
initiated in Brussels on January 27-28, 2003.
1259
 A Joint Declaration on Cooperation 
to Combat Terrorism with the main objective of fighting terrorism and sharing 
information about international terrorist networks was signed at the Fourteenth 
ASEAN-EU meeting, in line with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
related to terrorism, in particular resolution 1373 (2001), 1377 (2001) and 1390 
(2002).
1260
  
 
For decades, ASEAN has faced a number of challenges in responding to terrorism and 
transnational crime. These challenges have been tackled through ASEAN‟s traditional 
approach to security, based on comprehensive security and resilience. Terrorism and 
transnational crimes primarily remain domestic sources of instability for ASEAN 
countries. At the multilateral level, we have seen the adoption of a common rhetorical 
stand, the setting up of frameworks of cooperation and action and the engagement of 
                                                 
1256
 Op. Cit., ASEAN. (2002d). 
1257
 ASEAN (Producer). (2002e, 05 November 2008) Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Co-Operation between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China Podcast retrieved from 
http://www.aseansec.org/13196.htm.  
1258
 Op. Cit., Emmers, R. (2007), p. 16.  
1259
 ASEAN. (2003b). Joint Declaration on Co-operation to Combat Terrorism. Brussels: Secretariat 
of ASEAN Countries. 
1260
 Ibid.  
 233 
 
dialogue partners. Nowadays, ASEAN is regarded as a platform for cooperation and a 
regional voice on the issue of terrorism and transnational crime at the international 
level. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
Countering radicalism is not easy, especially when dealing with various backgrounds 
and understandings of Islam among the Muslim population. Winning the battle of 
ideas will be an uphill task if the root causes of worldwide Muslim grievances are not 
addressed. For years the uneven foreign policy of the U.S towards Muslim countries 
has contributed to the backlashes and vendettas. Inconsistent policy undertaken by the 
US towards the Middle East, especially in its tendency to support Israel rather than 
address all of the underlying issues, can sometimes seem like a war on Islam, 
especially in the eyes of radical Muslims.  
 
Muslims worldwide share a deep sense of frustration over the injustice experienced 
across Muslim societies.
1261
 Millions of people in the Middle East perceive 
themselves as victims of America‟s uneven policies. History has shown that the 
superpower and its allies have supported undemocratic regimes such as Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq and the military administration in Algeria.  
 
According to Audrey Cronin (2004), work in the field of radical Islamism and 
religious terrorism in general suffers from a knowledge gap.
1262
 Because the 
phenomenon of religious terrorism crosses so many academic fields including 
political science, sociology, psychology, theology, economics, anthropology, history, 
law and international relations, it creates a challenge to academicians unaccustomed 
to collaborating. As Cronin points out, “the distinctive perspectives and modes of 
research engaged in by scholars in each of those disciplines have led most to rely on 
the familiar perspective and long-established arguments that are prevalent in each 
field”.1263   
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A strategic step has been taken by the Malaysian government in overcoming domestic 
militant ideology. The declaration of Malaysia as an Islamic state was regarded as the 
main tool in overcoming radical ideology. In late 2002, former Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohammad declared Malaysia an Islamic state, despite strong resistance 
from opposition parties. The Democratic Action Party (DAP), a Chinese dominated 
opposition party, said Malaysia should be a secular country and remain so forever.
1264
  
 
Further, the largest Malay Muslim opposition party, Partai Islam Semalaysia (PAS), 
claimed the Islamic country declared by the Mahathir regime was not in fact Islamic 
as it strayed too far from the true meaning of Islam. This declaration was politically 
motivated rather than intended to establish a true Islamic country, as claimed by PAS 
leaders.
1265
  
 
KMM and JI members have never recognized Malaysia as an Islamic country. They 
believe what was done by the Mahathir administration was only for political gain and 
did not benefit all Muslims. KMM still believes the that „election system‟ is the most 
effective tool for achieving their target of an Islamic state in Malaysia. However, JI 
strongly opposes the idea of democracy and believes that Jihad is the only way to 
establish an Islamic state and later an Islamic caliphate. They follow the belief that 
any country in the world, including Malaysia and Indonesia, which does not practice 
total Islamic Law as written in al-Quran and as-Sunnah should be attacked and 
sabotaged  and that any terrorist means should be used against these countries until 
they come to agree and abide by the Islamic Law.    
 
However, the war on terrorism is not an easy task; the threat still exists. Dealing with 
radical ideology remains the biggest challenge for all parties involved in countering 
terrorism. It is a difficult task to eliminate the radical ideology that has fed JI and 
KMM members for many years. Radical thinking came about through extreme 
education by Pondok or Madrasah (Islamic boarding schools) either in Indonesia, 
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Malaysia, India or Pakistan. Militant training and extremist preaching by Mujahidin in 
Afghanistan has also contributed to the establishment of radical ideology.  
 
Understanding the core problems in Islamic communities, the bases of political Islam 
and the roots of radicalism and extremism is crucial to tackling this problem.
1266
  
Radicalism and militant ideology cannot be eliminated if governments inside and 
outside the region are not willing to understand the fundamental issues. For example, 
radical Muslims in Southern Thailand clearly have no relation to terrorism; their 
struggle lies with patriotism and re-establishing the Malay-Pattani Kingdom. To 
generalize militant activities in Southeast Asia as being the same as militant activities 
in Afghanistan or the Middle East is overly simplistic because the roots of the struggle 
are different.   
 
There should be a distinction between moderate and extreme Islam in order to aid the 
identification of radical Muslims. Moderate Muslim majority countries in the region, 
such as Malaysia and Brunei, have shown their ability to assimilate with the current 
situation and to be rational about many issues. The majority of Muslims in this region 
hold moderate beliefs and wish for peace and harmony. Only a small number of 
Muslims are involved in terrorist activities. However, violent activities carried out by 
these individuals tarnish the image of all Muslims and create misconceptions about 
the true nature of Islam.  
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Chapter VII- 
CONCLUSION 
 
To understand the threat, it is of prime importance to be cognizant of the ideology and 
roots of Talibanization [radicalization]. It is clear that Talibanization [radicalization] 
lays less in Islam and more in the reconstruction of Islam for political purposes. 
Particularly important is the concept of Jihad, which has been extensively 
manipulated by Islamists to declare war on political enemies and justify any means to 
institute the supposed Islamic ends.
1267
 
 
 
 
6.1 Research Outcomes 
From my research, several outcomes have emerged:   
 
First, KMM had strong connections with JI. This connection was consolidated by 
KMM in the Klang valley section, also known as KMMM (K3M). K3M is regarded 
more left-wing than KMM, and was influenced by Darul Islam's (DI) top leaders 
Sungkar and Ba‟asyir, as well as Hambali and Abu Jibril. K3M was led by Zulkifli 
Khir, based in Puchong, Selangor. These Indonesian clerics were regularly invited by 
Zulkifli Khir to attend their weekly and monthly meetings to give ceramah (sermons) 
and handle Usrah. Extreme and radical interpretations of Jihad were also discussed 
broadly at these branch (wakalah) meetings.  
 
The evidence for this was discussed in chapter four. Veterans of Afghanistan, such as 
Zulkifli Khir, Adnan Daud, Zainuri Kamarudin, Azian Abdul Rahman, Murad 
Halimuddin and Zainon Ismail, who are KMM members, played a crucial role in 
shaping this wakalah for their extreme activities. KMM did not have a similar desire 
to establish Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) as JI, but they shared the aim of an Islamic 
state and to wage Jihad regardless of place or time. From that point, K3M always 
sought advice and guidance from JI members for every planned operation. In addition 
to operations, KMM members were also sheltered by their JI counterparts after 
fleeing to Indonesia.  
 
                                                 
1267
 Singh, B. (2007). The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamists 
Extremists. West port: Praeger Security International, p. 16. 
 237 
 
Second, Luqmanul Hakiem Islamic School (LHIS) was a feeder for the new 
generation of NII fighters. Evidence for this was illustrated in chapter four while 
explaining the role of JI in Malaysia. The idea of establishing LHIS came from 
Sungkar and Ba‟asyir, with the main objective of securing a wider platform of support 
for NII in the region. LHIS copied the system implemented at Ba‟asyir and Sungkar‟s 
institution, Pondok al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Indonesia.     
 
LHIS was also used as an Indonesian immigrant boarding school by illegal Indonesian 
immigrants. These immigrants included illegal workers and others who came to 
Malaysia in 1985 with the Sungkar and Ba‟asyir contingent to avoid the harsh 
treatment of the Suharto regime. JI members in Malaysia believed that the next 
generation of JI followers should be educated to follow the principles of salafi and 
should be ready for the Islamic caliphate they were working towards; the answer was 
LHIS.  
 
Third, the crack-down by the Malaysian government foiled all of the planned JI and 
KMM attacks. The evidence for this was explained in chapters three and four; the 
crackdown in Malaysia followed by further raids in Indonesia and Singapore 
completely paralyzed this militant movement. Thus, there was a domino effect 
following the Malaysia breakthrough, with a series of arrests in Malaysia, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Cambodia and Pakistan between 2002 and 2006. 
More than 300 JI, ASG, MILF and KMM members in this region were arrested, and 
some were killed. A number of crackdowns and arrests of JI‟s key leaders and its 
affiliated groups gravely disrupted its activities.  
 
KMM had plans for future attacks including bombings in several locations, the 
assassination of targeted individuals, especially those who had become „apostate‟, and 
the attack of non-Muslim worship sites. However, police investigations resulted in a 
series of arrests of KMM members. A number of KMM's hard-core members also left 
for Indonesia to avoid arrest. This situation significantly weakened KMM activities 
and caused them to abandon planned violent attacks.  
 
Fourth was the declaration of Malaysia as an “Islamic state” to encounter the militant 
ideology. The writer gave evidence for this in chapter five while clarifying the main 
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elements that fostered the development of militant organizations in Malaysia. The 
main objective of KMM and JI was to establish an Islamic caliphate. Mahathir‟s 
administration believed that if Malaysia was already practicing all of the criteria for 
being an Islamic country, these radical groups had nothing to fight for. Thus, 
declaring Malaysia an Islamic country denied these terrorist groups their original aim.   
 
 
Fifth, the government made the mistake of linking all KMM members to violence and 
criminal activities. Many of the KMM branches were not involved in radical activities 
– the key exceptions being the Selangor and Kuala Lumpur branches, otherwise 
known as K3M. All KMM members were detained under the ISA for between three to 
seven years without trial. Regardless of the degree of violence and crime they were 
involved in, only one type of punishment was ordered – that of being placed into a 
detention camp. There was no differentiation between individuals. As long as they 
were connected to KMM they were detained under the ISA. Evidence of this, was 
discussed in chapter three; the list of KMM, JI and DIS detainees is printed in 
appendix 1, 2 and 3 on pages 241-257.    
 
The authorities have used the ISA to solve all problems related to radical thinking. 
However a more mature and rational measure should be developed to avoid such 
unfair treatment in the future. KMM members should be given a fair and open trial in 
court. For those who have committed crimes of a higher level, a harsh punishment 
should be meted out.  Those who simply acted as followers should receive a lighter 
punishment. Their intentions and plans for bombings and attacks should be outlined 
through an open court and a „Restricted Order‟ (RO) can be implemented to monitor 
members‟ movements, and to prevent them from regrouping. Rehabilitation 
programmes are also an important part of the de-radicalization process that must be 
constantly carried out.        
 
Sixth, there is no connection between KMM and Southern Thailand operatives. 
However, KMM and Southern Thailand operatives‟ struggle has been more politically 
motivated as their long term vision is to establish the Daulah Islamiyah. Opposing 
voices within both governments were important in differentiating the struggle 
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between these groups. Evidence and a broader discussion of this were dealt with in 
chapter two.  
 
 Insurgency in Southern Thailand concerns the group of people who are descendents 
of the Pattani kingdom. These people are fighting for their own government and 
autonomy. They have no connection to either KMM or JI. KMM was in touch with a 
few Southerners regarding arms supplies, but they never discussed military training or 
joint operations. Al-Qaeda made contact through JI, with Southern Thailand Afghan 
veterans to organize the opening of new branches, to provide funds and to carry out 
joint operations. However this idea was rejected by Abdul Fatah, the Afghan alumni 
representative who also has strong connections with the separatists. Since then, 
Southern Thailand insurgencies have operated more in the domestic political sphere 
rather than in tandem with any Muslim network 
 
Seventh, regards concerns about a significant connection between KMM, JI and the 
MILF in the Southern Philippines. Although KMM and JI have no direct contact with 
Southern Thailand separatists strong networking between KMM and JI with MILF 
has been recorded since the 1990s. Mindanao was the MILF base used by KMM and 
JI as an alternative „medan Jihad‟ (Jihad centre) and strategic military and guerrilla 
training centre. JI also established Hudaibiyah and Abu Bakar camps in collaboration 
with MILF. I have given evidence of these connections in chapter three; the indirect 
link between KMM and MILF is also discussed in chapters two and four.   
 
The KMM leader, Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz, was in direct contact with the MILF 
chief, Salamat Hashim for training opportunities and expertise exchanges. KMM also 
intended on establishing its own Jihadi camps in Southern Philippines as an 
alternative, after Jihadist camps in Afghanistan were closed. However, this project 
was abandoned because of logistic and funding constraints. JI played a significant role 
in the Southern Philippines conflict and remained a safe haven for those on the run. 
The political situation and geographic location near a mass of small Islands made 
Mindanao important for the flourishing militancy in Southeast Asia.        
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Eighth, there is the potential for future political violence in Malaysia. JI and KMM 
have clearly shown their ability to work together to create chaos in the country.  There 
is a strong possibility they might re-group and act as before. Radicalism could return 
to Malaysia depending on the political situation. An explanation about possible future 
violence and militancy in Malaysia was discussed in chapter four.      
 
Recent political turmoil and changes have created the potential for radicalism to gain 
increased strength. Political instability and ethnic tension are common in 
contemporary Malaysia. The voices that ask for rights and ethnic equality are being 
raised more than ever before. Freedom of speech and the right to assemble as 
provided by Abdullah Badawi‟s administration has created uncertainty in the country. 
Religious conflict has started to flourish again in Malaysia, especially following 
Mahathir's autocratic administrative style, which ended in 2003.  
  
 
Ninth, KMM and JI were a product of the Afghan war and the roots of a regional 
Islamic political struggle. Afghanistan was a major militant „education centre‟ and 
also helped groups such as JI gain political strength. Then, Mujahidin with all its 
militant knowledge and experience spread and widened their struggle. Their fight is 
now not just in opposition to Israel in Palestine or Russia in Afghanistan, but it is 
against every country that does not implement Syariah law as their basic legal system. 
Therefore, countries in the region, including Malaysia, are under the constant threat of 
a struggle to re-establish an Islamic caliphate. Evidence and a broader discussion 
about this were discussed in chapters three and four.  
 
Tenth, the main conclusion of my research is that the Malaysian Government and by 
implication all South East Asia Governments need to set aside „political space‟1268 for 
Muslim groups who develop a radical stance or who threaten to do so and to give 
them a voice so that their political agendas and opinions may be heard and evaluated 
by other Muslims and non-Muslims and by the Government itself. A failure to do this 
may well result in the radicals becoming militant and in giving them an even more 
influential voice in the community-and eventually in the country and in the region. 
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 241 
 
And militancy will continue to threaten the stability of government, in the process of 
de-radicalizing such groups in positive ways will be lost, and the violence may never 
end. 
 
In relation to radicalism in Malaysia, the writer showed this happened because the 
political landscape of the ruling government through UMNO –MCA-MIC dominated 
the political system. Opponent Malaysian, Chinese and Indian minorities do not enjoy 
the same level of political authority. Moreover, the government also tried to destroy 
two political party-systems that could lead to more objections. Every minority has its 
own voice that needs to be heard and to be part of the process in finding a solution. If 
not, it will delay a resolution to the problem. A government that dominates and rules 
without being challenged encourages the growth of radicalism, especially from 
extremist Malaysian Muslims.        
 
In conclusion, in spite of the difficulties in defining terrorism, the standard methods of 
empirical enquiry can help the identification of threats to public order and assist in the 
formulation of appropriate responses. Countering militant Islam using every potential 
tool is needed regardless of how long it takes. Strong efforts have to be taken by all 
countries in order to win the „war on terror‟. Positive results might not come instantly, 
but the effort must continue. For KMM and JI, their mission to establish an Islamic 
caliphate is related to the success of militant Muslim activities. Their struggle through 
violence and not via the electoral process should not be permitted.  
 
The majority of Muslims in this region remain tolerant of others, including non-
Muslims. Only some people from particular groups such as KMM and JI were 
involved in violence and militant activities, but not the majority. Most Muslims are 
strongly opposed to the use of violence and terrorist activities in order to gain political 
power. The signs of militancy and violence that have overwhelmed Malaysia and 
Southeast Asian countries have instead encouraged Muslims to work harder towards 
peace. This new phenomenon has also increased the distribution of discourse on the 
issues of civilization and religion, democracy and human rights.  
 
The future stability of this region will depend on Southeast Asian countries being 
conscious of the need to foster continued economic development and education, and 
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to address the perceived inequities in religion and language that continue to exist. It 
will also be contingent on Southeast Asian countries maintaining a positive border 
relationship and ensuring that radical groups are prevented from exploiting its porous 
territory. The region‟s stability is determined by the effectiveness of internal security. 
The real danger posed by radical Muslims is not from al-Qaeda, which has only a few 
cells in place, but from other local Islamic parties or groups that continue to campaign 
aggressively for the enforcement of Islamic Law and an Islamic State through the use 
of violence on innocent civilians. The questions that arise are about the different ways 
Muslims think their religion should be lived out in the modern world. The following 
section deals with what I call Muslim and Islam.               
 
6.2 The Muslim and Islam  
Islam is not homogeneous and is streamed by different strands some of these are 
culture based and country specific like Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Arab states of the 
Gulf area. Some strands and standpoints are influenced by local factors like in 
Indonesia-where culture for example has affected the Islam of the Javanese making 
the outcome problematic for those Indonesian Muslims influenced by Arab Islam-say 
from the Yemen. Some strands are influenced by the existence of non- Muslim 
minorities- as is the case with Malaysia where there is a 60-40 split between the 
Muslim and the non-Muslim population. Problems with the perceptions of Islam are 
widely held. At least five categories of different perceptions have been noted by 
scholars. 
 
First, there are Muslims who think of Islam as a comprehensive way of life.
1269
 Islam 
should be practiced in kaffah (total) and followers cannot choose only parts of it or to 
only adopt the aspects they like. Islam should not differentiate between politics, 
social, law and society.
1270
 It must be implemented in every aspect of life, regardless 
of where and who the Muslims are.
1271
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Second, there are groups who strongly oppose any ideological influences from 
Western countries. Modernization is equated with Westernization by this group, 
regardless of whether it has a positive or negative impact.
1272
 Ideologies that do not 
originate from Muslim scholars are seen as a threat to the Muslim community. Most 
of these ideologies were associated with materialistic and secular thinking which do 
not correlate to Islamic values.
1273
 Islam must be in line with „the true path‟ revealed 
by Prophet Muhammad centuries ago and not follow the ideology of non Muslims, 
especially that of Christians. Muslims from this group relate modernization to tools of 
Christianity which could lead them into the path of „deviance‟.1274       
 
Third, there are Muslims who advocate a return to Islam.
1275
 They accuse Muslim 
societies today as having diverted from the “trueness” of Islam (in the eyes of this 
group). Muslims today are involved in many non-Islamic activities, either in practice 
or in ideology, and most of them follow the Western style of life, which in the eyes of 
this group involves immoral activities. Muslims should understand and be clear about 
Islam and always work to find the “right” path within their religion.1276 As a result, 
either by preaching or joining this group, Islam can be placed in the “right” position to 
make sure it is sustained in the future.  
 
Fourth, there are those who advocate the Shari`ah law for all Muslim societies, 
especially in Islamic countries.
1277
 Most Islamic countries have been colonized by 
European powers since the 15
th
 century. Since then, not only the education, social and 
political system, but also the law has been copied from the colonial system of 
legislation. This group wishes to remove colonial influence. For example, Malaysia 
copied British law and Indonesia Dutch law; both are not Islamic by practice and have 
been shaped by elements other than key Islamic principles. This group advocates 
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Islamic law as an alternative with Hudud and Qisas (Shari`ah Law) as a core in 
society, which must be obeyed by both Muslims and non-Muslims.
1278
  
 
Fifth, are those that advocate the „competent organization.1279 Only well structured 
and wisely managed organizations will be successful in growing their followers and 
expanding their influence.
1280
 Most radical Islamic groups such as JI and KMM as 
well as al-Qaeda formed their organization with strong and systematic administration. 
Well-structured groups attract people to join and to work together to achieve 
objectives. Regardless of the size of the group, when it comes to educating and 
increasing followers, competent groups will succeed over those that are unorganized. 
Consequently, radical ideology will be implemented through Usrah (small discussion 
group); but first followers must believe in their organization.
1281
 
 
Clarifying these perceptions is important for the success of radical groups such as 
KMM and JI, especially if they wish to gain support and sympathy from a large 
number of people. Once their followers believe in their methods and objectives they 
are one step closer to achieving the group‟s political agenda. However, the U.S 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as the expansion on the war on terror into Pakistan, 
the Yemen, the Sudan and Somalia and the hostile relationship between Palestine and 
Israel, Islam-Christian conflict and the economic imbalance between the West and the 
developing countries contributed to the growth in popularity that has accompanied the 
emergence of Islamic-based radical groups. The question that is highlighted in the 
issue that has risen the part of this thesis is the question of why radical Islam did rise 
when it did in Malaysia. The question that highlights the issue of this thesis centres on 
why radical Islam arose in Malaysia when it did. This can now be answered through 
the analysis and discussion of this thesis. 
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6.3 Why Did Radical Islam Rise in Malaysia? 
Some prominent elements of radicalism existed in Malaysia to foster the development 
of an organization like KMM. The political centrality of Islam, sometimes in the more 
radical brand was common in parts of the Middle East and Central Asia, and has been 
observed as a growing phenomenon in this region in more recent years. Since the 
Islamic resurgence of the early 1980s and 1990s, elements of a more radical political 
Islam have migrated from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. Although traces of these 
radical elements in this region currently appear only at the margins, if left unchecked 
they can exaggerate a number of existing security and political crises.
1282
 But consider 
the following factors with refers to Malaysia: 
 
First, is the search to define the „pristine‟ aspect of religion. Most militants, 
especially KMM and JI members, were faced with an „empty soul‟ and needed to be 
filled with something pristine and pure. Therefore they tried to find “pure Islam”, and 
to search for a leader with “special knowledge” of Islam1283. Sometimes they found 
this leader, and they become involved in a movement which is what happened with 
KMM.
1284
 This group was shaped by individuals who gained practical Jihad 
experience in Afghanistan and fostered close ties with al Qaeda.  
 
Second, is what the writer calls the „Strategic Station‟.1285 Historically, Malaysia has 
been an important trade centre since the 13
th
 century. The Malacca sultanate 
developed a good rapport with traders and built a great harbour for trading and 
business centuries ago.
1286
 This sultanate has had strong ties with many countries 
during this time such as the Ottoman-Empire, Srivijaya and the Chinese Emperor.
1287
 
Today, Malaysia is one of the “owners” of the Malacca Straits and is situated between 
East and West in the centre of Asia. This situation has attracted many parties 
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including, international criminal rings, which look at Malaysia as one of the great 
offshore hubs for traders.
1288
 It only takes a small step for crime to shift to militancy 
and violence to militant terrorism.  
 
Third, the Malaysian government has declared itself a Muslim State has been lenient 
in its granting of visas to Muslims from other countries.
1289
 Malaysia wants to be 
recognized as the most modern and liberal Islamic country in the Muslim world and 
as a bridge between the West and the Muslim world. Muslims are welcomed to see 
and feel modernization in the context of the Islamization which has been implemented 
in Malaysia. Not surprisingly the context of Malaysia has also strengthened its 
national identity as a Malay Muslim country, especially in regard to the Chinese and 
Indian minority ethnicities. Malaysia has also played a significant role in spreading 
Islam on a national and international level. However, these factors have provided  
fertile ground for radicalism and militancy to flourish.
1290
  
 
Fourth, Malaysia has also attracted radical Muslims because of the anti-west policy 
stance of its long time Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (1983-2004). Mahathir 
repeatedly expressed his ideas about the inharmonious relationships between western 
and Islamic countries.
1291
 He criticized western countries on various occasions, 
specifically with regard to the U.S policy against Palestine,
1292
 and was well known 
for his „Look East‟ campaign launched during the early stages of his tenure as 
Malaysia‟s fourth Prime Minister.1293 He successfully shifted Malaysia from being 
dependant on a Western-style economic system from the 18
th
 century to the more 
contemporary Eastern-style, which created a disciplined work-force and economic 
growth that can be seen in countries such as Japan, Taiwan and Korea. However, this 
kind of policy was exploited by radical Muslims, who established their networks in 
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Malaysia. The anti-West policy implemented by Mahathir was in line with their 
militant ideology.
1294
     
 
Fifth, was the influence of the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
1295
  This revolution was 
recognized as a „wake up call‟ and as a catalyst for Muslims worldwide to institute 
reform.
1296
 Not only did it exert powerful influences on other Islamic insurgencies, it 
transformed the Muslim imagination regarding what was politically possible using 
innovative Islamic discourse articulated in this case by Ayatollah Khomeini.
1297
 
Malaysian students studying in Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt and Syria 
were influenced by this revolution. Most of them returned wanting to make changes 
and implement Islamic values in all aspects of their lives.  Indeed, the „revolution‟ 
factor has proved a unifying influence and focal point for the rallying of armed 
resistance against government, for example in Acheh in Indonesia, Mindanao in the 
Southern Philippines and Patani in southern Thailand.
1298
 Inspired by the Iranian 
revolution, the Malaysian radical movements began to emerge in the 1980s, 
1299
 but 
their political ambitions were thwarted by the Malaysian government, which claimed 
to be an Islamic State. 
 
Sixth, was the strong connection between Malaysia and some Middle Eastern 
countries. Osama bin Laden who is the „Boss‟ of the al-Qaeda Company has shown 
he has strong ties in many Southeast Asia countries.
1300
 Al-Qaeda has bank accounts 
and a number of „radical projects‟ in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia 
and Singapore. Al-Qaeda has comfortably and conveniently operated here.
1301
 Many 
who graduated from the „Afghan War‟ came back and continued this ideology. 
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Afghan veterans were obviously well trained in the use of arms and guerrilla 
tactics.
1302
 Al-Qaeda has looked at this as a worthwhile connection and later became a 
fringe group encouraging this militancy.   
 
To develop these points further requires more work than the regulations for this thesis 
permit. So I will conclude in the following way: 
 
As I have shown that Malaysia was in fact the hub for radical Islam in Southeast Asia 
in the period that lead up to the events of 9/11 in the US and its immediate aftermath, 
until attention shifted to Indonesia following the first Bali bombing in October 2002. I 
have also shown that the role of Kumpulan Militan Malaysia in the context of radical 
Islam in Malaysia, and the links it developed with JI and individuals from al-Qaeda, 
provided the core influence for militant Islam that subsequently spread across 
Southeast Asia. It was only with the intervention of the Royal Malaysian Police 
(RMP) and security services presumably acting on the advice of the government that 
this influence came to an end. 
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Appendix 22: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Luqmanul Haqiem Islamic School (LHIS) is located at Jalan Rabbani, Batu 18, Sungai Redan, 
Kampung Sungai Tiram, Johor Bahru, Johor Malaysia.  
Photo: Author. 
 
 
Appendix 23: 
 
 
 
The logo of LHIS, painted on the wall of the main building, includes the motto  
Beriman, Berilmu, Beramal (Faith, Knowledge, and Practice).  
Photo: Author.     
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Appendix 24: 
 
 
 
 
Unfinished female toilets were abandoned after LHIS was closed down by  
Malaysian government in 2001.       
Photo: Author.     
 
 
Appendix 25: 
 
 
 
The picture shows Putera (Male) classrooms at ground level and the hostel on the second floor.  
A multi-purpose court was located on the middle of the building for exercise and outdoor games. 
Photo: Author. 
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Appendix 26: 
 
 
 
Dispersed documents and files were found at the office after it was raided by Malaysian police in 2001. 
Some of the documents were taken away by police as case exhibits  
Photo: Author.     
 
Appendix 27: 
 
 
 
Female classes were located behind Respondent G‟s house. He also acted as a student warden, along 
with his wife who was a canteen supervisor.    
Photo: Author.     
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Appendix 28: 
 
 
 
There was alternative access to LHIS from Respondent G‟s house at Jalan Rabbani,  
Kampung Sungai Tiram, Johor Bahru  
Photo: Author.     
 
 
Appendix 29: 
 
 
 
LHIS Surau, once a main centre for student‟s activities, is now being used by the  
surrounding community for daily prayers 
Photo: Author.     
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Appendix 30: 
 
 
 
Bilik Tamu (visitor‟s room) is located in the main building close to Surau, making it convenient for 
visitors to perform prayers and deliver lectures.  Once, Mukhlas and Paridah‟s house was 
located on the second floor of this building.     
Photo: Author.     
 
Appendix 31: 
 
 
 
A Bilik Buku Teks (Textbook room) was also located in the main building to provide students with 
books that were suitable and met with the requirements set by the Jabatan Agama Islam  
Johor (Johor Islamic Department).     
Photo: Author.     
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Appendix 32: 
 
 
 
Instead of government syllabus books, LHIS had many Arabic books that were donated by  
Sheikhs from the Middle East 
Photo: Author.     
 
 
Appendix 33: 
 
 
 
Training fields which were provided for Puteras with platform for presentation.  LHIS students were 
exposed to martial arts training as well as spiritual and mental training.     
Photo: Author.     
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Appendix 34: 
 
 
 
This female playground was completed sometime in 1995 to provide an exercise area for students. 
Most of the funds came from donations from JI Singapore cell members.     
Photo: Author.     
 
 
Appendix 35: 
 
 
 
The playground in the female section, complete with slides and swings was also used  
by LHIS kindergarten children.     
Photo: Author.     
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Appendix 36: 
 
 
 
Only male students were allowed to move in their sections and to learn in the  
classes located in their area.     
Photo: Author.     
 
 
Appendix 37: 
 
 
 
Female classrooms were constructed by Jemaah members with assistance  
from surrounding people.     
Photo: Author.     
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Appendix 38: 
 
 
 
Sewing, knitting, and cooking classes were provided for female students at the Bengkel Kratangan 
(Craft Workshop) organized by Jemaah‟s wives.      
Photo: Author.     
 
 
Appendix 39: 
 
 
 
Musolla or a prayer hall for Puteris was located in the middle of the female section and was used for 
Quran and Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) classes  
Photo: Author.     
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Appendix 40: 
 
 
 
Boeng Kok‟ Mosque was among the sites regularly visited by Hambali during his exile in  
Cambodia between 2000 and 2001 
Photo: Author.     
 
 
Appendix 41: 
 
 
 
A private Islamic boarding school in Southern Thailand was accused of being a private-run militant 
training base. Many Ustazs in this kind of school disappeared, believed to have been 
kidnapped by militants or by the government backed military. 
Photo: Author.      
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Appendix 42: 
 
 
 
 
Maahad Ihyaussunnah al-Muhammadiyyah at Sadao town was one of the modern private Islamic 
boarding schools partly funded by government.      
Photo: Author.     
 
Appendix 43: 
 
 
 
 
The Islamic Committee of Satun in Southern Thailand played a significant role in establishing 
networks between the Muslim community and the Thailand government, as well as 
developing a better understanding between Muslims and Buddhists.     
Photo: Author.     
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